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1.1 Scope of the Thesis
The research in this thesis deals with utilizing operationsresearch and simulation techniques to model and solve
some interesting stochastic problems which are complex in nature. Two of these problems are applications in
energy and economics in relation to modeling generation capacity investments in deregulated electricity mar-
kets, which have gained a lot of attention since the restructu ing of electricity markets towards decentralization.
Another particular group of problems is highly relevant formanufacturing and inventory control in relation to
applications in stochastic fluid systems.
One most commonly used modeling approach in this thesis is the utilization ofoptimization problems. De-
velopment of efficient solution algorithms and high speed computers has made optimization problems (e.g.,
linear and nonlinear programs) attractive and widely-usedto solve various decision making problems. An
optimization problem is generally a problem of one decisionmaker. One may also be interested in solving op-
timization problems involving two or more decision makers simultaneously. We then speak of anequilibrium
problemand the solution of the corresponding problem is called anequilibrium. The concept of equilibrium,
as introduced by John Forbes Nash (Nash (1950)) in noncooperative game theory, plays a central role in eco-
nomics. Operations Research theory and techniques have also been extensively utilized for analyzing and
solving various types of equilibrium problems in the literature (e.g., Karamadian (1971), Harker and Pang
(1990), Harker (1993), Ferris and Pang (1997), Ferris and Kanzow (2002), Facchinei and Pang (2003)). Many
problems in engineering and economics can be formulated as equilibrium problems. An excellent overview of
how this is accomplished is given by Ferris and Pang (1997).
One of the most interesting and recent applications of equilibri m problems in economics include electric-
ity markets which have experienced significant changes towards deregulation and competition with the aim of
improving economic efficiency. In this thesis, we mainly focus on the modeling of generation capacity in-
vestments in deregulated electricity markets. We utilize the theory of equilibrium and equilibrium problems
to model the behavior of both competitive and strategic generators in electricity markets. Utilizing theory and
applications of equilibrium problems in electricity markets, the scope of this thesis also falls in the intersection
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of operations research and noncooperative game theory.
Under the old-style vertically integrated monopoly structure of electricity markets before deregulation,
prices were regulated and set to cover total costs and hence enable the utility to finance investment. In the
ideal situation of a well-managed regime, this correspondsto utilizing a single optimization problem (which
fitted well with the regulated monopoly regime with a centralplanner) to identify optimal planning and op-
eration of electricity systems. Since deregulation, the power generation sector has operated in a competitive
environment where electricity prices are set by an unregulated wholesale market. Similarly, investments in
power generation is no longer done by a central planner and are left to market participants responding to cur-
rent and expected market prices. Thus, long term planning ofpower generation capacity may suffer from
uncertainty and imperfections in the short-term (e.g., dayahead and real time) operation of electricity markets.
This has raised the concern about incentives to invest in generation capacity in the literature as well as among
policy makers since deregulation of electricity markets. Many authors argue that low and volatile spot market
prices in current energy-only markets, reflecting short-run marginal costs and constrained by low price caps,
may not provide adequate incentives for sufficient generation capacity investments (e.g., Stoft (2002), Cramton
and Stoft (2005), Joskow (2007), Joskow (2008)).
Additional market mechanisms may be designed by regulatorsto eliminate the imperfections which reduce
the incentives in investments. We assess three examples of these market mechanisms under perfect compe-
tition: an energy-only electricity market with VOLL pricing (reflecting the value of lost load (VOLL), see
Stoft (2002)), an electricity market with an additional forward capacity market (e.g., Cramton and Stoft (2005),
Hobbs et al. (2007), Joskow (2008)), and an electricity market with operating-reserve pricing (e.g., Stoft (2002),
Hogan (2005), Hogan (2009)). We elaborate on both how these market mechanisms can be represented by math-
ematical models and the assessment of equilibrium for generation capacity investments under different market
designs when future spot market conditions are not known in advance (i.e., under demand uncertainty). Under
each market design, the investment decisions of generatorsre formulated as a two-stage equilibrium problem
where generation capacities are installed in the first stageand generation takes place in future spot market at the
second stage. We emphasize the link between optimization and equilibrium problems and show that, regarding
the problem of generation capacity investments in perfectly competitive electricity markets, the equilibrium
problems of most of these market mechanism can be cast as optimization problems (e.g., (non)linear programs,
two-stage stochastic programs). In particular, this result indicates the prevalence of optimization problems,
which are fast and efficient to solve, for providing solutions to stochastic equilibrium models of real world
systems with uncertainty. This result also suggests that anequilibrium of a single-stage model (so calledopen
loop model) in which investment and operation decisions are made simultaneously coincides with an equilib-
rium of a two-stage model (so calledclosed loop model) where investment and operation decisions are made
sequentially. In one case of these market mechanisms, namely op rating reserve pricing, we cannot cast the
corresponding equilibrium problem as an optimization problem.
We also consider a closed loop model of strategic generatorsfacing uncertain demand and anticipating
perfectly competitive spot market outcomes when they choose their generation capacities, in which case an
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equilibrium of the closed loop model does not coincide with an equilibrium of the less complicated open loop
model as shown by Wogrin et al. (2012). In general, such closed loop models can be formulated as an equi-
librium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) and examples have been posed in the literature that have
multiple or no equilibria (e.g., Hu (2003), Ehrenmann (2004), Hu and Ralph (2007), Gabriel et al. (2012)). This
indicates that an equilibrium for the corresponding two-stage game may not exist or, if exists, it is in general
not unique. Therefore, it is of interest for users of these models to know general sets of conditions under which
solutions exist and are unique so that they can have confidence in the solutions before solving such compli-
cated closed loop models. Thus, establishing general sets of conditions for existence and uniqueness enhances
the value of such models for policy and market intelligence purposes. The existence and uniqueness of the
closed loop equilibrium in electricity markets has been extensively discussed in the literature under various
assumptions (e.g., competition in quantities or prices, price-demand relations, number of firms in the market,
symmetric or asymmetric costs of firms etc.). Among these, Krps and Scheinkman (1983), Gabszewicz and
Poddar (1997), Murphy and Smeers (2005), and Grimm and Zoettl (2008) focus on the equilibrium of genera-
tion capacity investments in the context of addressing longterm aspects of market power. In this thesis, we also
establish sufficient conditions which guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the closed loop equilibrium for
the generation capacity investments of strategic generators in electricity markets. Our analysis is done under a
broader scope in terms of the underlying price-demand relations, the assumed demand uncertainty with a broad
class of continuous distributions, and any finite number of generators with symmetric or asymmetric costs.
Despite the impressive advances in mathematical modeling,some complex systems are well beyond the
capabilities of being represented with explicit mathematical expressions. Even when it is plausible to formulate
a proper mathematical model, the resulting optimization problem may prove too complex for available solution
algorithms. An alternative approach to modeling complex systems issimulation. In simulation models, the
relation between the input (e.g., parameter) and output (e.g., performance measure) need not to be stated ex-
plicitly. Instead, the system is represented by componentssuch asentities(e.g., object of interest),events, and
states, and the actual behavior of the system is imitated by mathematical or logical relationships to link these
components. Given a set of input parameters, a simulation model is run and the output is realized.
In this thesis, we also utilize a simulation modeling approach, the so calledgeneralized semi-Markov Pro-
cess (GSMP), to model a manufacturing flow control problem proposed by Kimemia and Gershwin (1983)
within the framework of optimal control problems for stochastic fluid systems. Glynn (1989) provides a brief
introduction on the role of GSMPs in simulation and an excellent description of GSMP framework can be found
in Shedler (1993). Although in the past GSMPs were mainly used for modeling systems with discrete entities,
they can also be well suited for modeling fluid systems; see Suri and Fu (1994) and Gürkan (2000) for example.
The particular manufacturing flow control problem that we consider involves optimization of multiple target
inventory levels in a production/inventory system. In thissystem, the production and demand rates change
according to some stochastic process. There has been a strong interest in the development of production and
inventory control models and in their analysis within this framework. Utilization of GSMP enables us to de-
velop an intuitive and transparent algorithm to obtain a flexibl and general representation of the corresponding
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problem.
Decision making problems with fixed or known parameters are clled deterministicproblems. Decision
making problems under uncertainty, where one or more parameters vary or are unknown at the time a decision
should be made, are calledstochasticproblems. Many real world decision making problems in engineering
and economics give rise to intractable mathematical formulations, especially due to their stochastic nature.
A key difficulty in decision making under uncertainty is in dealing with an uncertainty space that is huge
and frequently leads to very large-scale models. Additional complexity is difficulty in derivation of closed-
form analytic expressions for the performance measures in ma y stochastic problems. Alternative methods
to find a solution to stochastic problems is an active area of research. Among these, we focus on a class of
simulation-based methods, so calledsample-path methods(also known asample average approximation) (e.g.,
Robinson (1996) and Rubinstein and Shapiro (1993)). Regarding sample-path methods, the complex nature of
the stochastic systems motivates researchers to use simulation together with deterministic solution methods
as an alternative tool for solving stochastic optimizationproblems or stochastic equilibrium models. There
has been a lot of progress in the development and implementation of sample-path methods for optimizing the
performance of a complex stochastic system that can be observed only through simulation (where no analytic
solutions available) (e.g., Plambeck et al. (1996), Shapiro and Homem-De-Mello (1998), Gürkan et al. (1999b),
Gürkan (2000)). In many applications, the performance functio to be observed is a limit function which is
the output of a sequence of simulation runs of increasing lenth, all using the same random number streams;
that is if we go out far enough in the sample-path, we get a goodestimate of the limit function. The resulting
limit function is deterministic such as an expectation or a ste dy-state performance measure from a simulation
model. The optimization or equilibrium problem with the resulting deterministic limit function can be solved
by using state-of-the-art deterministic optimization andequilibrium solvers, respectively. Most of the state-of-
the-art solvers require gradient information; therefore we also exploit the developments in gradient estimation
techniques to calculate the exact partial derivatives. Gürkan et al. (1996, 1999a) give an extension of sample-
path methods to find an approximate equilibrium of stochastic equilibrium models. The basic idea again is
utilization of simulation and efficient and effective deterministic solvers (together with gradient estimation
techniques) for solving complex stochastic equilibrium problems.
To summarize, this thesis mainly focuses on
(i) the application of deterministic or stochastic optimizat on and equilibrium problems to model and ana-
lyze the problem of generation capacity investments by competitive and strategic generators in decentral-
ized electricity markets, which has been a research topic ofinterest since the deregulation of electricity
markets,
(ii) the application of simulation and stochastic fluid models to model and analyze a stochastic manufacturing
flow control problem, and
(iii) the application of sample-path methods together withthe state-of-the-art deterministic optimization tools
to be able to solve these problems which are complex and largescal due to their stochastic nature.
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1.2 Research Topics and Contribution
In this section, we give an overview of our research topics and contribution, which are later discussed in detail
in the succeeding chapters.
1.2.1 Electricity Markets: From Monopoly to Competition
For decades, electricity markets all over the world were particularly organized as public monopolies. Since
the late 1980s, policy makers and regulators in many countries have liberalized, restructured or deregulated
the electric power sector, typically by introducing competition at the generation and retail level. Reforms were
pioneered by Chile, the UK, and Norway and have spread all over the world. The motivations for changing
the power industry structure and the implementation of market eforms vary from country to country, but in
general the aim of restructuring has been to increase efficiency and competition leading to lower costs and price
reductions. Today different paradigms of restructured electricity systems, varying in complexity and scope, can
be found in many parts of the world including United States, New Zealand, Australia, and Europe.
The supply of electricity from generators to consumers requi s three basic steps: generation, transmission,
and distribution. Generation takes place at power stationswhere energy fuel (e.g., gas, coal, oil) is converted
to electricity. Electricity is then transmitted over long distances from power stations to substations by Trans-
mission System Operators (TSOs). Transmission takes placevi high voltage lines in order to minimize losses.
Electricity is transformed to a lower voltage at the substations and distributed to consumers through low volt-
age lines by Distribution System Operators (DSOs). The international experience from electricity liberalisation
around the world has led to consensus on some steps of restructuring for achieving a well functioning electricity
market (see Sioshansi and Pfaffenberger (2006) and Sioshansi (2008) for a survey). In the process of restruc-
turing, the former vertically integrated electricity utilities are restructured and unbundled, and competition has
been introduced into generation, wholesale, and retail segments of the industry. Transmission and distribution
businesses usually remain as national or regional monopolies but they are regulated by an independent system
operator. The effective separation of generation and transmission activities is crucial for achieving competition
in electricity markets. As a result, electricity generators wning one or different types of power stations compete
to supply power for consumers and maximize their profits. Generators also need to have access to transmis-
sion and distribution services provided by TSOs and DSOs in order to reach their customers. Other common
elements of the restructuring include introduction of wholesale and spot power markets and establishment of
independent system operator.
Since the introduction of competition in electricity markets by decentralization of electricity generation,
many interesting research questions have been addressed inthe intersection of operations research and nonco-
operative game theory in economics. Most of these questionsoriginate from the challenges faced by regulators
and policy makers due to the specific characteristics of electricity markets. In general, an electricity market
shows different characteristics than other economic wholesale markets, leading to complex interactions be-
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tween the market participants (Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), Stoft (2002)). First, electricity is extremely
costly to store. This implies that generated electricity must be transmitted and consumed directly at every sec-
ond. A shortfall or surplus of electricity can endanger the stability of the entire electricity network due to the
complex nature of the way electricity flows through the network and because of the need to protect network
equipments from large variances in frequency and voltage. If the demand for power exceeds the supply, this
may lead to the action of shutting down generation plants andtransmission equipment which, in the worst
cases, can lead to a major regional blackouts. Another difficulty is that demand tends to be inelastic, meaning
that consumers cannot respond to real time prices. In order to respond to real time prices, final consumers
would need to have real time meters. This is not currently thecase for a large proportion of consumers. Hence,
when there is shortage of supply, transmission operator hasto curtail consumption at very high costs. The
combination of excluding demand-side response with the complexities in nature of the market (costly storage
and grid reliability requirements) makes electricity markets vulnerable to the exercise of market power. Most
of these complexities can be overcome by sufficiently well designed markets. Thus, extension of optimization
models of a single decision maker to equilibrium models of multiple decision makers has become an essential
instrument in the literature for analyzing different market d signs for decentralized electricity markets (e.g.,
Wolf and Smeers (1997), Boucher and Smeers (2001), Hobbs (2001), Day et al. (2002), Metzler et al. (2003),
Hobbs and Pang (2004), Schulkin et al. (2010)).
1.2.1.1 Generation Capacity Investments in Perfectly Competitive Electricity Markets
In the days of regulated monopolies, there was no issue of generation resource adequacy. Companies were
obligated to serve the demand and had to invest accordingly;an optimization model was used to compute the
expansion of generation capacity decisions that would satisfy demand at minimal investment and operations
costs. In compensation for this obligation, electricity prices were regulated (often at average cost) in a way that
guaranteed that the company could pay for its expenses (includi g reimbursement of long term debt) and make
a reasonable profit on equity. Capacity expansion models were extensively developed during the regulatory
periods before loosing some of their appeal after restructuing. The theory of peak load pricing for non-storable
commodities, such as electricity, is the economic counterpart of these computational models; it can be seen as
an economic interpretation of the capacity expansion modelin t rms of electricity prices that induce efficient
investments and operations. Of particular importance, thetheory of peak load pricing explains that the price of
electricity in the highest demand period must embed a particular (peak load) component to induce an efficient
capacity mix. Both the capacity expansion models and the theory of peak load pricing can be traced back to
work conducted ińElectricité de France in the fifties and sixties (see the colle tion of early papers treating both
subjects in Morlat and Bessière (1971)).
With liberalisation, generation and investments became the responsibility of companies who had to make a
profit on the electricity market. This gave rise to the question whether these markets would provide sufficient
incentives for investments or whether additional policy measures would be needed to ensure these investments
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and thereby security of delivery in electricity markets. This discussion focuses especially on those power plants
which will only be needed to meet demand at peak hours and therefor have to earn sufficient revenues in those
hours to cover their investment costs. The theory of peak load pricing, which was initially developed for the
regulated monopoly, was later proved equally relevant to perfectly competitive markets (see Crew et al. (1995)
for a survey). This theory has become crucial today to explain why perfectly competitive energy-only electricity
markets, which are based on power exchanges where supply bidding is at the sole short-run marginal cost, may
not spontaneously provide the right incentive to invest in ge eration capacity for peak load. To clarify further,
in a perfectly competitive energy-only spot market (lacking demand-side response), the market price is set at
the bid of the most expensive operating power plant (e.g., peak ower plant). Thus, when there is sufficient
capacity, market price is equal to the fuel cost of the peak power plant, leaving it with a zero margin to cover
its investment costs. Furthermore, unacceptability of price spikes and concerns on market power have led the
politicians to cap the prices during scarcity hours (i.e., when generation capacity is scarce) and potentially limit
the peak generators from receiving sufficient margin to cover th ir investment cost. This missing margin is now
commonly referred to as the missing money in the literature (e.g., Stoft (2002), Cramton and Stoft (2005, 2006)
and Joskow (2007, 2008)).
Since the resource adequacy problem due to missing money wasbrought up, generation capacity invest-
ments in decentralized electricity markets have gained a lot of attention as a research topic and in the political
debate with an emphasis on the questions: Do current liberalz d markets (e.g., energy-only markets) provide
right incentives to invest in generation capacity? If not, what type of market mechanisms are needed to provide
the right incentives?
Initially, when liberalisation was introduced in Europe and i the US, policy makers held the view that
energy-only electricity markets would provide sufficient icentives for new investment. Therefore, no addi-
tional measures were put in place to stimulate investments.However, experience with these energy-only mar-
kets have led policy makers to change their views. For example, in recent years, more and more US states have
implemented some sort of policy measures aimed at stimulating investments in new generation capacity, such
as scarcity pricing when generation capacity is inadequateor capacity payments to generators via additional
capacity markets next to the electricity market
The concern of generation adequacy have also been raised recntly in Europe; in particular as a result of
the substantial growth of intermittent renewables. The generation from intermittent renewables such as wind
is highly volatile and flexible conventional generation capacity (e.g., gas-based power plants) is needed as a
back-up for limited number of hours in a year when wind is not avail ble. In an energy-only electricity mar-
ket, renewables (e.g., wind, solar) would increase price volatility, tend to reduce market price levels in most
of the hours, and decrease the overall capacity utilizationof conventional capacity (e.g., gas, coal). This may
aggravate the missing money problem in particular for conventional resources and investments in conventional
capacity becomes less attractive. Therefore, many market partici ants and policymakers in Europe are now ex-
pressing a concern whether energy-only markets with high penetrations of intermittent renewables are capable
of providing sufficient incentives for back-up generation capacity in future. For example, the debate in North-
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west Europe concerning the need for investments in electricity generation capacity is intense for some countries
such as Germany and the UK. The UK has significant needs in investments as of 2015 (De Joode et al. (2013)).
These investment are needed mainly as a replacement of old capacity that has to be decommissioned (such as
coal plants) partly due to environmental regulations. One of the reasons for the large investments needed in
Germany is the planned nuclear phase-out. Furthermore, back-up apacity is needed to accommodate the in-
creasing share of renewables (Elberg et al. (2012)). Elberget al. (2012) investigate the missing money problem
in Germany with high penetration of intermittent renewables after 2020. They confirm that gas-based gener-
ation units may not be able to recover their investment costsin a future energy-only electricity market with
a higher level of intermittent renewable energy sources. Their study underlines that the share of intermittent
renewable electricity generation itself is not at the root of the problem but can add to the challenges of provid-
ing long-term resource adequacy in an energy-only electricity market. Similar findings are also confirmed by
Özdemir et al. (2013) for the Netherlands with higher level of intermittent renewables in 2020.
Parallel to the policy debate, there has also been considerable attention in the scientific literature for the
question whether investors can recoup their generation capacity investments on the electricity market. Accord-
ing to this literature, an optimal energy-only electricitymarket would allow investors in peak capacity to earn
sufficient revenues during peak hours (e.g., Stoft (2002), Joskow (2008)). Important conditions for such an
optimal energy-only market are prices which are allowed to rise to the point where consumers would prefer to
be shut off instead of paying this price and sufficient flexibility in demand to react to high prices. However,
these conditions are not necessarily met in real energy-only electricity markets. For instance, high peak prices
tend not be acceptable for politicians and regulators, who therefore have introduced price caps and most of the
electricity consumers cannot respond to prices. Such imperfections in addition to uncertainties in energy-only
markets may lead to insufficient net revenues for generatorsto provide adequate generation capacity for opti-
mal generation capacity portfolio. Theoretical and numerical examples are given in the literature to illustrate a
variety of imperfections in energy-only markets leading tothis missing money problem and improvements are
suggested to reduce its magnitude (e.g., Hobbs et al. (2001), Stoft (2002), De Vries (2004), Cramton and Stoft
(2005), Hogan (2005), Hobbs et al. (2007), Joskow (2008), Cramton and Ockenfels (2011)). Among these, we
focus on remedies which improve (scarcity) pricing when generation capacity is fully utilized.
In Chapter 3, we assess three different market designs that have been discussed in the literature to remedy
resource adequacy problem: an energy-only electricity market with VOLL pricing (a variant of scarcity pricing
reflecting the value of lost load (VOLL)), an electricity market with an additional forward capacity market,
and an electricity market with operating-reserve pricing.In an energy-only electricity system, when there
is shortage of supply, the price of electricity should be sufficiently high to provide incentives for adequate
generation capacity investments, known as VOLL pricing. Inperfectly competitive markets, Stoft (2002) shows
that VOLL pricing results in optimal generation capacity investments. However, in reality VOLL is difficult to
estimate and therefore a price cap (which is in general lowerthan VOLL) is used. If the price cap induced by the
regulator is not high enough, this will constrain prices from rising up to their competitive levels at peak hours,
yielding underinvestment in generation capacity (Joskow (2008)). An alternative solution is to implement a
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capacity market where the regulator imposes some capacity trget in line with expected demand and the firms
contributing to the sufficient investment level receive capacity payments accordingly. In order to increase
the robustness against market power, many variants of capacity markets have been proposed regarding the
implementation of the market design and the treatment of demand response (e.g., Cramton and Stoft (2005),
Joskow (2008), Hobbs et al. (2007), Cramton and Ockenfels (2011)). In this thesis, we assume a forward
capacity market where capacity is auctioned before the investm nt decision is made and the resulting capacity
payment is certain for the lifetime of the plant. A more sophisticated alternative remedy is to apply some form
of reliability or operating-reserve pricing so that electrici y price increases when the reserve margin decreases
(Stoft (2002), Hogan (2005), Hogan (2009)). Lastly, as a categorically different alternative, ensuring a price
responsive demand in the short-run as well as in the long-runmay remedy the resource adequacy issue. Next,
we discuss our analysis and contributions.
We concentrate on these four mechanisms (including demand-side bidding) and propose alternative ways to
model and solve the generation capacity investment problemof multiple firms in a competitive environment. We
also take into account uncertainties in future and extend the eterministic formulations of the electricity market
models with stochastic elements (e.g., demand uncertainty) which may lead to large scale problems. The natural
approach is to resort to complementarity formulations as this mathematical programming paradigm has been
extensively used to model restructured electricity system. We assess the extent to which these models can
be restated as stochastic optimization problems and propose solution algorithms using sample-path methods.
Consequently, we can use deterministic optimization solvers, that are numerous and quite powerful, to solve
stochastic equilibrium problems. This result is of interest to users of such models for policy analysis purposes
since practical tools are needed in real world problems to gain insights into the social implications of a market
design or a policy target (see e.g., Schroeder (2012) and Allcott (2012) for examples of real world applications).
We consider perfectly competitive electricity markets of three types of agents: risk neutral generators, a
transmission system operator, and consumers. As mentionedabove, perfectly competitive energy-only elec-
tricity markets (barring demand-side bidding or scarcity pricing) may not guarantee resource adequacy since
the market sets the price at the bid of the most expensive operating plant (peak power plant). Thus, even in
perfectly competitive markets, guaranteeing resource adequacy may require market designs creating investment
incentives by provision of enough margin to cover the capital costs of an efficient generation system, including
the peak power plant. For each market design, we model and analyze capacity investment choices of each
firm using a two-stage optimization problem where its generation capacities are installed in the first stage and
its generation takes place in future electricity market at the second stage. Since there are multiple firms, we
essentially have an equilibrium problem at both stages.
In reality, future electricity market conditions are not known in advance. Although we focus mainly on
electricity demand being uncertain and/or fluctuating witha very low elasticity, our methodology and results
can be easily generalized to spot markets with other uncertainties (i.e., fuel costs, transmission capacities, wind
generation etc.). For given wind capacity and volatile windgeneration, one can substitute demand with residual
demand levels (i.e., demand minus wind). Under uncertaintyabout future electricity market conditions, real
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world problems including generation capacity investment decisions lead to stochastic equilibrium problems
that are large scale and computationally more complex to solve than a stochastic optimization problem; see
e.g., Schroeder (2012) and Allcott (2012) for examples of real world applications. Equilibrium problems are
indeed broader than optimization problems which is addressed in detail by Gabriel et al. (2012). In this thesis,
we not only emphasize the link between optimization and equilibri m problems but also show that, regarding
the problem of generation capacity investments in perfectly competitive electricity markets, most of the formu-
lations of stochastic equilibrium problems can be cast as two-stage stochastic programs. The main contributions
of Chapter 3 can be summarized as follows:
• We expand the existing short-run models of restructured electricity system to include both uncertainty
of spot market conditions (i.e., demand uncertainty) and resource adequacy mechanisms, such as VOLL
pricing, capacity market, and operating-reserve pricing,and also demand-side bidding as an alternative
remedy.
• In perfect competition, we show that most of the formulations f these “(stochastic) equilibrium” models
are in fact equivalent1 to or can be cast as single (stochastic) nonlinear or linear optimization problems. In
particular, in the stochastic setting, this result indicates the prevalence of two-stage stochastic program-
ming for providing solutions to stochastic equilibrium models. We believe that this result is helpful for
making an economic assessment of the incentives in generation capacity investment in real world systems
for the following reasons: in Section 2.2.2, we explain how we can solve a two-stage stochastic program
as a nonlinear or linear optimization problem. Because of the availability of very efficient nonlinear
programming solvers and decomposition methods for two-stage stochastic programs, solving a stochas-
tic program is computationally much faster than solving a stochastic equilibrium model for large scale
systems, which we also observe in our numerical experiments. However, this does not necessarily guar-
antee that there is an equivalent nonlinear or linear optimization problem for every equilibrium model.
In only one case of operating-reserve pricing, we obtain an equilibrium problem that is not equivalent to
an optimization problem.
• Under perfect competition, we show that single and two-stage representation of these “equilibrium”
models are equivalent. In other words, the open loop equilibria and the closed loop equilibria of these
models coincide. This result may not hold for electricity markets with strategic firms (see Wogrin et al.
(2012)).
• Two-stage models with stochastic elements may prove computationally challenging to solve due to the
resulting large scale problems (Kall and Wallace (2006)). Thus, we provide detailed algorithmic ap-
proaches for numerically tackling all these models. We utilize sample-path methods as well as the
equivalence result in relation to solutions of stochastic equilibrium and optimization problems. Our
computational methods allow solving large-scale problemswith several uncertain parameters by utiliz-
1“equivalent” models or problems used in this thesis refer toproblems or models having same solution sets.
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ing deterministic off-the-shelf solvers. We also illustrate that these algorithmic approaches help further
reduce the computational time.
• Through numerical experiments, we gain insights on the impact of demand uncertainty and to what
extend these different mechanisms can remedy the resource adequ cy issue. In particular, we first find
that uncertainty of demand leads to higher total generationcapacity expansion and a broader mix of
technologies compared to the investment decisions assuming average demand levels. Furthermore for the
same VOLL (or price cap) level, energy-only markets with VOLL pricing tend to lead to total generation
capacity below the peak load with a certain probability whereas energy markets with a forward capacity
market or operating-reserve pricing result in higher investments, assuming random demand with finite
support and no forced outages. Finally, the regulator decisions (e.g., reserve capacity target) in capacity
markets and operating-reserve pricing can be chosen in sucha way that results in very similar investment
levels and fuel mix of generation capacities in both market designs.
The result of the prevalence of stochastic programming for pr viding solutions to stochastic equilibrium
models can be extended to generation capacity investment strategies in perfectly competitive electricity mar-
kets with different regulatory mechanisms such as emissiontrading scheme (Gürkan et al. (2012)) or renewable
obligations (Gürkan and Langestraat (2012)). In addition, t may also be of interest to include risk averseness
of generators by using “coherent risk measures” (e.g., Ehrenmann and Smeers (2011) and Ralph and Smeers
(2011)). The resulting problems are still stochastic equilibrium problems which are somewhat modified ver-
sions of the stochastic equilibrium problems presented in this thesis. When the markets are “perfectly compet-
itive” and “complete”, the formulation of an equivalent two-stage stochastic program is still possible (Ralph
and Smeers (2011)). This allows assessment of investment incent ves of risk averse generators in “perfectly
competitive” and “complete” markets by utilizing a two-stage stochastic program.
1.2.1.2 Strategic Generation Capacity Investments under Demand Uncertainty in Electricity Markets
Besides the impact of the market mechanism and imperfections mentioned in Section 1.2.1.1, investment in-
centives for generation capacity may be manipulated by electricity generators’ capability to exercise market
power. In energy-only competitive electricity spot markets where the supply bidding is at the sole short-run
marginal cost, a generating firm (in particular a peak power plant) anticipating the impact of its capacity choice
on market prices would likely exert market power and have incntive to underinvest in order to gain positive
margins. In Chapter 4, we again model and analyze a two-stageproblem of generation capacity investments
but this time by strategic generators facing uncertain demand. These strategic generators compete as Cournot
players when they choose their generation capacities underdemand uncertainty at the first stage and they an-
ticipate the impact of their capacity choice on perfectly competitive electricity market outcomes at the second
stage. Thus, we have a closed loop model.
Due to strategic behavior, the two-stage capacity investment problem of each firm conveys different prop-
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erties than the corresponding problem in Chapter 3 formulated under perfect competition. In the absence of
market power, the corresponding two-stage capacity investm nt problem is a convex problem and, as shown
in Chapter 3, most of the two-stage capacity investment equilibri m problems in competitive markets can be
cast into convex non(linear) optimization problems similar to the early capacity expansion models. This result
also suggests that an equilibrium of the closed loop model coincides with an equilibrium of the less compli-
cated open loop model. However, convexity is in general lostwhen market power is introduced. The two-stage
capacity investment problem of a strategic firm may be formulated as a bilevel problem, to be more precise
as a stochastic MPEC (mathematical program with equilibrium constraints). When there are multiple strategic
firms having an MPEC problem each, then one can speak of findinga solution toan equilibrium problem with
equilibrium constraints (EPEC)(e.g., Gabriel et al. (2012)). It is well known that EPECs arein general noncon-
vex problems and they may have multiple or no solutions (e.g., Hu (2003), Ehrenmann (2004), Hu and Ralph
(2007), Gabriel et al. (2012)). As a consequence, an equilibri m for the corresponding two-stage game may
not exist or, if exists, it is in general not unique. Furthermo e, when firms anticipate a perfectly competitive
spot market outcome, an equilibrium of the closed loop modeldo s not coincide with an equilibrium of a less
complicated open loop model (see Wogrin et al. (2012)). Therefore, establishing a set of general conditions for
existence and uniqueness is desirable for policy and marketmodels including strategic firms so that users can
have confidence in their solutions before solving such complicated closed loop models.
In Chapter 4, we establish sufficient conditions which guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a closed
loop equilibrium in energy-only electricity markets with strategic generators. Our analysis include various types
of such a closed loop model regarding the underlying price-demand relations, the assumed demand uncertainty
with a broad class of distributions, and generators with symmetric or asymmetric costs. As mentioned before,
we consider strategic firms facing uncertain demand and competing as Cournot players when they choose their
generation capacities at the first stage while anticipatinga perfectly competitive future spot market outcome
based on their choices (for example they may expect regulatory intervention at the spot market). After a
firm installs its capacity at the first stage, its production takes place in electricity spot market at the second
stage which represents a competitive energy-only market. Wlook into both symmetric and asymmetric firms
facing inelastic or elastic demand. In reality, electricity demand is uncertain and/or fluctuating with a very
low elasticity. We focus on two cases of demand uncertainty:(i) an inelastic random demand drawn from a
continuous distribution; or(ii) price-demand relationship that can be well approximated bya linear curve with
a random intercept having a general underlying continuous probability distribution.
Short term aspects of market power (related to choices of production when capacities are given) within
various specific market design assumptions have been extensively analyzed in the literature. Among these,
equilibrium modeling of Nash games in quantities is a commonapproach (e.g., see Borenstein and Bushnell
(1999), Wei and Smeers (1999), Hobbs (2001) for reviews). Long term aspects of market power related to
generation capacity expansion have also received growing attention. Among the most important works in the
literature, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) analyze capacity choice at the first stage prior to price competition at
the second stage (e.g., Bertrand) with deterministic demand. They show that there exists a unique equilibrium
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which is equivalent to the single stage Cournot outcomes. Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997) analyze capacity
choices of two symmetric firms at the first stage prior to a Courn t market at the second stage with demand
uncertainty. They prove existence of symmetric equilibrium and compare it with the deterministic solution of
using expected demand. Murphy and Smeers (2005) move one step further and formulate open and closed loop
market models with two asymmetric Cournot players and finiteumber of demand scenarios, each having a
linear demand curve with respective probabilities. In their analysis, Murphy and Smeers (2005) conclude that
the complexity of solving capacity expansion increases with a closed loop model even without considering the
network limitations. They find closed loop examples which may not have an equilibrium. They show that if an
equilibrium exists, then it is unique and falls between the perfect competition and open loop equilibria.
All the models mentioned above assume an elastic demand represented by a linear price-demand curve
with random intercept and the structure of the assumed demand distribution is in general simple (i.e., uniform
demand segments). Furthermore, their analysis are in general based on limited number of players (e.g., two
players). In Chapter 4, we consider both inelastic random deand and an elastic demand represented by a linear
price-demand curve with random intercept having a general underlying continuous probability distribution. In
addition, we analyze the capacity choices of both symmetricand asymmetric firms. We establish existence and
uniqueness results under a broader scope in terms of the underlyi g price-demand relations (elastic and inelastic
demand), the assumed demand uncertainty with a broad class of continuous distributions, and any finite number
of players with symmetric or asymmetric costs. We note that te continuity of demand distribution is a crucial
assumption for establishment of our results.
In a similar closed loop model with symmetric firms and elastic demand, Grimm and Zoettl (2008) analyze
strategic capacity choices under more general assumptionsof a monotone random demand curve and its under-
lying probability distribution. They establish existenceand uniqueness results when firms engage in Cournot
competition at the second stage. They also show existence ofequilibrium when firms anticipate competitive
spot market outcomes at the second stage; however the uniqueness of equilibrium cannot be established under
their general assumptions. In our analysis, the closed loopgame with symmetric firms facing a linear demand
curve with random intercept is indeed a subclass of their model whereas the closed loop model with inelastic
random demand constitutes another type. For both cases, we establish sufficient conditions for the random
demand’s probability distribution which guarantee a unique equilibrium for symmetric firms anticipating com-
petitive spot market outcomes. Furthermore, we give sufficient conditions for a unique equilibrium of such a
closed loop game with asymmetric firms facing an elastic random emand (i.e., a linear demand curve with
random intercept). We explain our analysis in more detail below and elaborate on our contributions.
• We show that whether firms sell their power via central auction or bilateral contracts in the spot market,
the corresponding two-stage game yields the same equilibrim, f it exists. A similar result has also
been established by Metzler et al. (2003) for a short-run Cournot competition in electricity spot markets
where generation capacity is fixed. Metzler et al. (2003) show t at a bilateral market model with Cournot
producers and perfect arbitrageurs yields the same Nash-Cournot equilibrium as a Cournot competition
in pool market. We extend their result for the two-stage capaity investment equilibrium problem we
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consider here. Our result indicates that when the spot market is p rfectly competitive, different structures
of buying and selling electricity do not affect the generation capacity choices of strategic firms. Thus, we
establish the remaining of our results for the two-stage problem of each firm under the assumption of a
stylized pool market model. In order to preserve analyticaltractability, we do not consider any network
constraints for the contributions below.
• In a single-stage Cournot model where symmetric firms choosetheir production output under uncertainty
concerning the intercept of a linear price-demand function, Lagerlöf (2006) shows that if the distribution
of the demand has a monotone hazard rate then the uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed. Chapter 4
establishes an extension of that result for a two-stage gamewhere symmetric firms strategically choose
their capacities at the first stage and their production takes place at the second stage in energy-only per-
fectly competitive electricity markets. Due to demand uncertainty, generators’ capacity choices at first
stage may not be utilized for all the demand realizations at the second stage. For the two-stage problem
of each strategic firm maximizing its expected profit, the constraint set is closed and convex; however,
the objective function is in general not concave. Hence, generalized concavity (such as strict logcon-
cavity and strict quasiconcavity; see Chapter 2 for corresponding definitions) of the objective function
are desirable properties for establishing existence and unique ess results for the corresponding two-stage
stochastic game. For such a two-stage game, we characterizethe class of probability distributions under
which we preserve generalized concavity (e.g., strict quasiconcavity) of each firm’s first stage problem,
thus we can establish the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. We show that one general class of
distributions are logconcave distributions (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005)) having a monotone in-
creasing hazard rate function under which the existence anduniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed for
symmetric generators facing an inelastic or elastic randome and. Thus, in case of symmetric firms,
we can conclude that a large class of continuous probabilitydistributions guarantee the uniqueness of
equilibrium for the two-stage game.
• When firms are asymmetric, the first-stage expected profit functio s of some firms (e.g., base-load gener-
ators) do not, in general, satisfy generalized concavity when demand is inelastic. We show by an example
that even with two generators (e.g., peak-load and base-load) facing uniform demand, the first stage ob-
jective function of the base-load generator may not satisfygeneralized concavity. Hence, an equilibrium
may not exist. When demand is elastic (represented by a linear demand curve with random intercept), a
unique equilibrium is guaranteed for another condition (different than logconcavity) for the continuous
probability distribution of the intercept under which we prove strict concavity of all firms’ expected profit
functions. The corresponding condition is also similar to astandard assumption in the literature used for
the demand function itself (e.g., Sherali et al. (1983), Wolf and Smeers (1997), Grimm and Zoettl (2008),
and Xu (2005)).
• To sum up our contributions above, we consider various typesof the two-stage investment model of firms
CHAPTER 1. Introduction 15
regarding the underlying price-demand relations, the assumed demand uncertainty, and any finite number
of players with symmetric or asymmetric costs. In most of thecases, we establish sufficient conditions
under which solutions exist and are unique and we identify a bro d class of commonly used continuous
probability distributions of the random demand satisfyingthese conditions, which will enhance the value
of such models for policy and market intelligence purposes.In particular, it is of interest to users to know
the general sets of conditions which guarantee the existence a d uniqueness of an equilibrium before
solving such complicated closed loop models.
1.2.2 Optimal Threshold Levels in Stochastic Fluid Models via Simulation-Based Optimiza-
tion
The research in manufacturing flow control can roughly be classified in two directions; papers directly address-
ing optimal control issues and papers that analyze and optimize the performance of plausible policies. Our work
falls in the latter category but the policies we employ are stongly motivated by the research on the former.
Kimemia and Gershwin (1983) propose formal optimal controltheory as an approach for studying general
manufacturing flow control problems. They also propose a plausible class of control policies. The first formal
proofs of optimality of a certain policy, however, were established later by Akella and Kumar (1986) and
Bielecki and Kumar (1988) for a two machine state system withexponential up and down times, constant
demand, linear holding and backorder costs. In particular,these papers establish the optimality of a hedging
point policy. Whenever up, the machine should produce at full capacity below a target inventory level called
the hedging point and produce at a rate which enables it to stay there once it reaches this target.
There are several extensions of the hedging point type optimali y structure. For instance, for a multiple
machine state system with a Markovian transition structure, a multiple hedging point type policy is optimal.
For each machine state where production capacity exceeds demand rate, there is a corresponding hedging point
(see Sethi et al. (2002) for related results). It is also known that with non-exponential machine state transitions,
the structure of the optimal policy becomes more complex (see Hu and Xiang (1995) for an example) but
hedging point policies remain useful due to their simplicity. In addition, if the production policy is required to
depend only on the inventory level (and not on elapsed times since previous transitions), hedging point policies
seem to be the only practical alternative for implementation. In turn, these type of policies are used not only for
designing manufacturing controllers, but also for using capa ity options and subcontracting strategies (e.g., Hu
et al. (2004), Tan and Gershwin (2004)), and for coordinating production and marketing decisions (e.g., Zhang
et al. (2001)).
There is also considerable literature on the performance analysis side for the implementation of hedging
point policies. Sharifnia (1988) investigates the multiple machine state problem with Markovian transitions
when a multiple hedging point policy is used and presents analytic l results for the performance measures of
the system. Finding the optimal hedging points, however, remains difficult. Liberopoulos and Hu (1995) also
investigate the multiple machine state problem with Markovian transitions with a different focus. They estab-
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lish useful monotonicity properties of the optimal hedginglevels with respect to the machine state transition
structure.
The particular manufacturing flow control problem that we consider in Chapter 5 is that of a single resource
(a machine for simplicity) coping with a flow of demand whose rate varies randomly. The production capacity
of the machine can take multiple values according to some external stochastic process. Similarly the demand
rate at any given time is governed by another external and uncontrollable stochastic process. A hedging point
policy, in general, requires determining a parameter corresponding to each machine and demand state. The
corresponding parameter (hedging point) acts as an inventory target threshold in each machine/demand state.
The machine should produce at the maximum rate if the inventory level is below the current threshold, should
stop if the inventory level is above the current threshold, and should produce at the rate that would keep the
inventory level at the current threshold level when it reaches there. The objective is then to find the optimal
threshold (target inventory) levels minimizing expected inventory and backorder costs such that the production
rate is adjusted in each state depending on the target level.
According to the previous studies in the literature, derivation of the closed-form analytical solution and
finding the optimal hedging points are difficult for a multiple machine state problem even with Markovian tran-
sitions (e.g., Liberopoulos and Hu (1995), Sharifnia (1988)). If one is concerned with a system with several
machine and demand states and fairly general random disturbances (i.e., not necessarily exponentially dis-
tributed), then the generality of the problem and the intractability of an analytical solution makes a simulation-
based method an attractive approach. Using a simulation-based method for finding optimal hedging points has
been tried before by Caramanis and Liberopoulos (1992), Liberopoulos and Caramanis (1994), Haurie et al.
(1994), Yan et al. (1999), Brémaud et al. (1997), Yan et al. (1999), and Yin et al. (2001). However, the op-
timization side of all these papers is confined to the method of stochastic approximation and its variants, see
Robbins and Monro (1951). Although very prominent, in practice hese methods suffer from serious drawbacks
such as slow convergence, lack of a good stopping criterion,and difficulty in enforcing feasibility. In particular,
when there are constraints, these methods handle inequality constraints –even deterministic linear inequalities–
via projection onto the feasible set. Such a projection operation can retard the performance of an optimization
algorithm immensely, as illustrated by the simple example in Appendix 6 of Plambeck et al. (1996). Further-
more, even in the unconstrained case, the empirical performance of stochastic approximation type methods is
very sensitive to the choice of a predetermined step size. Fuand Healy (1992), L’Ecuyer (1991), Glasserman
and Tayur (1995), and Gürkan (2000) contain a number of examples which demonstrate this sensitivity.
These difficulties are partly reflected in the available numerical results of simulation-based optimization
literature for finding optimal hedging points. None of the papers we are aware of (for single-part single-stage
models) has numerical experiments with systems having morethan two decision variables and they are all
solving unconstrained problems. Furthermore, very often,comprehension of how the gradient estimates are
derived is quite challenging for a non-specialist in gradient stimation literature since the arguments leading
to a particular estimator are often done case by case. For example, Brémaud et al. (1997) is one of the papers
developing a rigorous infinitesimal perturbation analysis(IPA) algorithm for a system whose transition times are
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not necessarily Markovian and the IPA analysis of the two hedging point case is done in a separate section than
the IPA estimate for a single hedging point. Zhao and Melamed(2006, 2007) also deal with a general Make-to-
Stock system with random demand and production rates and IPAerivatives are computed for the time averaged
inventory level and time-averaged backorder level with respect to the base-stock level recursively via a sample-
path analysis. However, for some initial conditions, derivation of their IPA derivatives is not straightforward,
which is also mentioned by Melamed et al. (2010) as a drawbackand there are no numerical experiments
reported in these papers.
Application of IPA derivatives in stochastic fluid models isan active area of research. It is of interest to
develop computationally robust IPA formulas which are flexible (i.e., free of number of control parameters and
initial conditions of the system) and directly computable from a sample path (see Wardi et al. (2010), Melamed
et al. (2010) for recent work), which we attain with our approach as mentioned below. Moreover, we also
provide numerical experiments for various number of systemcontrol parameters and with service-level type
probabilistic constraints, which indicates the flexibility and practicality of our methodology.
To overcome the difficulties encountered in the literature,w propose using a different simulation-based
method, namely sample-path optimization, coupled with a generalized semi-Markov process (GSMP) repre-
sentation of the system. As mentioned earlier, a GSMP can simply be thought as a mathematical framework
that models the evolution of a discrete-event simulation representation of the system (see Glynn (1989) and
Shedler (1993)). As we summarize, this has the following consequences which are the main contributions of
Chapter 5:
• On the modeling and gradient estimation side, the GSMP approch allows us to derive a rigorous, intu-
itive, flexible, and transparent algorithm for a general system that can compute the function and gradient
values of the objective function and service level-type probabilistic constraints at any parameter setting
in a single simulation run.
• Using sample-path optimization we avoid certain drawbacksassociated with stochastic approximation
type methods such as having to fine tune several parameters, slow convergence, and ad-hoc handling of
constraints. Thus on the optimization side, we are able to solve much larger (with several machine and
demand states) and general (not necessarily exponential disturbances) problems even with probabilistic
constraints.
• We report numerical results for systems with more than twenty hedging points and service-level type
probabilistic constraints. In these numerical studies, our method performs quite well even on problems
with nonconvex objective functions and probabilistic constraints, which are considered very difficult to
solve by current standards. In addition, we obtain insightson the structure of optimal hedging points for
much larger systems than is usually reported in the literature. In particular, we observe that production
and demand variability has an important effect on the optimal threshold levels of a system. As the
production and demand variability increases, the optimal threshold levels also increase to hold enough
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safety stock against the uncertainty in production and demand r tes. Furthermore, as the utilization of
a system converges to one, the optimal threshold levels get close to each other and converge to a single
threshold level.
Finally, our general approach with appropriate modifications could be applicable to several other challenging
problems encountered in practice. These problems can also be formulated as stochastic fluid models that involve
the optimization of a finite number of threshold levels as a control parameter of certain buffer quantities in the
system. Examples in the literature include production/marketing problems involving dynamic pricing where
the optimal price may vary as a function of threshold (e.g., Zhang et al. (2001)); subcontracting/manufacturing
problems where subcontracting strategies depend on the inventory level, for example using a subcontractor
when the number of waiting orders exceeds a certain threshold (e.g., Tan (2002a), Hu et al. (2004), and Tan
and Gershwin (2004)). Several admission control or routingproblems in telecommunication networks and call
centers are also among the implementations of stochastic fluid models, e.g., admit new arrivals of a given class
if the buffer is lower than a threshold, reject otherwise (e.g., Sun et al. (2004) and Liu and Gong (2002)).
For the interested reader, Cassandras (2007) provides an overview of the theory of stochastic fluid models and
their applications with threshold-based controllers in various fields such as finance, telecommunications, and
engineering.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives the necessary background information for the mathematical
formulations and the notation used throughout this thesis.The common formulations of optimization and equi-
librium problems and the relation between them are summarized briefly in this chapter as well as an overview of
the sample-path methods for solving stochastic optimization and equilibrium problems is given with references
to the literature. The remaining chapters of this thesis areb sed on the following papers:
Chapter 3: Generation Capacity Investments in ElectricityMarkets: Perfect Competition
G. Gürkan,Ö. Özdemir, Y. Smeers
Working Paper, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands, 2012 (Gürkan et al. (2012a)).
Chapter 4: Strategic Generation Capacity Choice under Demand Uncertainty: Analysis of Nash Equilibria
in Electricity Markets
G. Gürkan,Ö. Özdemir, Y. Smeers
Working Paper, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands, 2012 (Gürkan et al. (2012b)) .
Chapter 5: Optimal Threshold Levels in Stochastic Fluid Models via Simulation-based Optimization
G. Gürkan, F. Karaesmen,Ö. Özdemir
Discrete Event Dynamic Systems (2007) 17, 53-97 (Gürkan etal. (2007)).
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Note that Chapter 5 is a slightly adjusted version of Gürkanet al. (2007) in which the abstract and the
introduction are updated with some recent literature in this area and with the most important insights observed
from the numerical experiments performed in this study.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
This chapter gives an introduction to mathematical formulations and notation used throughout this thesis. It
mainly focuses on optimization and equilibrium models to model the problems of one or several decision
makers. A problem itself may be stochastic if the decisions are made under uncertainty. Section 2.1 starts
with basic definitions of the common terminology used in thisesis. In Section 2.2, we introduce standard
deterministic and stochastic optimization models in operations research that are used to formulate a single
agent’s problem. Then, in Section 2.3, we give a brief overview of the concepts of a game and an equilibrium
which are commonly encountered in problems where there are multiple agents interacting with each other in a
noncooperative fashion. We also introduce some typical mathematical models used to formulate the equilibrium
problem of multiple agents. Finally, Section 2.4 gives an overview of simulation-based methods, so called
sample-path methods(also known assample average approximation methods), which are used as solution
methods in numerical applications of the stochastic problems presented throughout the thesis.
2.1 Definitions
2.1.1 Generalizations of Concave/Convex Functions
Generalized concave/convex functions are important for the characterization of a solution in optimization prob-
lems because they are among the few functions for which sufficient optimality criteria can be given. Similarly,
they are also crucial for equilibrium problems since an equilibrium is a solution that is reached among all agents
maximizing their utilities subject to a set of constraints.We first start with the definitions of concave and con-
vex functions. Then we give brief introductions to generalized concave and convex functions (see Bazara et al.
(2006) for details), which are mainly referred in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
Definition 2.1.1(Concavity/Convexity). Let X be a nonempty convex set inRn.
• The function f : X → R is concave onX if f (λx1 + (1− λ )x2)) ≥ λ f (x1) + (1− λ ) f (x2) for each
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x1,x2 ∈ X and λ ∈ (0,1). The function f is strictly concave onS if the inequality holds as a strict
inequality for eachx1,x2 ∈ X with x1 6= x2 and for eachλ ∈ (0,1),
• The functionf : X →R is convex onX if f (λx1+(1−λ )x2))≤ λ f (x1)+(1−λ ) f (x2) for eachx1,x2 ∈
X andλ ∈ (0,1). The functionf is strictly convex onX if the inequality is true as a strict inequality for
eachx1,x2 ∈ X with x1 6= x2 and for eachλ ∈ (0,1).
Notice that a continuous concave function can have flat sections, linear portions, and kinks. A strictly
concave continuous function can have kinks, but it can have neither flat sections nor linear portions. A strictly
concave function is also a concave function while the converse is not true. The same is true for convex functions.
The following definition introduces the most inclusive class of generalized concave/convex functions.
Definition 2.1.2(Quasiconcavity and Quasiconvexity). Let X be a nonempty convex set inRn.
• The function f : X → R is quasiconcave onX if the following inequality is true for eachx1,x2 ∈ X and
λ ∈ (0,1):
f (λx1+(1−λ )x2))≥ min{ f (x1), f (x2)}.
The functionf is strictly1 quasiconcave onX if the inequality holds as a strict inequality for eachx1,x2 ∈
X with x1 6= x2 and for eachλ ∈ (0,1).
• The function f : X → R is quasiconvex onX if the following inequality is true for eachx1,x2 ∈ X and
λ ∈ (0,1):
f (λx1+(1−λ )x2))≤ max{ f (x1), f (x2)}.
The functionf is strictly1 quasiconvex onX if the inequality holds as a strict inequality for eachx1,x2 ∈X
with x1 6= x2 and for eachλ ∈ (0,1).
A function f is called (strictly) quasiconvex if and only if− f is (strictly) quasiconcave. Let’s focus on the
quasiconcave functions in Definition 2.1.2. A functionf is quasiconcave if wheneverf (x2)≤ f (x1), f is grater
than equal tof (x1) at all convex combinations ofx1 andx2. Hence, if f decreases its value at a point along any
direction, it must remain nonincreasing in that direction.A continuous quasiconcave function can have flat,
linear, and even convex portions; however, when it starts todecrease it cannot increase again (i.e., the function
cannot have multiple peaks). Strict quasiconcavity rules out the flat sections, but can still contain linear and
convex portions. Note that a strictly concave or a strictly quasiconcave function is also quasiconcave while the
1We caution the reader that the same definition is sometimes ref rred to in the literature as “strongly” quasiconcave/quasiconvex.
CHAPTER 2. Preliminaries 23
converse is not true. Similar results hold for quasiconvex functions.
Strictly quasiconcave and strictly quasiconvex functionsare especially important in nonlinear programming
because they ensure that a local maximum and a local minimum over a convex set are a unique global maximum
and a unique global minimum, respectively (see Theorem 3.5.9 of Bazara et al. (2006)). However, strictly
quasiconcave (strictly quasiconvex) functions do not share the particular property of concave (convex) functions
which says a zero gradient implies the function is at a globalmaximum (global minimum) (see Definition 3.5.9.
of Bazara et al. (2006)).
There is another class of functions, so called pseudoconcave (pseudoconvex) functions, which is very close
to the class of quasiconcave (quasiconvex) functions and itretains the property of concave (convex) functions
that its gradient is never zero except at its global maxima (minima) (see Definition 3.5.10. of Bazara et al.
(2006)).
Definition 2.1.3 (Pseudoconcavity and Pseudoconvexity). Let f : X → R be a differentiable function defined
over the open nonempty convex setX ⊂ Rn.
• f is pseudoconcave if for eachx1,x2 ∈ X with ∇ f (x1)T(x2 − x1) ≤ 0, it holds that f (x2) ≤ f (x1); or
equivalently, if f (x2)> f (x1)⇒ f (x1)T(x2−x1)> 0 for eachx1,x2 ∈ X.
• f is pseudoconvex if for eachx1,x2 ∈ X with ∇ f (x1)T(x2 − x1) ≥ 0, it holds that f (x2) ≥ f (x1); or
equivalently, if f (x2)< f (x1)⇒ f (x1)T(x2−x1)< 0 for eachx1,x2 ∈ X.
The function f is (strictly) pseudoconvex if and only if− f is (strictly) pseudoconcave. (Strictly) pseudo-
concave functions are also (strictly) quasiconcave while te converse is not true. Another generalized function
referred in the thesis is logconcave functions, which is defined next.
Definition 2.1.4 (Logconcavity). Let f : X → R be a nonnegative function defined over the open convex set
X ⊂ Rn. f is logconcave if it satisfies the inequality
f (λx1+(1−λ )x2))≥ f (x1)λ f (x2)1−λ for eachx1,x2 ∈ X andλ ∈ (0,1).
Note that a positive functionf is logconcave if its logarithm (logf ) is concave. Every (strictly) concave
function that is nonnegative on its domain is (strictly) logc ncave. Moreover, (strict) log-concavity implies
(strict) quasiconcavity as shown by Avriel (1972).
We end this section by summarizing the relationships between th various forms of concavity in Figure 2.1
(see Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004) and Bazara et al. (2006) for the details). According to Figure 2.1, the
following relations hold which will be relevant for Chapter4:
• f is (strictly) concave⇒ f is (strictly) quasiconcave.
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• f is differentiable and (strictly) concave⇒ f is (strictly) pseudoconcave⇒ f is (strictly) quasiconcave.
• f is nonnegative and (strictly) concave⇒ f is (strictly) logconcave⇒ f is (strictly) quasiconcave.
Figure 2.1: Relationships between the various forms of generaliz d concavity (e.g., Boyd and Van-
denberghe (2004), Bazara et al. (2006))
2.1.2 Monotonicity
Definition 2.1.5. The continuous mappingF : Rq 7→ Rq is
(a) monotone over a setB if
[F(x1)−F(x2)]
T(x1−x2)≥ 0, ∀x1,x2 ∈ B;
(b) strictly monotone overB if
[F(x1)−F(x2)]
T(x1−x2)> 0, ∀x1,x2 ∈ B, x1 6= x2;
(c) strongly monotone overB if there exists anα > 0 such that
[F(x1)−F(x2)]
T(x1−x2)≥ α ||x1−x2||2 , ∀x1,x2 ∈ B.
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Note that whenF is continuously differentiable and if the Jacobian matrix∇F of F is positive semidefinite
(positive definite) thenF is monotone (strictly monotone). Moreover, the following relations are valid:
strong monotonicity⇒ strict monotonicity⇒ monotonicity.
2.2 A Single Agent’s Problem
In this section, we introduce two types of modeling tools to formulate the decision making process of a sin-
gle agent. In Section 2.2.1, we start with a special class of optimization problems callednonlinear programs
(NLPs) and their stationary conditions, namelyKarush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT) conditions. A standard NLP for-
mulation is often used to formulate single-stage optimization problems. Whereas the deterministic optimization
problems are formulated with fixed or known parameters, mostreal world optimization problems include pa-
rameters which vary or are unknown at the time a decision should be made. In Section 2.2.2, we introduce
two-stage stochastic programswhich can be used for modeling a single agent’s optimizationproblem that
involve uncertainty in some parameters.
2.2.1 Nonlinear Programming (NLP)
Mathematical programming deals with the optimization of anobjective function in the presence of inequality
and equality constraints. If the objective function and allthe constraints are linear then it is alinear program
(LP). Otherwise, it is anonlinear program (NLP). The development of state-of-art solvers and high-speed com-
puters has made LPs and most of the NLPs widely used tools for solving problems in diverse fields. Although
traditional (non)linear programming deals with deterministic optimization, the mathematical theory of (N)LPs
can also serve as a basis for the analysis and solution of stochasti optimization problems. For instance, the
state-of-art solvers for (N)LPs may be used to solve complexstochastic problems, which we explain in more
detail in Section 2.4. For solving some of the problems presented in Chapters 3 and 5 in this thesis, we use
stochastic optimization and resort to the existing theory and efficient solution methods of (N)LPs. Next, we
give a brief overview of some known results from the theory of(N)LPs which are also utilized in this thesis.
We consider the following constrained (non)linear program
min f (x)
s.t. g(x) ≥ 0 (λ )
h(x) = 0 (µ)
x≥ 0 (ν),
(2.1)
wherex∈ Rn is the vector of decision variables andf : Rn 7→ R, g : Rn 7→ Rk andh : Rn 7→ Rm are continu-
ously differentiable functions. We will focus on finding a sttionary point that satisfies the first order optimality
conditions of the NLP (2.1). The Lagrangian theory plays a crucial role in defining the first order optimality
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conditions of a (non)linear program. For the NLP (2.1), the Lagrangian function is defined as
L(x,λ ,µ ,ν) := f (x)−λ Tg(x)−µTh(x)−νTx,
whereλ ∈ Rk+, µ ∈ Rm, andν ∈ Rn+ are the vector of Lagrange multipliers (dual variables) corresponding to
the inequality, equality, and nonnegativity constraints,re pectively.
If x∗ is a local minimizer of NLP (2.1) and a regularity condition such as thelinear independence constraint
qualification (LICQ)or Slater constraint qualification(see Bazara et al. (2006) for these and other types of
constraint qualifications) holds atx∗, then there existsλ ∗,µ∗, andν∗ such that
∇xL(x∗,λ ∗,µ∗,ν∗) = 0
0≤ x∗ ⊥ ν∗ ≥ 0
0≤ g(x∗)⊥ λ ∗ ≥ 0
h(x∗) = 0,
(2.2)
where we use the notation “⊥” to signify that the inner product of the two variables equalto zero (e.g.,x∗Tv∗ =
0). Note thatL∇xL(x∗,λ ∗,µ∗) = ∇x f (x∗)−λ ∗T∇xg(x∗)−µ∗T∇xh(x∗)−ν∗. Thus,
(i) if x∗i = 0, then∇xi f (x∗)−λ ∗T∇xi g(x∗)−µ∗T∇xi h(x∗) = ν∗i ≥ 0,
(ii) if x∗i > 0, then∇xi f (x∗)−λ ∗T∇xi g(x∗)−µ∗T∇xi h(x∗) = ν∗i = 0.
As a result of(i) and (ii) , we can eliminateν∗ and rewrite the first order optimality conditions in (2.2) as
follows:
0≤ ∇x f (x∗)−λ ∗T∇xg(x∗)−µ∗T∇xh(x∗) ⊥ x∗ ≥ 0
0≤ g(x∗) ⊥ λ ∗ ≥ 0
h(x∗) = 0.
(2.3)
The conditions in (2.3) together with the regularity condition on the pointx∗ establish the necessary op-
timality conditions for the NLP (2.1) and are called Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. Under certain
conditions, the KKT conditions are also sufficient to find an optimal solution of the NLP (2.1). Proposition
2.2.1 gives example for which the KKT conditions are sufficient optimality conditions; hence the solution of
(2.3) and the solution of the NLP (2.1) are equivalent. The (non)linear programs we formulate in Chapter 3 fall
also in this category.
Proposition 2.2.1. Let f be pseudoconvex, g be a vector-valued quasiconcave function, and h be a vector-
valued affine function. If there exits(x∗,λ ∗,µ∗) such that the KKT conditions are satisfied, then x∗ is a global
minimum. A special case is when (2.1) is a linear program (LP)where f,g, and h are linear functions of x.
Note that in Proposition 2.2.1,x∗ satisfying the KKT conditions is a global minimum but not necessarily
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unique. When the functionsf andg are twice continuously differentiable, if the Hessian matrix of the La-
grangian function is positive definite at(x∗,λ ∗,µ∗), then the KKT conditions are also sufficient forx∗ to be a
unique minimizer of the NLP (2.1). For more extensive theoryin nonlinear programming, the reader is referred
to Simone and Blume (1994) and Bazara et al. (2006).
2.2.2 Two-stage Stochastic Programming (SP)
The basic idea of two-stage stochastic programming is that the optimal decisions are made before the realiza-
tion of the uncertain data,ξ (ω), and do not depend on future observations. In a standard two-stage stochas-
tic program, one is interested in finding an optimal decisionx∗ which minimizes an expected value function
Eω [F(ξ (ω),x)] (e.g., expected cost) at the first stage. This expected valuefunction represents the expecta-
tion of a random functionF(ξ (ω),x) (defined on a common probability space(Ω,F ,P)) which is an optimal
value of a second-stage problem after realization of the uncrtain dataξ (ω). To be more precise, the standard
formulation of a two-stage stochastic program is given by
x∗ = argmin
x∈X
Eω [F(ξ (ω),x)], (2.4)
whereX ∈Rn, ξ (ω) is a random vector, and the random functionF(ξ (ω),x) is the optimal value of the second
stage optimization problem at givenx andω ∈ Ω:
F(ξ (ω),x) := min
y(ω)
{ f (ξ (ω),x,y(ω)) s.t.g(ξ (ω),x,y(ω)) ≥ 0,h(ω ,x,y(ω)) = 0}.
Here,x∈Rn is the first stage decision vector which does not depend onξ (ω) andy(ω) ∈Rm is the second
stage decision vector which takes different values with different realizations ofξ (ω). Note thatx is a parameter
to the second stage problem. Although the value ofy depends on the value of all parameters (including x) of the
second stage problem, we emphasize its dependency with respect toξ (ω) in the notation in order to facilitate
the main distinction between first and second stage variables.
ξ (ω)may have a discrete probability distribution with finite number of possible outcomes (i.e.,ξ1,ξ2, . . . ,ξS)
and respective (positive) probabilitiesπs,s= 1,2, . . . ,S. However,ξ (ω) may also be a vector of random pa-
rameters with continuous probability distributions. Furthermore, the corresponding probability distributions of
ξ (ω) may or may not be known. It may be known in situations where realizations repeat themselves several
times and the distribution can be accurately estimated fromhistorical data. However, without knowing the ex-
act distribution of the random variable, samples of random parameters may be obtained simply from historical
data.
If ξ (ω) has a discrete probability distribution with a finite numberof scenarios then one may compute a
solution to the stochastic programming problem by solving the equivalent deterministic optimization problem.
When the probability distribution ofξ (ω) is continuous, it is most of the time impossible to calculateth
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expected valueEω [F(ξ (ω),x)] analytically. One of the solution methodologies replaces the random variables
by a finite random sample generated beforehand and solves thequivalent (deterministic) optimization problem
by a mathematical programming method (as one would do for thefinit scenario case), which is often known as
external sampling (Shapiro (2003)). The method we utilize in th s thesis is called“sample-path optimization”
or “sample average approximation method”which uses external sampling and state-of the art deterministic
solvers to obtain an approximate of the solution to a two-stage stochastic problem. The method is described in
detail in Section 2.4. In Chapter 3, we formulate a two-stagestochastic program of a central decision maker in
decentralized electricity markets and we utilize asample-path optimization methodto solve the corresponding
stochastic problem.
2.3 Noncooperative Decision Making in Multi-agent Systems
When there are multiple agents (e.g., players) who minimize(maximize) their own costs (profits) and whose
strategies have impact on the other’s decisions, we have a competition in a noncooperative manner. We call the
collection of solution strategies which optimize all the players’ problems simultaneously so that no one has in-
centive to deviate from his/her strategy anequilibriumand the corresponding problem anequilibrium problem.
One of the classical concepts of equilibrium in noncooperative game theory is the“Nash equilibrium”, which
we discuss briefly in Section 2.3.1. We introduce two types ofcompetition in Section 2.3.2, namely perfect
competition and imperfect competition. We give an example of a perfect competition in a market with players
consisting of suppliers and consumers. This example can be viewed as a simpler formulation of each power
supplier’s problem that we analyze in Chapter 3. We then introduce the concept of imperfect competition with
an example of Cournot competition. The main distinction betwe n perfect and imperfect competition is that
in imperfect competition at least one player has market power. The concept of market power is discussed in
more detail in Chapter 4 where we analyze the strategic capacity choice of a power supplier in a decentralized
electricity market under imperfect competition.
Mixed complementarity problems (MCPs)or variational inequality (VI) problems, which we introduce in
Section 2.3.3, are extensively used to model and solve economic equilibrium problems which arise from com-
petition of multiple players in a market (see Ferris and Pang(1997), Gabriel et al. (2012) for an extensive
overview). In addition,bilevel problems, mentioned in Section 2.3.4, can be used to model two-stage gmes
where there may be multiple agents at both stages. In Chapters 3 and 4, we also utilize MCPs and bilevel
problems for modeling in the context of competition in decentralized electricity markets.
2.3.1 Nash Games
A game is a model of interacting players. Each player has a setof possible actions. The model captures
interaction between the players by allowing each player to be affected by the actions of all players. Players
can interact in a variety of ways (e.g., by choosing prices orquantities in sequential or simultaneous way) and
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many of these have been studied by using game theory (e.g., Varian (2006)). Each player chooses an action,
which is the best for him/her, not having been informed of theother players’ actions. As mentioned before,
the collection of solution strategies (actions) which are optimal for all the players’ problems is anequilibrium.
Even though players are not informed of others’ actions, they may anticipate what they will be, e.g., from their
past experience. In this section, we give a brief definition of “Nash equilibrium” in which each player chooses
his/her optimal strategy given the optimal strategies of other players, thus no one has incentive to deviate from
his/her strategy.
The concept of equilibrium point in anN-person game, so called“Nash equilibrium”, was introduced by
John Forbes Nash (Nash (1950)). In noncooperative game theory, the Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of
a game involving two or more players, in which no player has anincentive to change his/her own strategy as-
suming that the other players do not change their decisions.In other words, if each player has chosen a strategy
and no player can benefit by changing his/her strategy while te o her players keep theirs unchanged, then the
current set of strategy choices and the corresponding payoffs (costs or profits) constitute a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose that there areN players and playeri’s strategy set isXi and is independent of the other players’
(his/her rivals) strategies. Playeri’s cost function fi(xi ,x−i) depends on all players’ strategies.xi denotes the
vector of playeri’s own strategy andx−i ≡ (x j) j 6=i denotes the vector of his/her rivals’ strategies. For each fixed





i ,x−i) s.t.xi ∈ Xi}. (2.5)
For anyx−i , let ϒi(x−i) denote the solution set of the problem (2.5). Then a Nash equilibri m x∗ is a
point such thatx∗i ∈ ϒi(x∗−i) for all i. There is an extensive literature which provides various results on the
existence of a Nash equilibrium. One of the well known results is that Nash games possess an equilibrium if
(1) the strategy spaces are nonempty, convex, and compact, and (2) players have continuous and quasiconcave
(quasiconvex) payoff (cost) functions (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)). This result introduced by Debreu (1952)
is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3.1. (Debreu (1952))An N-person strategic game has a Nash equilibrium if the strategy sets
Xi, i = 1. . .N, in this game are non-empty, compact, convex subsets of a Euclidian space and the payoff (cost)
functions fi are continuous in x and quasiconcave (quasiconvex) in xi where xi is the strategy of player i.
Under certain conditions, the Nash equilibriumx∗ can be computed by solving a variational inequality (VI)
or a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). In Section 2.3.3,we introduce these problems and briefly explain
how we can formulate Nash games and compute Nash equilibria via VI or MCP formulations. We also give a
brief overview of existence and uniqueness theorems withinthe context of these formulations.
Finally, we define above a standard Nash game where each player h s a feasible set of strategies that is
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independent of the other players’ strategies. As an extension of the standard Nash game, if each playeri’s
strategy setXi depends on his/her rivals’ strategies, then we speak ofgeneralized Nash games. In generalized
Nash games, we haveXi(x−i) as the feasible strategy set for playeri and the equilibrium is calledgeneralized
Nash equilibrium. It is well known that generalized Nash equilibria are typically not unique. This result is
based on the observation that the Lagrange multiplier (shadow price) for the joint active constraints2 in Xi(x−i)
can be different for each player. If the shadow prices for thejoint constraints are taken to be common for each
player, then the generalized Nash equilibrium problem can be reduced to a VI problem. Generalized Nash
equilibrium problems are out of the scope of this thesis. Interested readers are referred to Harker (1991) for
detailed analysis.
2.3.2 Perfect vs Imperfect Competition
In Chapters 3 and 4, we analyze the generation capacity investments in decentralized electricity markets under
perfect and imperfect competition, respectively. In orderto clarify the concept of perfect and imperfect compe-
tition used in this thesis, we next give a simple example for each case in a market where there are suppliers and
consumers. Suppliers are assumed to compete in quantities.Each firm as a supplier decides on their production
level and the market sets the price at which the quantity demanded by all consumers are satisfied by the quantity
supplied by all producers, resulting in an economic equilibrium of price and quantity.
2.3.2.1 Perfect Competition
A market is perfectly competitive if each player assumes that the market price is independent of its own action
(Varian (2006)). Thus in a perfectly competitive market, players are price-takers; that is they act as if the
market price is given and their actions do not influence the price. Perfect competition might be a reasonable
assumption if the industry is composed of many suppliers that produce an identical product and each firm has a
small share in the market (Varian (2006)). For instance, in aperfectly competitive market with firms competing
in production quantities of an identical product, each firm does not anticipate (or worry about) how it can
influence the market price by changing its supply. It is a price-taker and all it worries about is how much output
it wants to produce to maximize its profit. Whatever it produces an be sold at market price.
Let xi be the vector of supply levels of a price-taking firmi, then (2.6) gives an example of the profit






whereXi is the strategy set of firmi, Ci(xi) is the continuously differentiable production cost function of firm
2The common constraints, in each player’s strategy setXi(x−i), that are binding at equilibrium.
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i, andp is the vector of unit prices ofxi which is a fixed (exogenous) parameter in firmi’s problem. Although
the market pricep is exogenous to firmi’s problem, it is endogenous to the whole system and it is set at a level
where the market clears itself; that is demand equals the total quantity produced by all firms. Furthermore, ifXi
is a convex set andCi(xi) is a convex function, we have a convex optimization problem for each firm. Then by
using Proposition 2.2.1 in Section 2.2.1, the KKT conditions of problem (2.6) for each firmi are the necessary
and sufficient optimality conditions. Asp is a fixed parameter in firmi’s problem, while formulating its KKT
conditions, firmi’s marginal profit, which is the gradient of the objective function, is computed as follows:
MPi(x
i) = p−∇xiCi(xi), (2.7)
where the equilibrium values ofp andxi will be determined by solving the KKT conditions of all firms and
market clearance conditions simultaneously. Below we compare this marginal profit with the marginal profit
of a firm in imperfect competition. The use of the KKT conditions in solving the economic equilibrium in a
market with several players will be explained in more detailin Section 2.3.3.
2.3.2.2 Imperfect Competition
In imperfect competition, at least one player exerts marketpower; that is he/she behaves strategically and
anticipates the impact of his/her decisions on the market equilibria (i.e., total supply and market prices). There
are several types of imperfect competition. In this section, we consider one case, namelyCournot games, which
is relevant for the content and discussions in this thesis. In Cournot games, all players exert market power while
competing in quantities simultaneously.
Cournot games: In a Cournot game, each firm as a supplier takes the quantity se by its competitors as given
and then chooses its profit maximizing quantityx∗i by anticipating the impact of his decisionxi on the market







whereXi is the strategy set of firmi, Ci(·) is the continuously differentiable production cost function of firm i,
x−i is the vector of quantities supplied by firmi’s rivals, andP(·,x−i) is the vector valued market price function
at givenx−i .
By using (2.3) in Section 2.2.1, the firmi’s first order optimality conditions will contain the following
gradient of its objective function for givenx−i :
MPi(x
i ,x−i) = ∇xi P(xi ,x−i)Txi +P(xi,x−i)−∇xiCi(xi), (2.9)
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whereMPi is the firm i’s marginal profit. Note that this is different from perfect competition since firmi
behaves strategically, its marginal profit contains the gradient of the price as well. If problem (2.8) is a convex
optimization problem for each firm then one can find the corresponding Nash-Cournot equilibrium by solving
the KKT conditions of all the players and the market clearance conditions simultaneously. In Section 2.3.3,
we briefly explain how one can solve Nash games which also includes Cournot players by using the KKT
conditions. Finally, it is a well known result that Cournot games in the limit (as number of firms grows to
infinity) result in perfect competition equilibria (Varian(2006)).
2.3.3 Mixed Complementarity Problems (MCPs) and Variational Inequalities (VIs)
A variety of physical and economic phenomena including economic equilibrium problems are most naturally
modeled bymixed complementarity problems (MCPs)in the sense that certain pairs of inequality constraints
must be complementary and at least one must hold with equality. We next give the standard formulation of an
MCP and present some basic results regarding the existence and uniqueness of its solution. Then, we briefly
mention some of the application areas of MCPs relevant to this thesis such as finding a solution to an NLP or
an equilibrium to a Nash game.
Given lower boundsl i and upper boundsui with −∞ ≤ l i < ui ≤ ∞ for all i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,q}, the standard MCP
is defined as the problem of finding a pointz∗ ∈ Rq inside the boxB= {z | l ≤ z≤ u} that iscomplementaryto
the nonlinear functionF : Rq 7→ Rq. The pointz∗ is complementaryto F(z∗) when
either z∗i = l i and Fi(z
∗)≥ 0
or z∗i = ui and Fi(z
∗)≤ 0 for i = 1,2, . . . ,q,
or l i < z∗i < ui and Fi(z
∗) = 0.
(2.10)
The following are important special cases:
• If l ≡−∞ andu≡ ∞ then MCP reduces to solving a systems of nonlinear equations; that is we try to find
a pointz∗ ∈ Rq such thatF(z∗) = 0.
• If l ≡ 0 andu≡ ∞ then we obtain the standard nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP) of finding a
feasible pointz∗ ∈ Rq for the system
z∗i ≥ 0, Fi(z
∗)≥ 0, andz∗i Fi(z
∗) = 0, for i = 1,2, . . . ,q. (2.11)
• If F(z) is an affine function ofz in (2.11), sayF(z) = Mz+ t for some given vectort ∈ Rq and matrix
M ∈Rq×q, then the problem NCP (2.11) reduces to a linear complementarity problem (LCP). The reader
is referred to Cottle et al. (2009) and Murty (1988) for an extensive treatment of LCPs.
MCPs are special cases ofvariational equality (VIs) problems. We can formulate MCP (2.10) as a so-called
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box constrainedvariational inequality problem (2.12) since the setB is a rectangular set.z∗ is a solution of
MCP (2.10) if and only if it is a solution of the following VI:
F(z∗)T(z−z∗)≥ 0, ∀z∈ B. (2.12)
The establishment of the relationship between the complementarity problem and the variational inequality
problem can be found in many sources in the literature (Karamdian (1971), Harker (1993), Dirkse and Ferris
(1995a), Nagurney (1999), Facchinei and Pang (2003)).
A considerable number of solution algorithms has been developed for solving mixed complementarity prob-
lems. An extensive survey on the developments in solving mixed complementarity problems is done by Ferris
and Kanzow (2002). Moreover, the reader can find a comparisonof the performance of the algorithms used by
different MCP solvers in Billups et al. (1997)3. Among these solvers, PATH (Dirkse and Ferris (1995b), Ferris
and Munson (2000)) has been one of the most prominent state-of- rt algorithms which performs successfully
on large scale mixed complementarity problems. In Chapter 3, we also formulate the equilibrium problem
of generation capacity choice of the power producers in perfectly competitive electricity markets as an MCP,
which we solve by utilizing the PATH solver.
Existence and uniqueness: Many of the basic theoretical results in complementarity and variational inequality
problems have been already well-developed. There is a largebody of literature which provide various results
on the existence and uniqueness of solutions to these problems. Since it is not possible to give all these results
here, we just give a flavor of the existence and uniqueness theory for complementarity problems by using the
variational inequality formulation VI (2.12). The interest d reader can find an extensive review of theoretical
results in Harker and Pang (1990), Harker (1993), Nagurney (1999), and Facchinei and Pang (2003).
The basic result is stated in the following theorem for the exist nce of a solution to the VI (2.12) (hence to
the MCP (2.10)).
Theorem 2.3.2. (Harker and Pang (1990))Let B be a nonempty, compact, and convex set and let F(z) be a
continuous mapping on B. Then there exists a solution to the problem VI (2.12).
In general, the variational inequality problem may have more than one solution. IfF is continuous and
strictly monotone onB, then the solution of the VI (2.12) is unique, if it exists, asstated in the next theorem.
Theorem 2.3.3. (Harker and Pang (1990))Let B be a nonempty, closed, and convex set and F be continuous
and strictly monotone on B. Then VI (2.12) has at most one solution.
The following theorem provides a condition under which bothexistence and uniqueness of the solution to
3Also see http://www.gams.com/docs/pathvsmiles.htm for comparison between PATH and MILES.
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the problem VI (2.12) is guaranteed.
Theorem 2.3.4. (Harker and Pang (1990))Let B be a nonempty, closed, and convex set and F be continuous
and strongly monotone on B. Then there exists a unique solution z∗ to VI (2.12).
Finally, since MCPs constitute a subclass of VIs, the existence and uniqueness results for VIs also hold for
MCPs.
2.3.3.1 Formulating Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) Conditions of an NLP as an MCP
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT) conditions are first order (necessary) optimality conditions of an NLP. As men-
tioned in Section 2.2.1, under certain conditions, KKT conditions are also sufficient optimality conditions of an
NLP. One can establish the relationship between the (non)linear optimization problem and the mixed comple-
mentarity problem by formulating the KKT conditions of an NLP as an MCP (e.g., Ferris and Sinapiromsaran
(1998)).
Let z in MCP (2.10) be composed of the vectors of primal variablesx and dual variablesλ andµ of the NLP
(2.1). Then the mixed complementarity problem is to findz∗ = (x∗,λ ∗,µ∗) ∈ Rq whereq= n+m+ k within


























where f ,g, andh are the functions in NLP (2.1). It can be easily seen that the first order conditions of NLP
(2.1) given in (2.3) are equivalent to the MCP (2.13). Therefor , in theory, one can try to find the stationary
points of an NLP problem using an MCP solver. If the KKT conditions (2.3) are necessary and sufficient for
optimality then the solution of the MCP (2.13) is equivalentto he solution of the NLP (2.1).
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2.3.3.2 Formulating Nash Games as MCPs
MCPs represent a broader class of problems than (N)LPs; thatis MCPs are not just the optimality conditions of
(N)LPs. There may not be any (non)linear optimization problem corresponding to an MCP Gabriel et al. (2012).
Furthermore, using MCPs is a natural way of formulating various equilibrium problems such as Nash games.
The advantage of MCPs is that we can formulate and solve the optimality conditions of several (N)LP problems,
that are not separable, simultaneously. This is especiallyuseful when we would like to find an equilibrium in
a Nash game where every player’s objective function dependso the strategy of other players and each player
attempts to maximize (minimize) his/her utility (cost) foreach fixed strategy of his/her opponents under a set
of constraints (such as market clearing conditions) that tie all these optimization problems together.
Next, we elaborate on how we can formulate Nash games and compute Nash equilibria via variational
inequality or mixed complementarity problem formulations. To this end, we assume thatXi in playeri’s problem
(2.5) is represented by a set of equality and inequality constrai ts. ThenXi := {xi |gi(xi)≥ 0, hi(xi)= 0, xi ≥ 0},
wheregi , andhi are continuously differentiable functions. As a result, playeri’s problem (2.5) becomes an NLP
and we can compute a Nash equilibrium in two ways (Harker (1993) and Facchinei and Pang (2003)):
• If fi is a pseudoconvex function,gi is a vector-valued quasiconcave function,hi is a vector-valued affine
function, and a constraint qualification holds, then by using Proposition 2.2.1 in Section 2.2.1, the solu-
tion of each playeri’s optimization problem (2.5) is equivalent to solving the KKT system (2.14):
0≤ ∇xi f (x∗i ,x∗−i)−λ ∗i
T ∇xi gi(x∗i)−µ∗i
T ∇xi h(x∗i) ⊥ x∗i ≥ 0
0≤ gi(x∗i) ⊥ λ ∗i ≥ 0
hi(x∗i) = 0,
(2.14)
whereλ i andµ i are the vector of Lagrange multipliers (dual variables) corresponding to the inequality
and equality constraints of firmi, respectively.
In order to find a Nash equilibrium, one can concentrate on solving the KKT conditions for every player in
one mixed complementarity problem simultaneously (one cansolve (2.14) for alli) and use an algorithm
like PATH (Dirkse and Ferris (1995b), Ferris and Munson (2000)).
• Alternatively as we explain in Section 2.3.3 we can calculate a Nash equilibrium by solving a variational
inequality problem. A tuplex∗ = (x∗1,x∗2, . . . ,x∗N) is a Nash equilibrium ifx∗ is a solution of VI (2.15).
F(x∗)T(x−x∗)≥ 0, ∀x∈ X, (2.15)




Xi. SinceXi := {xi | gi(xi)≥ 0, hi(xi) = 0, xi ≥ 0}, VI (2.15)
is equivalent to (2.14).
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If Xi is a compact and convex set, then since∇xi fi(xi ,x−i) is continuous with respect toxi for each fixed
x−i, the existence of Nash equilibria follows from Theorem 2.3.. In addition if fi is strictly convex with
respect toxi for each fixedx−i , then by Theorem 2.3.3 strict monotonicity ofF(x) implies that there is a
unique Nash equilibrium (Harker and Pang (1990), Harker (1993), and Nagurney (1999)). Similar to the
first case, we can use PATH to solve (2.15).
2.3.4 Bilevel Programming
Bilevel programming problems are hierarchical mathematical problems where the set of all decision variables
is partitioned between vectorsx and y to be solved at two stages. The vectorx is the decision variable of
the optimization problem at the first stage. Givenx, the vectory∗(x) is chosen as an optimal solution of the
optimization problem parameterized inx at the second stage. Hence, there is an (N)LP problem at each stage
and the constraints of the first-stage problem are defined in part by the second-stage problem.
To be more precise, knowing the selectionx at the first stage, a decision maker selects his/her best strategy
y∗(x) which optimizes his/her problem (i.e., his/her cost (utility) s minimized (maximized)) at the second stage:
y∗(x) ∈ S(x) := argmin
y≥0
{ f (x,y) s.t.g(x,y) ≥ 0,h(x,y) = 0}, (2.16)
where f : Rn 7→ R, g : Rn 7→ Rk, h : Rn 7→ Rm are differentiable functions andy∗(x) is called the optimal
reaction of the decision maker at the second stage on the given choice ofx at the first stage. In principle, one can
takey∈R l in (2.16); we will considery≥ 0 just to keep in line with the mathematical formulations introduced
throughout this thesis.
Being aware of the second stage decisiony∗(x), the same or another decision maker chooses his/her best
strategyx∈ Rn which optimizes his/her problem at the first stage:
min
x
{θ(x,y∗(x)) s.t.x∈ X,y∗(x) ∈ S(x)}, (2.17)
whereX ∈ Rn is a nonempty closed set in which the constraints only involve the first stage decisionx and are
independent ofy∗(x).
The (N)LP problem (2.17) at the first stage is called theupper level problemwhereas the (N)LP problem
(2.16) at the second stage is called thelower level problem. The upper level problem is sometimes calledthe
leader’s problemand the decision maker is calledthe leadersince his/her strategy at the upper level leads the
decisions made at the lower level. If there is another decision maker at the lower level who is not a leader,
then he/she is calledthe followerand his/her problem may also be called asthe follower’s problem. Dempe
(2002) presents an extensive overview of the theory of bilevel programming, different formulations of bilevel
problems as one level optimization problems, their optimality conditions, and the solution algorithms.
In a bilevel program, there may be one or several agents at both upper and lower level problems. Next, we
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show two special cases of bilevel program. The first case, a two-s age stochastic program, represents a problem
of a single agent at both upper and lower levels whereas in thesecond case there is an equilibrium problem of
several agents at the lower level.
2.3.4.1 Two-stage Stochastic Programs
A two-stage stochastic program, introduced in Section 2.2.2, is a special case of bilevel programs. In a general
bilevel program there may be several agents at upper and lower evels whereas in a two-stage stochastic program
(e.g., problem (2.4)) there is a single agent. This agent hasto make a “here-and-now” decisionx at the first stage
before the realizations of the uncertain dataξ (ω), viewed as a random vector, are known. At the second stage,
after one or many repetitive realizations ofξ (ω) becomes available, he/she obtainsy∗(ω ,x) andF(ξ (ω),x) by
solving the lower level problem for givenx. Eventually, we are interested in findingx∗ which minimizes his/her
expected cost,θ(x,y∗(x)) := Eω [F(ξ (ω),x)], at the upper level.
As mentioned in Section 2.2.2, we formulate a two-stage stochastic program of a central decision maker
in Chapter 3 and we solve the corresponding stochastic program to find the equilibrium of firms’ generation
capacity choices under uncertainty of market conditions indecentralized electricity markets.
2.3.4.2 Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints (MPECs)
In game-theoretic models with multiple agents, each agent as being a leader may face a bilevel problem where
the lower level problem is an equilibrium problem. Then eachgent’s bilevel problem can be reformulated as a
mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). MPECs are widely used tools to reformulate the
bilevel problem of a leader as a single optimization problemby replacingS(x) in (2.17) with the equilibrium





0≤ ∇y f (x,y)−λ T∇yg(x,y)−µT ∇yh(x,y) ⊥ y≥ 0
0≤ g(x,y) ⊥ λ ≥ 0
h(x,y) = 0,
(2.18)
whereλ ∈ Rk+ andµ ∈ Rm are the vector of Langrange multipliers of the inequality and equality constraints
in (2.16), respectively.
Viewed as an NLP, the feasible region of an MPEC is often nonconvex and its constraints do not sat-
isfy a classical constraint qualification such asthe linear independence constraint qualification (LICQ)or the
Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification (MFCQ). Therefore, standard solution methods for nonlinear
programs are prone to failure. Several specialized solution approaches for MPEC problems are proposed in the
38 2.4. Methodology: Simulation-based Optimization underUncertainty
literature. Some of these are implicit programming approach, smoothing and regularization methods, penalty
function approach, and sequential quadratic programming (SQP) approach. For an extensive review of these
methods and several theoretical results about MPECs, we refer the reader to Luo et al. (1996) and Outrata et al.
(1998).
In Chapter 4, we consider a bilevel problem for each each firm:For given generation capacities of the other
firms, each firm chooses its generation capacity at the upper lev l and the production of all firms takes place at
the lower level in future market. Furthermore, the future market conditions at the lower level are not known in
advance (i.e., under demand uncertainty). We assume that each firm has market power at the first stage; that is it
anticipates the impact of its capacity choice at the first stage on the market price and the production of all firms
for each demand realization at the second stage. In this context, if we focus on only one firm’s problem, then
we can also reformulate its bilevel problem as am thematical problem with equilibrium constraints (MPEC).
Finally, in Chapter 4, we indeed consider all firms as leadershaving an MPEC problem each, then one can
speak of finding a Nash equilibrium toan equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). It is well
known that EPECs are in general nonconvex problems and they oft n do not have solutions. Two different
approaches can be found in the literature to solve EPEC problems but none of these solution methods has
analytically been proved to converge to the true solution ofthe EPEC problem (see Gabriel et al. (2012) for
details). One of these approaches is the so called ALLKKT approach, where the first order conditions of all
the leaders’ problems are solved simultaneously (Hu (2003), Ehrenmann (2004), and Hu and Ralph (2007)).
Another approach, so-called diagonalization, is a kind of fixed-point iteration in which each leader chooses and
updates his/her strategy sequentially holding the other leaders’ strategies as fixed until the sequence converges
(Hobbs et al. (2000), Hu and Ralph (2007), Yao et al. (2008)).
2.4 Methodology: Simulation-based Optimization under Uncertainty
Development of alternative methods to find a solution to stochastic problems is an active area of research.
Among these, a class of simulation-based methods, so calledsample-path methods(also known assample
average approximation methods), utilize simulation and deterministic optimization methods to solve many
types of stochastic problems. In sample-path methods, a complex stochastic system is observed along a fixed
sample path by using the method of common random numbers fromsimulation literature (e.g., Banks et al.
(2010)). This way the underlying stochastic problem is converted to a deterministic problem which provides
an approximate solution to the solution of the stochastic problem. The resulting deterministic problem is then
solved by fast and effective deterministic solution methods available and its solution is taken as an approximate
solution of the original stochastic problem.
In Chapter 3, we consider both two-stage stochastic programs and two-stage stochastic equilibrium prob-
lems in decentralized electricity markets and we utilize sample-path methods to find a solution to each of these
problems. In Chapter 5, we consider a stochastic optimization problem of a manufacturing flow control sys-
tem, which is modeled as a stochastic-fluid system, and find a solution to this problem by using sample-path
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optimization method.
This section outlines several aspects of sample-path methods for solvingstochastic optimization problems
andstochastic equilibrium models. We first describe how the sample-path idea is used for solving stochastic
optimization problems in Section 2.4.1 and then we present,in Section 2.4.2, an extension of this method to
solve stochastic equilibrium models.
2.4.1 Sample-path Optimization
In this section, we present the basic idea ofsample-path optimization methodto find a solution to a stochastic
optimization problem.
Suppose we are given an extended real-valued stochastic process{ fM(x) | M ≥ 1} wherex represents the
vector of decision variables andfM(x) almost surely converges pointwise to an extended real-valued imit
function f∞(x), asM → ∞. We are interested in solving a stochastic optimization problem that involvesf∞(x);
however,f∞(x) is intractable (i.e., its analytical representation is notpossible) or hard to compute. For example,
f∞(x) can be a steady-state4 performance measure of a simulation (e.g., the long run time-averaged number of
customers in a system or the long run average production and/or backlog cost of the system per unit time) while
fM(x) is observed for simulation length ofM. f∞(x) can also be an expectation whilefM(x) is the average ofM
instances of the system.
Assume that{ fM(x) | M ≥ 1} and f∞(x) are defined on a common probability space(Ω,F ,P). For eachx,
we denote the sample-path of the stochastic process by{ fM(ω ,x) | M ≥ 1} whereω represents the sample path
(which is a list of random numbers that give rise to a particular simulation run), andM is the simulation length.
We cannot computef∞(x) but we can usefM(ω ,x) for largeM to approximatef∞(x). For instance, iff∞(x) is
a steady-state performance measure, then we can simulate the corresponding systemM time units and compute
fM(ω ,x) which converges pointwise tof∞(x) asM → ∞. On the other hand, if∞(x) is an expectation, then we
repeatedly simulateM instances of the system and computefM(ω ,x) =
1
M
∑Mj=1 f (ω ,x j ). By using the strong
law of large numbers, the average of the observations,
1
M
∑Mj=1 f (ω ,x j), converges almost surely to the expected
value, f∞(x) asM → ∞. Furthermore, in most cases, we can compute derivatives or directional derivatives of
the function fM(ω ,x) by utilizing well-established methods of gradient estimation (see Glassermann (1991)
and L’Ecuyer (1991) for a general overview). Some commonly used gradient estimation techniques are finite-
difference methods, the likelihood ratio method, and infinitesimal perturbation analysis (see Ho and Cao (1991)
and Glassermann (1991)).
The method can be summarized as follows: we fix a sample pathω (by using common random numbers)
and a large simulation lengthM (to get a good estimate of the limit function), then we obtainhe deterministic
function fM(ω ,x) and the corresponding problem becomes a deterministic optimization problem (e.g., NLP).
By exploiting the information of (directional) derivatives of fM(ω ,x), we can solve the resulting deterministic
4A system is said to be in steady state provided the probability that the system in a given state is time independent.
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problem with efficient deterministic (NLP) solvers available and take its solution as an approximate minimizer
of the stochastic optimization problem (that involvesf∞(x)). Note that when the limit function is a steady-state
performance measure or an expectation, which is the case in the applications we consider in this thesis, the
minimizers of the stochastic problem are independent ofω .
The theory of sample-path optimization for finding a minimizer of f∞(x) in stochastic optimization prob-
lems with deterministic constraints is analyzed in Robinson (1996) which also contains additional references
to the literature. Robinson (1996) gives a number of sufficient conditions that guarantee that if we takeM large
enough, each approximate minimizer offM(ω ,x) will be close to a true minimizer of the limit function (f∞(x)).
The results of Robinson (1996) guarantee that the method converges with probability one under two conditions:
first, the sequence of approximating functions epiconverges to the limit function; second, the limit function al-
most surely has a nonempty, compact set of minimizers. Theseconditions hold under fairly general settings.
For instance, epiconvergence is implied by pointwise convergence of convex functions (fM(ω ,x)) to a convex
limit ( f∞(x)). Later, Gürkan et al. (1999b) establish almost-sure convergence of sample-path methods when
dealing with stochastic optimization problems with stochastic constraints. In this thesis, we do not explicitly
deal with theoretical issues related to convergence analysis; in tead we solely focus on the operational issues
and observe convergence numerically. However, for some of the stochastic optimization problems we consider
in this thesis (such as two-stage stochastic programs in Chapter 3), we have convex approximating functions
which converge pointwise to convex limits. Hence, sufficient conditions for convergence hold for these prob-
lems and ensure that if we take the sample size large enough, the solutions we obtain will be close to the true
minimizer of these stochastic problems. The reader interest d on the theory of convergence in sample-path
optimization is referred to Robinson (1996) and Gürkan et al. (1999b).
Basic applications of sample-path optimization in the litera ure were done by Plambeck et al. (1996) and
Plambeck et al. (1993) regarding the solution of simulationoptimization problems with deterministic con-
straints. Plambeck et al. (1996) report extensive numerical experiments utilizing sample-path optimization on
large scale systems (project management involving PERT networks with up to 110 stochastic arcs and cycle time
optimization in unreliable tandem production lines with upto 50 machines). In turn, Gürkan (2000) focuses
on optimization of buffer allocations in unreliable tandemproduction lines and also solves large scale systems
with up to 50 machines. Both Plambeck et al. (1996) and Gürkan (2000) use IPA for gradient estimation.
Furthermore, a closely related technique centered around likelihood-ratio methods appeared in Rubinstein
and Shapiro (1993) under the name of stochastic counterpartmethods. The basic approach (and its variants)
is also known asample average approximation method (SAA)in the stochastic programming literature and is
used by Shapiro and Homem-De-Mello (1998) to solve a two-stage stochastic program with recourse structure.
In this thesis, we utilize sample-path optimization or sample average approximation methods to find a so-
lution to the stochastic optimization problems we introduce in Chapters 3 and 5. It is worth to note that the
types of stochastic optimization problems we tackle in these chapters allow us to use sample-path methods in
order to find the optimal decisions. In Chapter 3, we deal withfinding the optimal investment decisions in a
two-stage stochastic program for which the theory of sample-path method and the statistical inference for its
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convergence are quite well-developed (Shapiro and Homem-D-Mello (1998), Linderoth et al. (2006)). How-
ever, the sample-path method which shows a considerable promise for solving two-stage stochastic programs
may be practically inapplicable for solving multistage stochastic programs with a large (e.g., greater than 4)
number of stages (see Shapiro (2006) and Shapiro et al. (2009) for the computational complexity of solving
multistage stochastic problems with sample-path methods). In Chapter 5, we consider a control problem of a
stochastic manufacturing system and we are concerned with optimizing the production parameters (i.e., target
inventory levels) of a plausible class of policies proposedfor such type of problems in the literature. However,
it is not much known whether sample-path methods would work tfind optimal policies of a stochastic optimal
control problem, in particular with infinite horizon. Next,we briefly describe the implementation of sample-
path methods we use in Chapters 3 and 5. More details of these mthods can be found in the corresponding
chapters.
In Chapter 3, we formulate a two-stage stochastic program ofa central decision maker under different
electricity market designs, where the generation capacities are chosen at the first stage under uncertainty of
future market conditions and power generation takes place in the future spot market at the second stage. The
two-stage stochastic program involves minimizing the total expected cost of the electricity system as the limit
function. We cannot observe the expected cost which is the obj ctive function in the first-stage problem;
however we can approximate it by a sample-average function using the sample{ωm}Mm=1. Thus, we utilize
sample-path optimization or sample average approximationmethod in stochastic programming literature to find
its approximate solution (which we also show to be the equilibrium of the perfectly competitive decentralized
electricity markets). The approximate problem is in general an NLP and we can solve it by using a standard
NLP solver in two ways:
• One way is solving a single NLP which includes both first stagevariables and all the second stage
variables for the sample{ωm}Mm=1. However, the size of the NLP may get very large for large sample
sizes which increases the computational time. Thus, we use in Chapter 3 an alternative approach as
explained below.
• Alternatively, we can solve the first and second stage problems iteratively by using an (N)LP solver at
each stage as illustrated in Figure 2.2 (a). We model the approximate problem at the first stage in which
we define the sample average cost function as an external function. In order to solve the approximate
problem at the first stage, we solve the second-stage problemM consecutive times at any first stage
decision pointx that the NLP solver (at the first stage) would like to evaluateits optimality. For givenx,
we obtain the corresponding primal-dual solutions from thesecond stage (N)LP problem and we use these
primal-dual solutions in the first stage problem to calculate the value and the (directional) derivatives of
the sample average cost function. The iterations continue util the optimality conditions of both the NLP
problem at the first stage and the (N)LP problem at the second stage are satisfied at a decision pointx∗.
Thus,x∗ is taken as the optimal generation capacity investments in the electricity market and the primal-
dual solutions of the second stage problem atx∗, for eachm∈ M, are taken as the optimal spot market
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outcomes.
Furthermore, both the two-stage stochastic program and itsapproximate problem given in Chapter 3 are
convex problems with nonempty solution sets. Hence as mentioned above, this guarantees convergence of the
sample-path method by using the results of Robinson (1996).
In Chapter 5, we consider a manufacturing flow control problem that is modeled as a stochastic fluid sys-
tem. We are interested in finding the optimal threshold (target inventory) levels of a plausible class of control
policies, so-called hedging policies, minimizing the longrun time-averaged production and backorder cost of
the manufacturing system. The system is incurred under different production and demand states that change
according to some external stochastic process. The long runaverage cost depends on the production rate, which
is adjusted in each state depending on the threshold (hedging) level.
In order to solve this problem, we use a similar approach to G¨urkan (2000): We develop a generalized
semi-Markov process (GSMP) representation of the system. AGSMP can simply be thought as a mathematical
framework that models the evolution of a discrete-event simulation (Glynn (1989) and Shedler (1993)). By uti-
lizing the GSMP representation together with IPA for gradient stimation, we can derive recursive expressions
to calculate the value and the exact derivatives of the approximating average cost function in a single simulation
run of M time units. Thus, we fix a sample-path by using common random nu bers and solve the approximat-
ing NLP problem for a largeM by using a state-of-the-art NLP solver. The illustration ofthe corresponding
sample-path method is given in Figure 2.2 (b). In the NLP model, w define the approximating average cost
function as an external function. We use an iterative procedure in which the NLP solver calls the simulation
model (GSMP) at any decision pointx that it would like to evaluate its optimality. The GSMP modelenables
us to obtain the value and the (directional) derivatives of the approximating average cost function at a single
simulation run at each iteration. The iterations continue until the optimality conditions of the NLP problem at
a decision pointx∗ are satisfied. Thus,x∗ is taken as the optimal threshold levels of the system. Furthermore,
we also include stochastic constraints in the manufacturing flow control problem and use sample-path method
in a similar way to solve the approximating problem. In the modified stochastic problem, we constrain the long
run proportion of time that the system is in backlog state below a pre-specified level.
2.4.2 Solving Stochastic Equilibrium Models: Stochastic MPCs/VIs
In this section we present an extension of the sample-path optimization method discussed in Section 2.4.1 to
solve stochastic MCPs or variational inequality problems.Since stochastic MCPs are a subclass of stochastic
VIs, we will explain the sample-path method for stochastic VIs. Consider the following VI problem in which
we are interested in finding a pointz∗ ∈ B, if it exists, satisfying
F∞(z
∗)T(z−z∗)≥ 0, ∀z∈ B, (2.19)
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of the implementation of sample-path methods in (a) Chapter 3 and (b)
Chapter 5, respectively
whereF∞(z∗) are vector-valued functions involving expectations or steady-state performance measures in a
stochastic system andB is polyhedral convex set.
As an extension of sample-path optimization, the sample-path method for solving stochastic VIs inherits
its important features, thus it is very similar to its optimization counter part. LetFM(ω ,z), observed by a
simulation length ofM, be approximating functions ofF∞(z). As in the sample-path optimization method
described in Section 2.4.1, we fix a largeM to get a good estimate ofF∞(z) and a sample pointω using the
method of common random numbers from simulation literature. For fixedM andω , FM(ω ,z) is a deterministic
function ofz. Hence, we solve the deterministic variational inequalitydefined byB andFM(ω ,z) and take its
solution as an approximate solution of the problem VI (2.19). By utilizing gradient estimation methods, one
can use efficient deterministic algorithms (i.e., PATH by Dirkse and Ferris (1995b) and Ferris and Munson
(2000)) to solve the approximating variational inequalityproblem, which is a very important feature since
unlike stochastic optimization problems there are currently o other methods to solve stochastic variational
inequalities.
In Gürkan et al. (1996) and Gürkan et al. (1999a), the basicidea of using sample-path information is ex-
tended to solving stochastic variational inequalities andequilibrium problems. For an extensive analysis of
sample-path method for stochastic variational inequalities and the sufficient conditions for convergence of the
method, the reader is referred to Gürkan et al. (1999a).
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of the implementation of sample-path method to solve stochastic MCPs in
Chapter 3
In Chapter 3, we also use sample-path methods for finding an approximate of the solution of stochastic
mixed complementarity problems. As briefly mentioned in Section 1.2.1.1, we formulate, in Chapter 3, stochas-
tic equilibrium problems for different electricity marketdesigns under perfect competition. These equilibrium
problems are formulated as stochastic MCPs consisting of the vector-valued expected performance functions
of the first stage generation capacity decisions under uncertainty of spot market outcomes at the second stage.
We can approximate the corresponding stochastic MCPs by using the sample{ωm}Mm=1. Thus, we can find an
estimate of the solution to these stochastic MCPs by solvingthe approximating MCP problems. In particular,
for one case of operating-reserve pricing scheme we need to solve the equilibrium problem as a stochastic
MCP since we cannot cast it as a single stochastic optimization problem. Similar to the implementation of
sample-path optimization methods described in Section 2.4.1, we can solve the approximating MCP in two
ways:
• One way is solving a single MCP which includes both first stagevariables and all the second stage
variables for the sample{ωm}Mm=1. However, the size of the MCP may get very large for large sample
sizes, which increases the computational time as we also observe in our numerical experiments.
• Alternatively, we can decompose the first and second stage variables and solve both problems iteratively.
For the equilibrium problems formulated in Chapter 3, we have n MCP problem at the first stage whose
second stage decision variables are solutions to an (N)LP problem (see Chapter 3 for details). Thus, we
solve the first stage problem by an MCP solver (e.g., PATH) andthe second stage problem by an (N)LP
solver iteratively as illustrated in Figure 2.3. We model the approximate problem at the first stage as
an MCP in which we define the approximating functionsFM(ω ,z) as external functions ofz. In order
to solve the approximate problem at the first stage, we solve the second-stage problemM consecutive
times at any first stage decision pointz that the MCP solver (at the first stage) would like to explore.For
given z, we obtain the corresponding primal-dual solutions from the second stage (N)LP problem and
we use these primal-dual solutions in the first stage problemto calculate the value and the (directional)
derivatives of the the approximating functions with respect to z. The iterations continue until the MCP
solver finds a solutionz∗ (i.e., generation capacities) which is taken as the first stage equilibrium in the
electricity market. The primal-dual solutions of the second stage (N)LP problem atz∗, for eachm∈ M,
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are taken as the spot market outcomes at equilibrium.
Finally, as in the application of sample-path optimizationmethod, we do not deal with convergence analysis
theoretically; instead we observe convergence numerically.
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Chapter 3
Generation Capacity Investments in
Electricity Markets: Perfect Competition
Abstract
In competitive electricity markets, markets designs basedon power exchanges where supply bidding (barring demand-
side bidding) is at the sole short run marginal cost may not guarantee resource adequacy. As alternative ways to remedy
the resource adequacy problem, we focus on three different market designs in detail when demand is inelastic, namely
an energy-only market with VOLL pricing (or a price cap), an additional capacity market, and operating-reserve pricing.
We also discuss demand-side bidding (i.e., a price responsive demand) which can be seen as a categorically different
alternative to remedy the resource adequacy problem. We consider a perfectly competitive market consisting of three
types of agents: generators, a transmission system operator, and consumers; all agents are assumed to have no market
power. For each market design, we model and analyze capacityinvestment choices of firms using a two-stage game where
generation capacities are installed in the first stage and geeration takes place in future spot markets at the second stage.
When future spot market conditions are assumed to be knowna priori (i.e., deterministic demand case), we show that
all of these two-stage models with different market mechanisms, except operating-reserve pricing, can be cast as single
optimization problems. When future spot market conditionsare not known in advance (i.e., under demand uncertainty),
we essentially have a two-stage stochastic game. Interestingly, an equilibrium point of this stochastic game can be found
by solving a two-stage stochastic program, in case of all of the market mechanisms except operating-reserve pricing. In
case of operating-reserve pricing, while the formulation of an equivalent deterministic or stochastic optimization problem
is possible when operating-reserves are based on observed deman , this simplicity is lost when operating-reserves are
based on installed capacities. We generalize these resultsfor other uncertain parameters in spot markets such as fuel costs
and transmission capacities. Finally, we illustrate how all these models can be numerically tackled and present numerical
experiments. In our numerical experiments, we observe thatuncertainty of demand leads to higher total generation
capacity expansion and a broader mix of technologies compared to the investment decisions assuming average demand
levels. Furthermore for the same VOLL (or price cap) level and u der the assumptions of random demand with finite
support and no forced outages, energy-only markets with VOLL pricing tend to lead to total generation capacity below
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the peak load with a certain probability whereas energy markets with a forward capacity market or operating-reserve
pricing result in higher investments. Finally, the regulator decisions (e.g., reserve capacity target) in capacity markets
and operating-reserve pricing can be chosen in such a way that results in very similar investment levels and fuel mix of
generation capacities in both market designs.
3.1 Introduction
In the days of regulated monopolies, there was no issue of generation resource adequacy. Companies were
obligated to serve the demand and had to invest accordingly;an optimization model was used to compute the
expansion of generation capacity decisions that would satisfy demand at minimal investment and operations
costs (subject to reliability constraints that we will not discuss here). In compensation for this obligation,
electricity prices were regulated (often at average cost) in a way that guaranteed that the company could pay for
its expenses (including reimbursement of long term debt) and make a reasonable profit on equity. The theory
of peak load pricing for non-storable commodities, such as electricity, is the economic counterpart of these
computational models; it can be seen as an economic interpreation of the capacity expansion model in terms
of electricity prices that induce efficient investments andoperations. Of particular importance, the theory of
peak load pricing explains that the price of electricity in the highest demand period must embed a particular
(peak load) component to induce an efficient capacity mix. Both the capacity expansion models and the theory
of peak load pricing can be traced back to work conducted inÉlectricité de France in the fifties and sixties (see
the collection of early papers treating both subjects in Morlat and Bessière (1971)).
Capacity expansion models were extensively developed during the regulatory periods before loosing some
of their appeal after restructuring. After restructuring,generation and investments became the responsibility of
companies who had to make a profit on the electricity market. This gave rise to the question whether energy-
only electricity markets would provide incentives for adequate investments and thereby maintain security of
supply. This discussion focuses especially on those power plants which will only be needed to meet demand
at peak hours and therefore have to earn sufficient revenues ithose hours to cover their investment costs. The
theory of peak load pricing, which was initially developed for the regulated monopoly, was later proved equally
relevant to perfectly competitive markets (in case of elastic demand, see Crew et al. (1995) for a survey). This
theory has become crucial today to explain why competitive electricity markets may not spontaneously provide
the right incentive to invest in generation capacity for peak lo d and to suggest remedies to this market failure.
In this chapter, we consider three variations of competitivelectricity market designs known as energy-
only market with VOLL pricing (or a price cap), a forward capacity market, and operating-reserve pricing as
possible remedies to a market failure of insufficient generation capacity investment. We also discuss demand-
side bidding which is strictly speaking not a remedy to a market failure but an alternative way to remove this
market failure. We formulate generation capacity investment decisions in these electricity market designs as
two-stage equilibrium problems, which is a natural way of modelling problems with multiple decision makers
in a competitive environment. We show that most of these equilibri m models can be cast in mathematical
CHAPTER 3. Generation Capacity Investments in ElectricityMarkets: Perfect Competition 49
programming formulations that are not too far from the earlycapacity expansion models. Establishing the
exact relations between the two-stage equilibrium problems and the early capacity expansion models under
these market designs is one of the main objectives of this chapter. We continue this introduction by formalizing
the question of resource adequacy in competitive electricity markets. We do so by referring to the early capacity
expansion models (in the most simplified setting) and to the int rpretation of their dual solution in peak load
pricing terms.
Consider the following simple generation capacity expansion model of a regulated monopoly where supply
and demand are located at a single node. There is a finite set ofplant typesK and a finite set of time segments
Ω (these can also be interpreted as states of the world, as we later do) each occurring with some durationπ(ω)
(that we later interpret as probabilities).d(ω) is the demand in time segmentω ; κk andck are the unit capacity
and unit generation cost of plantk; xk is the capacity of plant typek andyk(ω) is the generation of this plant
in time segmentω . Assuming the monopoly firm is regulated in a way that motivates cost minimization, the








s.t. xk−yk(ω)≥ 0 π(ω)βk(ω) ∀ω ∀k
∑
k
yk(ω)−d(ω)≥ 0 π(ω)p(ω) ∀ω
yk(ω)≥ 0 xk ≥ 0 ∀ω ∀k.
(3.1)
This model allows the monopoly firm to determine an optimal investment portfolio of generation capacity
mix for satisfying various demand levels2. The closely related producer and consumer surplus maximization
problem has a richer economic content. LetP(ω ,d) be the inverse demand function of the market where the
price is given as a function of quantity supplied in time segmnt ω ∈ Ω. The producer and consumer surplus













s.t. xk−yk(ω)≥ 0 π(ω)βk(ω) ∀ω ∀k
∑
k
yk(ω)−d(ω)≥ 0 π(ω)p(ω) ∀ω





P(ω ,ξ )dξ is known as the consumers’ willingness to pay atd(ω). The KKT conditions of
problem (3.2) provide the necessary relations to explain the resource adequacy problem. Specifically the KKT
1Note that we multiply these dual variables with their probabilities in the models (3.1) and (3.2) for the purpose of scaling.
2In the formulation (3.1), the demand constraint is assumed to be always binding ifck > 0,∀k. In more general market models with
transmission or unit commitment constraints, however, theoptimal solution might not be binding since technical and economic reasons
may drive generators to run even when power supply exceeds thdemand. In these situations, generators may seek to maintain output
by offering to pay wholesale buyers to take their electricity. This could yield negative price in some locations or periods.
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condition associated with a positive generation variableyk(ω) is stated as:
ck+βk(ω) = P(ω ,d(ω)) = p(ω), ∀ω . (3.3)
Alternatively, the KKT condition associated with a positive investment variablexk is stated as:
∑
ω
π(ω)βk(ω) = κk. (3.4)
The economic interpretation of (3.3) is that a plant of typek which is operating in time segmentω generates
a (scarcity or capacity) rentβk(ω) in that time segment; this rent is equal to the difference betwe n the electricity
price p(ω) in that time segment and the plant’s fuel costck. The economic interpretation of (3.4) is that one
invests in a plant of typek when the duration (π) weighted sum of the rentsβk(ω) over all time segments
ω is equal to the investment costκk. Departing from this pricing scheme induces inefficiencies, either at the
consumption or generation side. The question of resource adequacy is whether restructured electricity markets
lead to electricity prices that satisfy these relations. Ifnot, there is a resource adequacy problem.
It is now recognized that the original restructured electricity markets do not spontaneously satisfy relations
(3.3) and (3.4). Because electricity is not storable, the market (barring demand-side bidding) clears in the short
run when demand is inelastic. The market therefore does not ensur (3.3), because it does not face a downward
sloping demand curve in the short run. Instead, the organization of the market sets the price at the bid of the
last plant selected to satisfy the demand, which used to be a widely used pricing scheme when liberalisation
was introduced in many countries such as in Europe and in the US. Barring market power and demand-side
bidding, this price is equal to the fuel cost of the last select d power plant in time segmentω . This implies that
the most expensive unit in operations over the different time segmentsω (the peak plant) does not make any
margin and hence (3.3) is not satisfied for that unit. This canbe interpreted as follows: the electricity price in
the peak does not incorporate the necessary component, called as “scarcity rent”, that pays for the capacity at
peak demand. The peak plant therefore appears with a zero margin in (3.4) which is thus also never satisfied
for that equipment. This missing margin is now commonly referr d to as the missing money. Stoft (2002)
was among the first ones to analyze investments by invoking insufficient payments for capacity. He explained
how, barring well developed demand-side bidding, pools andpower exchanges prevent prices on the market
to reflect scarcity in generation capacity (see also Cramtonand Stoft (2005, 2006)). Both Hogan (2005) and
Joskow (2007, 2008) also offer enlightening and in depth analysis of the missing money. Oren (2007) provides
a comprehensive description of the different techniques aimed at restoring resource adequacy; he also discusses
various implementations and gives an extensive list of references.
Guaranteeing resource adequacy therefore requires eliminat ng the missing money by creating enough ca-
pacity rentβk(ω) to cover the capital costs of an efficient generation system,including the capacity cost of the
peak plant. This in turn requires changing the electricity pricing mechanism. In an energy-only system, the idea
is to price electricity at a high value that is supposed to reflect the value of lost load (VOLL), known as VOLL
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pricing, when demand is curtailed. In perfectly competitive markets, Stoft (2002) shows that VOLL pricing re-
sults in optimal generation capacity investments. However, in reality VOLL is difficult to estimate and therefore
a price cap (which is in general lower than VOLL) is used. If the price cap induced by the regulator is not high
enough, this will constrain prices from rising up to their competitive levels at peak hours, yielding underinvest-
ment in generation capacity (e.g., see Joskow (2008)). An altern tive solution for avoiding market failure is to
implement a capacity market where the regulator imposes some capacity target in line with historical data and
expected demand and the firms contributing to the sufficient investment level receive numerations accordingly.
In order to increase the robustness against market power, many variants of capacity markets have been proposed
regarding the implementation of the market design and the treatment of demand response (e.g., Cramton and
Stoft (2005), Joskow (2008), Hobbs et al. (2007), Cramton and Ockenfels (2011)). Here we assume a forward
capacity market where capacity is auctioned before the investm nt decision is made and the resulting capacity
payment is certain for the lifetime of the plant. A more sophisticated alternative remedy is to apply some form
of reliability or operating-reserve pricing so that electrici y price increases when the reserve margin decreases
(Stoft (2002), Hogan (2005), Hogan (2009)). Lastly, as a categorically different alternative, ensuring a price
responsive demand in the short-run as well as in the long-runmay remedy the resource adequacy issue.
In recent years, more and more countries have implemented (e.g., US states) or are planning to implement
a variety of these market mechanisms aimed at stimulating investments in new generation capacity, such as
scarcity pricing when capacity is inadequate or capacity payments via additional capacity markets next to the
electricity market. For policy analysis in real world problems, practical tools are needed to gain insights into
the social implications of a market design or a policy target(s e e.g., Schroeder (2012) and Allcott (2012)
for examples of real world applications). Thus, we concentrate on these four mechanisms (including demand-
side bidding briefly) in our analysis with the following contributions. We first expand on existing short run
equilibrium models of restructured systems to include generation capacity decisions under these resource ade-
quacy mechanisms and uncertainty about future electricitymarket conditions. The natural approach is to resort
to complementarity formulations as this mathematical programming paradigm has been extensively used to
model restructured electricity systems. We then assess theex ent to which these models can be restated as op-
timization problems as solvers for optimization problems are now numerous and quite powerful. Furthermore,
we provide insights about to what extent the investment incentiv s are affected by these different mechanisms
under demand uncertainty. To this end, we illustrate how allthese models can be numerically tackled and
present some numerical experiments.
We assume price-taking firms and hence exclude market power.Ev n if real markets may depart from per-
fect competition, perfect competition models provide an essential benchmark for imperfect competition models.
Moreover, real markets may suffer from inefficiencies as a result of regulatory intervention or market design.
Utilizing perfect competition models still allows policy makers to gain insights into the social implications of
a market design or a policy target (e.g., Allcott (2012)). Inaddition, there are computational reasons. Multi-
stage imperfect competition models are difficult if not impossible to solve. This is already true for two-stage
investment and operation models that are EPEC (equilibriumproblem subject to equilibrium constraints) when
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involving market power (see Ralph and Smeers (2006), Hu and Ralph (2007) for more details on these and
related complications). More general models involving a sequence of cycle of investment and operations are
at this stage computationally unexplored. Last, the experience of reformed markets indeed shows that market
power mitigation instruments are effective and that properly designed reformed markets function competitively
and hence can be modeled under the perfect competition assumption. For example, the market monitoring
results of PJM (2012) and CASIO (2012) indicate that market prices are at or near competitive levels most of
the time in US states. Furthermore, the European Union and its Member States are underway to move towards
a fully integrated European electricity market by 2014 withthe aim to increase competition and maximize
the economic welfare of all players. In some of the regions (e.g., Germany-Belgium-France-The Netherlands)
where the integration has already taken place for some time,significant price convergence is observed between
the countries in most of the hours, which is a good indicator for competitiveness (see DG ENERGY (2012)).
To sum up, in this chapter we will deal with a computable representation of the incentives to invest in power
markets functioning under perfect competition.
In reality, generation capacity expansion is a multi-period process. The market induces the creation of new
capacities and the retirement of old ones. A full version of the capacity expansion model therefore involves
a sequence of successive cycles of investment and operations (e.g., Schroeder (2012)). We limit our analysis
to simplified models that represent a single cycle of investmnt and operation: investment takes place in the
first stage at some investment costs; the market operates in the second stage with generators collecting sales
revenues and incurring fuel costs. This restriction is madefor the sake of the presentation. In contrast with
multi-period imperfect competition models, it is perfectly possible to implement the mechanisms considered
here in a multi-period context since convexity is in generalp eserved under perfect competition.
Although we focus mainly on electricity demand being uncertain and/or fluctuating with a very low elas-
ticity, our methodology and results summarized below can beeasily generalized to spot markets with other
uncertainties (i.e., fuel costs, transmission capacities, wind generation etc.). For given wind capacity and
volatile wind generation, one can substitute demand with residual demand levels (i.e., demand minus wind).
Under uncertainty about future electricity market conditions, real world problems including generation capacity
investment decisions lead to stochastic equilibrium problems (e.g., Schroeder (2012) and Allcott (2012)) that
are large scale and computationally more complex to solve than a stochastic optimization problem. Equilibrium
problems are indeed broader than optimization problems which is addressed in detail by Gabriel et al. (2012). In
this thesis, we not only emphasize the link between optimization and equilibrium problems but also show that,
regarding the problem of generation capacity investments in perfectly competitive electricity markets, most of
the formulations of stochastic equilibrium problems can becast as two-stage stochastic programs.
We consider a perfectly competitive market consisting of three types of agents namely generators, a trans-
mission system operator (TSO), and consumers; all agents are price takers. Generators are assumed to be risk
neutral and maximize their expected profits. The transmission ystem operator sells transmission services in
order to maximize the value of its infrastructure and consumers are simply represented by an inelastic demand
in most of the chapter, except in Section 3.6 where we consider a price responsive demand. It may also be
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of interest to include risk averseness of generators by using “coherent risk measures” (e.g., Ehrenmann and
Smeers (2011) and Ralph and Smeers (2011)). The resulting problems are still stochastic equilibrium problems
which are somewhat modified versions of the stochastic equilibri m problems presented in this chapter. When
the markets are “perfectly competitive” and “complete”, the formulation of an equivalent two-stage stochastic
program is still possible as shown by Ralph and Smeers (2011). The main contributions of this chapter can be
summarized as follows:
• We expand the existing short-run models of restructured electricity system to include both uncertainty
of spot market conditions (i.e., demand uncertainty) and resource adequacy mechanisms, such as VOLL
pricing, capacity market, and operating-reserve pricing,and also demand-side bidding as an alternative.
• In perfect competition, we show that most of the formulations f these “equilibrium” models are in fact
equivalent to or can be cast as optimization problems. In particular, in the stochastic setting this re-
sult indicates the prevalence of two-stage stochastic programming for providing solutions to stochastic
equilibrium models. We believe that this result is helpful for making an economic assessment of the
investment incentives in new generation capacity in real wor d systems for the following reasons: in Sec-
tions 2.2.2 and 3.9, we explain how we can solve a two-stage stochastic program as a nonlinear or linear
optimization problem. Due to the availability of powerful and efficient nonlinear programming solvers
and decomposition methods for two-stage stochastic programs, solving a two-stage stochastic program is
computationally much faster than solving a stochastic equilibri m model for large scale systems, which
we also observe in our numerical experiments. In only one casof operating-reserve pricing, we obtain
a complementarity problem that is not equivalent to an optimization problem.
• In perfect competition, we show that single and two-stage representation of these “equilibrium” models
are equivalent. In other words, the open loop equilibria andthe closed loop equilibria of these models
coincide.
• We use sample-path methods and provide detailed algorithmic approaches for numerically tackling all
these models, which allows solving these computationally complex stochastic problems by utilizing de-
terministic off-the-shelf solvers. We also illustrate that these algorithmic approaches help further decrease
the computational time compared to solving the two-stage equilibrium problem as a potentially very large
MCP (Mixed Complementarity Problem) including all the firstand second stage decision variables.
• Through numerical experiments, we gain insights on the impact of demand uncertainty and to what
extend these different mechanisms can remedy the resource adequ cy issue. In particular, we first find
that uncertainty of demand leads to higher total generationcapacity expansion and a broader mix of
technologies compared to the investment decisions assuming average demand levels. Furthermore for the
same VOLL (or price cap) level, energy-only markets with VOLL pricing tend to lead to total generation
capacity below the peak load with a certain probability whereas energy markets with a forward capacity
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market or operating-reserve pricing result in higher investments assuming random demand with finite
support and no forced outages3. Last, the regulator decisions (e.g., reserve capacity targe ) in capacity
markets and operating-reserve pricing can be chosen in sucha way that results in very similar investment
levels and fuel mix of generation capacities in both market designs.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we give the set up and notation used through-
out the chapter. In Section 3.3, we first introduce the deterministic investment and operations model (in the
context of a two-stage equilibrium problem under perfect competition) and present it in two different formula-
tions. One is a single-stage (open loop) version of the modelwh re generators simultaneously invest and decide
operations knowing future market prices. The other formulation is a two-stage (closed loop) model in which
investment and operation decisions are made sequentially.Generators operate the capacities inherited from the
first stage to maximize their profits. This market operation results in marginal values of plants that generators
take into account in the first stage in order to decide on theirinvestments. The distinction between open and
closed loop models is important when there is market power. We show that this distinction is irrelevant here:
both models are equivalent and can be reformulated as a single optimization problem of the standard capacity
expansion type. Although Section 3.3 begins with a deterministic model, the rest of the chapter elaborates on
stochastic models involving demand that is unknown at the tim of investment. In Section 3.3.2 we extend the
formulation to a stochastic energy-only equilibrium modeland again find that it is equivalent to a stochastic
capacity expansion model, which is a two-stage stochastic program. In Section 3.4, we take up the capacity
market formulation, which we find again equivalent to a convex stochastic programming problem. In Section
3.5, we consider the more novel question of operating-reserv pricing for which we give two formulations that
differ by the computation of the operating-reserves. One formulation refers the reserve to observed demand; the
other refers it to the total capacity. The former one turns out t be a convex stochastic optimization problem, but
the latter is not. In Section 3.6, we give a brief discussion of demand-side bidding which we treat by assuming
price responsive demand; this can be thought of a completelydifferent way of addressing resource adequacy
issue. Section 3.7 outlines how all our results can be generaliz d for other uncertain elements in spot markets,
such as unit generation costs and transmission capacities.W discuss various algorithmic approaches for han-
dling these models numerically in Section 3.8. We report numerical results in Section 3.9 and provide insights
to what extent the remedies to the missing money, discussed in Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, incite the generators
to invest in generation capacity. Conclusions terminate the chapter. Finally, Appendices 3.A contains the proofs
of some theorems, lemmas, and propositions.
3.2 Set-up and Notation
We consider a market with a regulator and three types of agents; namely generators, a transmission system
operator (a TSO), and consumers. Generators and the TSO are price takers and maximize profits at given
3Note that under different assumptions (e.g., forced outages, demand distribution without a finite support), VOLL pricing (with high
values of VOLL) may also result in similar investment levelsas the other market designs (see the result of Hobbs et al. (2001)).
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prices; consumers are represented by an inelastic demand. Generators and consumers are spatially distributed
in an electricity transmission network which is operated bythe TSO. Generation and transmission of electricity
take place in the spot market and the locational marginal pricing is assumed to clear the spot market.
The regulator intervenes to remedy the lack of incentive to invest; his/her role differs depending on the
market design. In an energy-only electricity market, he/shets the price of the unserved energy (VOLL) or
the price cap in case of demand curtailment. In an electricity market with a forward capacity market, he/she
sets the capacity target to guarantee resource adequacy andrewards the firms who contribute to the sufficient
investments to reach the target. Finally, in an electricitymarket with operating-reserve pricing, he/she sets
the price of the operating-reserve and provides the firms with additional payments whenever the systems total
reserve is scarce.
We consider agents interacting in a two-stage set-up: generators invest in their generation capacities in the
first stage and the generation is dispatched in the second stage where the spot market clears to satisfy demand
under transmission limitations. Under all market designs,the demand is first assumed to be constant during
the whole year. Then we consider a random demand which variesover a year and extend our analysis under
uncertainty of demand. The following notation would apply in a purely deterministic world:
Sets
N : set of all demand nodes
G : set of all firms
Ig : set of supply nodes of firmg∈ G
I : set of all supply nodes (I := ∪gIg)
Kg : set of plant types of firmg∈ G
L : set of electricity transmission lines in the network
Parameters
cgik : unit generation cost of plant typek∈ Kg owned by firmg∈ G at supply nodei ∈ Ig
κk : unit capacity cost of plant typek∈ Kg
dn : demand at noden∈ N
PTDFl , j : power transmitted through linel ∈ L due to one unit of power injection from node
j ∈ {N∪ I} to an arbitrary hub4 node
hl : capacity limit of linel ∈ L
VOLL : the value of unserved energy or lost load
4PTDF is calculated based on a hub node inn∈ N in a standard DC load flow model. The choice of hub node is arbitr ry. That is,
the flows resulting from a power injection at one node and an equal withdrawal at another do not depend on the location of thehub.
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Variables:
Second Stage:
ygik : quantity of power generated by plant typek∈ Kg of firm g∈ G at supply nodei ∈ Ig
f j : net power flow dispatched by TSO from nodej ∈ {N∪ I}
δn : unserved (curtailed) energy at noden∈ N
p j : locational market price (nodal price) at nodej ∈ {N∪ I} which corresponds to shadow
price of market clearing constraint
First Stage:
xgik : capacity of plant typek∈ Kg owned by firmg∈ G at nodei ∈ Ig.
3.3 Energy-only Market
We start our analysis with an energy-only electricity market. In an energy-only market with inelastic (exoge-
nous) demand, the price of electricity is set by the market atthe bid of the most expensive plant generating
unless the demand is curtailed. When demand is curtailed, thprice is capped by the regulator at the value
of loss load (VOLL) or a price cap. During the hours of curtailment, the peak plant obtains extra margin to
compensate its missing money for the whole year. The demand is first assumed to be constant during the whole
year in Section 3.3.1. In Section 3.3.2, we consider a randome and which varies over a year.
3.3.1 Two-stage Equilibrium Model with Constant ExogenousDemand
In Section 3.3.1.1, we give the exact formulation of the interactions between the agents in an energy-only
market at both stages when demand is fixed and we show some characteristics of both the short run and the
long run perfect competition equilibria. By using these characteristics, we show in Section 3.3.1.2 that solving
a single optimization problem where all the generation capaities are determined by a central decision maker
finds a perfect competition equilibrium of the two-stage game introduced in Section 3.3.1.1.
3.3.1.1 The Perfect Competition Equilibrium as Mixed Complementarity Problem
We next formulate each agent’s problem in the two-stage gamewhere firms give their investment decisions,x,
simultaneously at the first stage and they decide on their optimal generation levels,y, in the spot market at the
second stage. Note that demand is exogenous and known to all firms who are price takers at both stages.
Second Stage: At the second stage, each firmg∈ G maximizes its short term profit from the spot market by
optimization problem (3.5):
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ik) ∀i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg
ygik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg,
(3.5)
whereβ g is the vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with the capa ity constraints (yg ≤ xg) and is referred
as capacity/scarcity rent. Note that the nodal prices,p, enter as parameters to firms’ second stage problems.
Since all firms are price-takers under perfect competition,they act as if they cannot affect the value ofp. As an
important consequence, the nodal prices will also be taken as parameters in firms’ first stage problems given in
(3.10).
For a given set of generation decisions{yg}g∈G of the firms and nodal prices{p j} j∈{N∪I}, if there exists
a price difference between any two nodes in the spot market, TSO decides on imports/export flows{ f j} j∈N∪I
as long as there are available transmission possibilities and it maximizes its profits from the transmission of










f j = 0 (ρ)
∑
j∈{N∪I}
PTDFl , j f j ≤ hl (λ+l ) ∀l
− ∑
j∈{N∪I}
PTDFl , j f j ≤ hl (λ−l ) ∀l ,
(3.6)
whereρ ,λ+l , andλ
−
l are Lagrange multipliers of problem (3.6). In (3.6),ConsTSOis the set of Kirchoff law
based transmission constraints faced by TSO in the electricity network. TSO is also a price-taker and cannot
affect the nodal prices,p, to maximize its profit.
Finally, the nodal prices are determined to clear the spot market when supply matches the demand minus
possible curtailments. In case of a curtailment, the electricity is priced at VOLL by the regulator. The spot






ygjk +δ j + f j −d j ⊥ p j ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ {N∪ I}
0≤VOLL− pn ⊥ δn ≥ 0 ∀n∈ N,
(3.7)
where p j represents the locational marginal price of unit power ($/MWh) at nodej ∈ {N∪ I} andδn is the
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curtailed energy. Note that nodej may be both a supply and a demand node. If it is only a supply node, thenδ j
andd j equal to zero or if it is only a demand node then(y
g
jk)g∈G,k∈K equal to zero.
The spot market equilibrium conditions consist of the KKT optimality conditions of problem (3.5) for all
firmsg∈ G, the KKT optimality conditions of TSO’s problem (3.6), and the market clearance conditions (3.7),
which can altogether be formulated by the mixed complementarity problem (MCP) (3.8). An equilibrium point
satisfying the conditions in MCP (3.8) consists of the optimal generation quantitiesy∗ for all firms and the
optimal import/export flow decisionsf ∗ for TSO in the spot market:
MCP Firms(x) :











ik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg
MCP TSO:
0≤ hl − ∑
j∈{N∪I}
PTDFl , j f
∗
j ⊥ λ ∗+l ≥ 0 ∀l
0≤ hl + ∑
j∈{N∪I}
PTDFl , j f
∗
j ⊥ λ ∗−l ≥ 0 ∀l
p∗j −ρ∗+∑
l∈L
PTDFl , j(λ ∗−l −λ
∗+
l ) = 0 ∀ j ∈ {N∪ I}
∑
j∈{N∪I}










j −d j ⊥ p
∗
j ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ {N∪ I}
0≤VOLL− p∗n ⊥ δ ∗n ≥ 0 ∀n∈ N.
(3.8)
Boucher and Smeers (2001) consider a competitive equilibrim of a game in spot market where none of the
agents (firms, consumers, and TSO) has market power. The interactions between firms and TSO in (3.5) and
(3.6), respectively, is an example of such a game. Boucher and Smeers (2001) also introduce an optimization
problem referred to as Optimal Power Flow Problem (OPF). In our setting, for givenx, the OPF problem with




















ygjk +δ j + f j ≥ d j (p j) ∀ j ∈ {N∪ I}
δn ≥ 0 ∀n∈ N
f satisfyConsTSO
yg satisfyConsg(xg) ∀g∈ G.
(3.9)
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Let (y∗,δ ∗) and p∗ be the optimal primal solution (generation quantities, curtailed demand) and optimal
dual solution (nodal prices) of OPF problem (3.9) for a givenx, respectively. Boucher and Smeers (2001) show
that the solution(y∗,δ ∗, p∗) is also a competitive equilibrium of the game between firms and TSO defined in
(3.8) and vice versa. Indeed, it is easy to verify that the setof necessary and sufficient optimality conditions of
the LP (3.9) is equivalent to the MCP (3.8). Therefore, we maysolve the LP (3.9) directly and take its optimal
solution as a perfect competition equilibrium of the spot market at the second stage.
First Stage: At the first stage, each firmg∈ G determines its optimal investment quantitiesxg maximizing its
long term profit which is equal to its optimal short term profitfrom the spot market at the second stage minus
its investment cost. Since firms are price-takers, they act as if the market price is given, and hence the nodal
prices, p, appear as parameters in firms’ both first and second stage problems (3.10) and (3.5), respectively.


















g), ∀g, i,k} are the optimal generation quantities of firms in the spot market at equilibrium for
given (xg)g∈G. Next, in Lemma 3.3.1, we show that each firm’s optimal investment is equal to its optimal
generation amount in the spot market at equilibrium when we hav constant demand5. This is an intuitive result
for deterministic investment problems with fixed demand leve ; however we are not aware of a formal proof.
Lemma 3.3.1.Let x∗g be the vector of optimal investment quantities of each firm g∈ G for (3.10) and y∗ be the
vector of optimal generation quantities from OPF problem (3.9) for x= x∗. Then y∗g = x∗g for all g ∈ G.
Proof. There are two possibilities fory∗g as a solution of OPF problem forx= x∗: y∗gik = x
∗g





latter cannot hold at optimum of the first stage problem of firmg ∈ G, since one can always decreasex∗gik to
the level ofy∗gik and achieve a higher profit. In other words, the latter is always dominated by the former which
achieves the same cost for OPF problem and a higher profit for firm g∈ G.
In the next lemma, we provide a characterization for the optimality conditions of each firm’s capacity
decisions at the first stage. This type of formulation for deterministic problems has also been formulated in
the literature and explicitly illustrates the impact of thescarcity rents determined at the second stage on the
firm’s investment decisions at the first stage. We see that firms have an incentive to invest if the scarcity rents
determined at the second stage offset their investment cost. This is a very intuitive result which can also be
observed in early capacity expansion models developed during regulatory periods. A corresponding result (with
the expectation of scarcity rents) will appear later when firms choose their capacity under demand uncertainty
in Section 3.3.2.1, as well as when the firms have market powerat the first stage in Chapter 4.
5Note that this result will not hold for all periods and all firms when we have multiple demand periods, see Section 3.3.2 fordetails.
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Lemma 3.3.2. Let x∗ = {x∗g}g∈G be a point such that lower level problem (3.9) has a feasible so ution and
Π∗g(xg) is finite for all g∈ G in the neighborhood of x∗. Then x∗ is an equilibrium of the first-stage game if and
only if there existsβ ∗ such that
0≤−β ∗gik +κk ⊥ x
∗g
ik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg. (3.11)








whereΠ∗g(xg) is the optimal objective function value for problem (3.5) ata givenxg and given prices. Note that
(3.5) is a linear program wherexg is the right hand side parameter. It is well known thatΠ∗g(·) is a concave
function ofxg. Π∗g(xg) is also subdifferentiable atx∗g whenΠ∗g(xg) is finite in the neighborhood ofx∗. Hence,




necessary and sufficient optimality conditions
0≤−β ∗gik +κk ⊥ x
∗g
ik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg.
Therefore, a solution to this two-stage game, if it exists, should satisfy the optimality conditions given in
(3.11) at the first stage and the optimality conditions givenin (3.8) at the second stage simultaneously, and vice
versa. Combining these with Lemma 3.3.1, we obtain the next lemma.
Lemma 3.3.3. If there exists a solution x∗ to the two-stage game then it satisfies the following complementarity
conditions:
0≤ cgik − p
∗
i +κk ⊥ x
∗g









j −d j ⊥ p
∗
j ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ {N∪ I}
0≤VOLL− p∗n ⊥ δ ∗n ≥ 0 ∀n∈ N
( f ∗, p∗,ρ∗,λ ∗+,λ ∗−) satisfy MCPTSO.
(3.12)
Moreover, if there exists a solution to the complementarityconditions in (3.12), then it is a solution to the
two-stage game.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.
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3.3.1.2 An Equivalent Single Optimization Problem
It is easy to see that since we will always havex∗ = y∗ in the two-stage game with constant demand, (3.10) and
(3.5) reduce to the following single-stage formulation:






s.t. xgik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg.
(3.13)
The market clearance conditions can also be modified such that yg in (3.7) is replaced withxg (say in (3.7′)).
Then, one can easily verify that the equilibrium conditionsf the resulting single-stage game ((3.13), (3.6), and
(3.7)′) are equivalent to the complementarity conditions given in(3.12); therefore by using Lemma 3.3.3, the
solution of this single-stage game is equal to the solution of the two-stage game in Section 3.3.1.1. In other
words, in perfect competition open loop and closed loop equilibria coincide.
Next, we show that a perfect competition equilibrium of the two-stage (or one-stage) game can be found
by solving a particular single optimization problem which we introduce below in (3.14). This formulation
is nothing but a variation of early capacity expansion models, given in (3.1), used for decisions of regulated
monopolies. In this formulation, one can also think that theinvestment amounts of all firms are decided by
a central decision maker or a regulated monopoly who is minimizing the total cost of the system (i.e., total






















Theorem 3.3.4.A solution to the optimization problem (3.14), if it exists,is a solution of the two-stage game.
Moreover, if there exists a solution of the two-stage game, then it is also a solution of the optimization problem
(3.14).
Proof. The necessary and sufficient optimality conditions of the lin ar program in (3.14) is equivalent to the
complementarity conditions given in (3.12). By using Lemma3.3.3, the result follows immediately.
By using Theorem 3.3.4, the uniqueness and existence of competitive equilibria for the two-stage game
in Section 3.3.1.1 may also be established. The existence follows from the existence of a solution to the
optimization problem (3.14), i.e., if it is feasible and bounded. Moreover, if the solution to (3.14) is unique,
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then clearly there is a unique perfect competition equilibrium to the two-stage game.
3.3.2 Two-stage Equilibrium Model with Stochastic Exogenous Demand
In Section 3.3.1, we focused on a constant demand load over a yar and showed that single (open loop) and
two-stage (closed loop) games are equivalent; furthermore, on can find the perfect competition equilibrium
by solving a single optimization problem. We have done this to present the notation and the basic properties
of the underlying mathematical model. Clearly, demand is seasonal and time varying in reality. Moreover,
future demand is uncertain. Both seasonality and uncertainty of future demand affect the choice of the plant
type. While a constant yearly demand would lead to selectinga single technology in the solution of (3.14),
seasonality and uncertainty of demand imply a portfolio of technologies. We thus extend the preceding model
and consider the more realistic case in which demand is uncertain and varies, say, over a year. First, we prove
that one can find a perfect competition equilibrium to the two-stage game under demand uncertainty by solving
a two-stage stochastic program. We then show that the equivalence of single and two-stage games still holds in
a perfectly competitive market when demand is random and hasfinite number of possible scenarios. In other
words, the open loop equilibria and the closed loop equilibria coincide.
In Section 3.3.2.1, we analyze the solution of the two-stagecompetitive game outlined in Section 3.3.1.1
under demand uncertainty. We then introduce in Section 3.3.2.2 a two-stage stochastic program where a central
decision maker decides on the capacity levels of all firms mini izing the total expected cost at the upper level
under demand uncertainty. He/she then chooses the optimal generation quantities of all firms as demand is
observed at the lower level. The spirit of this stochastic program is not very far away from the early capacity
expansion model given in (3.1). We end Section 3.3.2.2 with Theorem 3.3.7 by showing that a solution of this
two-stage stochastic program is also a solution of the two-stage stochastic game. Finally, in Section 3.3.2.3
we give the single-stage formulation of the two-stage stochastic game when the random demand has discrete
distribution. We show that an equilibrium of the single-stage formulation is also an equilibrium of the two-stage
formulation
3.3.2.1 The Perfect Competition Equilibrium under Demand Uncertainty
Consider now the case when the investment decision at the first stage should be made before observing the
uncertain demand at the second stage. The notation of the two-stage model under uncertainty will be almost
identical to the notation given in Section 3.2 except we willutilize ω ∈ Ω to denote the uncertainty in demand
that can take different values in different states of the world ω ∈ Ω, each occurring with some probability. We
will also denote the dependency of the second stage variables with respect toω in order to facilitate the main
distinction between the first stage variables and the secondstage variables where the former do not depend on
ω ∈ Ω. To derive our theoretical results, we will assume that the probability distribution of demand,d(ω),
is known. This assumption is valid in situations where the dispatch of electricity and market clearance in the
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spot market repeats itself and the distribution of demand cabe estimated from historical data. In practice, also
as part of our numerical procedures in Section 3.8, we will need only a sample ofd(ω) rather than the entire
distribution ofd(ω). Without knowing the exact distribution of the random variable, samples ofd(ω) may be
obtained simply from historical data or, for instance, fromcomputation-based simulations (where it may be
easier to estimate the so-called basic factors, but since these factors interact in nonlinear and/or non-smooth
ways, numerical procedures are needed to draw the samples).
Second Stage: For now, we suppose thatdn(ω) indicates continuous random demand at noden with a general
distributionΨn. Let (Ω,F ,Ψ) denote the common underlying probability space whereΨ r presents the joint
probability distribution for the random demand vectord(ω) := {dn(ω)}n∈N with E[|d(ω)|] < ∞. Then for
givenω ∈ Ω, we can write the second stage problem of each firmg∈ G in (3.5), TSO’s problem in (3.6), and
the market clearing conditions in (3.7) in the state of the world ω (i.e., with second stage variables depending
on ω). For instance for givenxg, the second stage problem of each firmg∈ G in state of the worldω is given
as:













ik(ω)) ∀i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg
ygik(ω)≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg,
(3.15)
which is identical to (3.5) when there is one state of the world with constant demand. Note that since all firms
are assumed to be price-takers, the nodal prices,p(ω), appear as parameters in firms’ both first and second
stage problems.
By similar arguments in Section 3.3.1.1, we know that we can find a perfect competition equilibrium of the
spot market at eachω by solving OPF problem (3.16). For givenx and eachω ∈ Ω:
Z∗(ω ,x) := min


















ygjk(ω)+δ j(ω)+ f j(ω)≥ d j(ω) (p j(ω)) ∀ j ∈ {N∪ I}
δn(ω)≥ 0 ∀n∈ N




f j(ω) = 0 (ρ(ω))
hl − ∑
j∈{N∪I}
PTDFl , j f j(ω)≥ 0 (λ+l (ω)) ∀l
hl + ∑
j∈{N∪I}






ik(ω)) ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg
ygik(ω)≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg.
∀g∈ G
Remark3.3.5. Note that (3.16) is almost identical to (3.9) in which we indicate the explicit dependence toω
for the variables that are affected by demand uncertainty. From Boucher and Smeers (2001), we know that at
eachω a solution of (3.16) is also a perfect competition equilibrium of the spot market at the second stage.
First Stage: At the first stage, we assume risk neutral firms making decisions on the basis of the expectation
of their short term profit in the spot market. Consequently, we can write the optimization problem of each risk















wherey∗(ω ,x) is the vector of generation quantities of firms in the spot market at equilibrium and, hence is the
solution of Optimal Power Flow Problem (3.16) at the second stage for givenx andω ∈ Ω.
It is obvious that we no longer have the equality of first and second stage decision variables as in Lemma
3.3.1 when we move to the two-stage game under uncertainty. However, one can still use arguments similar
to the ones inProof of Lemma 3.3.2in order to formulate the impact of average scarcity rent received at the
second stage on the investment decisions of the firms.
Lemma 3.3.6. Let Π∗g(ω ,xg) be finite at the neighborhood of a point x∗ = {x∗g}g∈G for almost everyω ∈ Ω.
For investment choice x∗g, let Eω [β ∗gik (ω)] be the expected scarcity rent that firm g∈ G receives at the second
stage for using technology k∈ Kg at node i∈ Ig. Then x∗ is a solution of the first stage game if and only if
0≤−Eω [β ∗gik (ω)]+κk ⊥ x
∗g
ik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg. (3.18)
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.
One can interpret the expected scarcity rent in (3.18) as theexp cted marginal revenue of firmg at nodei
for investing in technologyk. If the expected marginal revenue of investing in technology k at nodei is not
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enough to cover the firm’s marginal cost of investment in technology k (κk), the firm chooses not to invest in
that technology at nodei. Otherwise, the firm invests in technologyk at nodei at a level where the expected
scarcity rent is equal to the unit investment cost. (3.18) ises entially identical to the relation (3.4) of early
capacity expansion models. For peak load generators,β ∗gik (ω) is equal to zero unless demand is curtailed.
Thus, peak load generators tend to underinvest so that totalgeneration capacity is below the peak load with
a certain probability and they cover their investment costsby VOLL during peak hours. Note that (3.18)
represents the first stage equilibrium conditions of risk neutral generators. When generators are assumed to
be risk averse, the formulation in (3.18) can be modified by replacing the statistical probabilities with the risk
adjusted probabilities; see Ehrenmann and Smeers (2011) for the corresponding modification.
3.3.2.2 An Equivalent Two-stage Stochastic Program
In this section we show that one can find an equilibrium to the two-stage stochastic game by simply solving a
stochastic program. As a consequence, the computational challenge of finding a solution of the two-stage game
may be considerably reduced. The stochastic program we presnt below may be considered as the capacity
expansion problem of a central decision maker who chooses the capacities(x) of all firms at the first stage in
order to minimize the total expected cost of the system without knowing the future uncertain demand. He/she
then determines the dispatch quantitiesy(ω) of all firms after observing the demand (possibly repeatedly) at the












Note that in Section 3.3.2.1 we have an equilibrium problem at the first stage consisting of|G | optimization
problems, each one given by (3.17) forg∈ G. The stochastic program we introduce here consists of a single
optimization problem, namely (3.19), at the first stage and the decision variables are the investment quantities
of all firms. At the second stage, we have another single optimization problem for each realization which is
formulated by (3.16).
Theorem 3.3.7.Consider the two-stage stochastic program which consists of he problems(3.19)at the first
stage and(3.16)at the second stage. Let x∗ be the optimal solution of this two-stage stochastic program where
Z∗(ω ,x) andΠ∗g(ω ,xg) are finite in the neighborhood of x∗ for almost everyω ∈ Ω. Then x∗ is also a perfect
competition equilibrium of the two-stage stochastic game giv n in Section 3.3.2.1 and vice versa.
Proof. (3.16) is a linear program. Thus, we know thatZ∗(ω ,x) is a convex function ofx for all ω ∈ Ω which
implies the convexity of the expectationEω [Z∗(ω , ·)]. By using an argument similar to the one in theProof of
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Lemma 3.3.6, one can show thatEω [β ∗gik (ω)] is unique,Eω [Z
∗(ω , ·)] is differentiable, and
∂Eω [Z∗(ω , ·)]
∂xgik
=−Eω [β ∗gik (ω)]. (3.20)




+κk ⊥ x∗gik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg.
By using (3.20), we can rewrite the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions of (3.19) as
0≤−Eω [β ∗gik (ω)]+κk ⊥ x
∗g
ik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg. (3.21)
The necessary and sufficient optimality conditions in (3.21) are identical to the equilibrium conditions of
the first stage game given in Lemma 3.3.6. Besides, the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions of (3.16)
are the equilibrium conditions of the second stage game. Thesolution(x∗,y∗(ω ,x∗)) to the two-stage stochastic
program is feasible for the first stage game and an equilibrium of the second stage game since it satisfies the
optimality conditions of (3.16). Moreover, it is also an equilibrium of the first stage game since it satisfies the
equilibrium conditions at the first stage by equivalence of (3.21) and (3.18).
One can also make the same argument for the opposite direction. If (x∗,y∗(ω ,x∗)) is an equilibrium of
the two-stage stochastic game, then it is a solution to the complementarity problem (3.18) and it satisfies the
optimality conditions of (3.16). Since (3.18) is equivalent to (3.21) and the second stage optimality conditions
of both the stochastic program and the stochastic game are deriv from the same problem (3.16),(x∗,y∗(ω ,x∗))
will also be a solution of the two-stage stochastic program.
As a conclusion, under the perfect competition assumption one can solve the stochastic optimization prob-
lem (3.19) of the central decision maker and take its optimalsolution as equilibrium point of the two-stage
stochastic game defined in Section 3.3.2.1.
3.3.2.3 Equivalence of Open and Closed Loop Equilibria withFinite Number of Scenarios
In this section, we assume that the demand distributionΨ has a finite support (e.g., set of time segments)
and takes valuesd(ω1),d(ω2), . . . ,d(ωM) with respective probabilitiesπ1,π2, . . . ,πM (e.g., duration of time
segments). Obviously, one could also viewd(ω1),d(ω2), . . . ,d(ωM) as a particular sample of the random
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variabled(ω) with a general distribution. Then,




























is the first stage objective function (3.17) of each firmg∈G wherep(ωm) is given. Lety∗(ωm,x) be the solution
of the second stage OPF problem (3.16) for the scenarioωm. The equilibrium conditions (3.18) of the first stage





πmβ ∗gik (ωm)+κk ⊥ x
∗g
ik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg. (3.22)
The equilibrium conditions of the second stage game can alsobe easily modified as the KKT optimality
conditions of OPF (3.16) driven for each scenario. Next, we show that one can find an equilibrium point of
the corresponding two-stage stochastic game with finite number of demand scenarios by solving a single-stage
stochastic game. We first outline this single-stage game between the firms and TSO.
Each firmg∈ G chooses its optimal investment amount and generation quantities simultaneously such that

















s.t. yg(ωm) satisfyConsg(ωm,xg) ∀m∈ M
xg ≥ 0,
(3.23)
wherep(ωm) is the price observed by each firm in scenarioωm. p(ωm) is exogenous to each firm’s problem
and TSO’s problem whereas it is endogenous to the MCP formulated by the KKT optimality conditions of all
firms and TSO together with the market clearance conditions.
TSO’s problem (3.24) is almost identical to (3.6) except it is formulated with explicit depends onωm since






p j(ωm) f j(ωm)
s.t. f (ωm) satisfyConsTSO(ωm).
(3.24)
Similarly, the spot market clearance conditions,MCP Market(ωm), at each state of the world is almost
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identical to (3.7) except it is formulated with explicit depends onωm.
Next, we show in Theorem 3.3.8 that if the random demand has discrete distribution then we can find
an equilibrium of the corresponding two-stage stochastic game in Section 3.3.2.1 by solving this single-stage
stochastic game.
Theorem 3.3.8.Let the demand distributionΨ has a finite support and takes values d(ω1),d(ω2), . . . ,d(ωM)
with respective probabilitiesπ1,π2, . . . ,πM . Then an equilibrium of the single-stage stochastic game formulated
by (3.23), (3.24), and MCPMarket(ωm), if it exits, is also an equilibrium of the corresponding two-stage
stochastic game given in Section 3.3.2.1 (by(3.17)and (3.16)). Moreover if there exists an equilibrium of this
two-stage stochastic game, then it is also an equilibrium ofthe single-stage stochastic game.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.
To summarize, the energy-only market model presented in Section 3.3 provides positive margin for peak
load generators when demand is curtailed and electricity price is set at VOLL. As a result, energy-only markets
tend to lead to total generation capacity below the peak loadwith a certain probability. In reality VOLL is
difficult to estimate in a direct way. An alternative is to asse the impact of a particular VOLL value on the
probability of not meeting the load and to revise this value if this probability is not satisfactory (too high or too
low, see Stoft (2002)). In case price caps lower than VOLL areus d in practice, this may lead to higher fre-
quency of curtailments and may enhance the resource adequacy problem. Hence, it may be necessary to resort
to additional market mechanisms as remedies to create better incentives for capacity investment and operation.
Next, we consider two different market designs, namely a capity market in Section 3.4 and operating-reserve
pricing in Section 3.5, as potential remedies to resource adequacy problem.
3.4 Imposing a Capacity Market
An alternative way to avoid resource adequacy problem is to implement a capacity market where the regulator
sets a total capacity target based on historic data and expect d demand and rewards a side payment to the firms
who contribute to reach this target. We continue our analysis by including such a capacity market in our basic
model of Section 3.3. In this modified model, the regulator imposes a capacity constraint on the total capacity
which needs to be fulfilled at the time of investment. To account for this, the following modifications are
needed:
(i) We impose the following market condition of the regulator at the first stage:
0≤ ∑
g,i,k
xgik −H ⊥ λ ≥ 0, (3.25)
whereH is the capacity target which may be estimated by the regulator on the basis of the forecasts of
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the demand fluctuations andλ may be considered as the price of the capacity which is paid tothe firms
who contribute to the sufficient investment level.




Mathematically, these modifications constitute a straightforward extension of the two-stage game in Section
3.3. When we have constant demand, the equilibrium (KKT optimality) conditions of the first stage game given
in Lemma 3.3.2 can easily be modified to:
0≤−β ∗gik −λ
∗+κk ⊥ x∗gik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg,
0≤ ∑
g,i,k
x∗gik −H ⊥ λ
∗ ≥ 0. (3.26)
In case of implementation of a capacity market, the result inLemma 3.3.1 (which is established for energy-
only markets) holds ifH ≤∑
j
d j whereas a similar type of result given in Theorem 3.3.4 always holds; that is, it
is still possible to show that one can find an equilibrium of this wo-stage game by solving a single optimization


















xgik −H ≥ 0 (λ )
x ≥ 0
(y,δ , f ) satisfyConsMarket
f satisfyConsTSO
yg satisfyConsg(xg) ∀g∈ G.
(3.27)
In case of uncertain demand, a similar modification of the equilibri m conditions (3.18) in Lemma 3.3.6
can be done for the first stage game:
0≤−Eω [β ∗gik (ω)]−λ
∗+κk ⊥ x∗gik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg,
0≤ ∑
g,i,k
x∗gik −H ⊥ λ
∗ ≥ 0. (3.28)
Note that the equilibrium conditions of the second stage game in the future spot market do not change and are
thus still formulated by the optimality conditions of the OPF problem (3.16). Therefore, by similar arguments
used for the energy-only market, we can again prove that an equilibrium of this two-stage stochastic game
with capacity market can be found by solving a two-stage stochastic program. This stochastic program given
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xgik −H ≥ 0 (λ ).
(3.29)
Hence, the two-stage stochastic program consists of an optimization problem, namely (3.29), which mini-
mizes the total expected cost of the system subject to a single constraint at the first stage and the OPF problem
(3.16) at the second stage.
3.5 Operating-reserve Pricing
A more sophisticated approach for the regulator to provide extra capacity payments to the firms contributing
to a sufficient level of investment is operating-reserve pricing. The principle of operating-reserve pricing is
providing the firms with extra regulated payment whenever thsystem’s total operating-reserve is scarce.
Let rp(r,x,d) be the value of operating-reserves determined by the regulator for a given value of total
operating-reservesr = ex−eywheree is the transpose of the vector of 1’s of appropriate dimension. Oncex,y,
andd are observed in the spot market, a mark-up price ofrp(r,x,d) is computed by the regulator and then taken
as exogenous reserve price by the firms. For givenx a dd, we assume the following properties ofrp(r,x,d).
Assumption 3.5.1. rp(r,x,d) is a monotone decreasing and differentiable function of total perating-reserves
r where
• If ed= ey≪ ex, there is ample operating-reserve and there is no markup;that is rp(r,x,d) = 0.
• If ed = ey≤ ex and ey is close to ex, then the operating-reserve is scarceand the regulator charges
consumers with the extra price of rp(r,x,d) in addition to the equilibrium price p.
• If ex= ey< ed, there is curtailment and the regulator sets the price to VOLL (or to a price cap).
Next, we modify the formulation of the two-stage game in Section 3.3 by incorporating operating-reserve
pricing scheme. In Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2, we give the corresponding two-stage model formulations in deter-
ministic and stochastic settings respectively and derive the equilibrium conditions at the first stage. Note that
choosing the functionrp(r,x,d) is an important issue since it may change the structure of theund rlying mathe-
matical formulation of the model and consequently applicabe solution methods. In Section 3.5.3, we elaborate
on that issue and give two possible formulations ofrp(r,x,d) function. We show that depending on the formu-
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lation, one cannot always preserve the simplicity of the single optimization formulation in deterministic setting
and the two-stage stochastic program in stochastic setting.
3.5.1 The Perfect Competition Equilibrium under Constant Demand
In this section, we modify both the first and the second stage problems given in Section 3.3.1 by incorporating
the operating-reserve pricing.
Second Stage: Let γ denote the unit price of operating-reserves. It is exogenous t the firms since they are







ik), for its operating-reserves at the second stage. This extraregulated
payment received by firmg ∈ G is added to its objective function at the second stage. The modified second
stage problem of each firmg∈ G maximizing its short run profit is given as:
















ik) ∀i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg
ygik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg,
(3.30)
where p andγ are exogenous parameters to each firm’s problem whereas theyare endogenous to the whole
system and are set at a level where the spot market clears itself. To emphasize,γ∗ = rp(ex− ey∗,x,d) is the
unit operating-reserve price set by the regulator for givenx,d and optimal generation dispatchy∗ in the spot
market at equilibrium. In addition, TSO’s problem and the market clearing conditions remain identical to (3.6)
and (3.7), respectively.
One can write the necessary and sufficient KKT optimality conditions of (3.30) for each firmg ∈ G, the
optimality conditions of (3.6) for TSO, and the market clearing conditions (3.7) and setγ∗ = rp(ex−ey∗,x,d).
The resulting KKT conditions are equivalent to the MCP (3.31). Hence, the solution to MCP (3.31) is a
competitive equilibrium of the spot market. The first complementarity constraint in (3.31) ensures that when a
firm produces positive amount(y∗gik > 0), a price is paid, which covers its marginal cost plus the scarcity ent
plus the operating-reserve pricerp(ex−ey∗,x,d):










ik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg
(y∗,δ ∗, f ∗, p∗,ρ∗,λ ∗+,λ ∗−) satisfy MCP Market∩MCP TSO.
(3.31)
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As discussed in Section 3.3.1, we can formulate the corresponding OPF problem (3.32) whose solution














s.t. (y,δ , f ) satisfyConsMarket
f satisfyConsTSO
yg satisfyConsg(xg) ∀g∈ G,
(3.32)
in which R(ex− ey,x,d) :=
∫ ex−ey
0
rp(s,x,d)ds can be interpreted as the additional welfare due to improved
reliability, or willingness to pay for extra reliability; it s similar to the integral of the inverse demand function
(e.g., in (3.2) or (3.42)) which is interpreted as consumers’ willingness to pay. By Assumption 3.5.1, for given
x andd, rp(ex−ey,x,d) is a monotone decreasing function ofex−ey; thereforeR(ex−ey,x,d) is a concave
function of (ex−ey) and consequently it is concave iny. Hence OPF problem (3.32) is convex. The solution
of OPF problem (3.32) is a competitive equilibrium of the modifie game in the spot market since its necessary
and sufficient KKT optimality conditions are equivalent to the MCP (3.31).








When we consider the interaction between first and second stage problems, Lemma 3.3.1 does not hold
anymore. Instead, we next show that optimality conditions of each firm’s problem at the first stage now involves
the scarcity rent and the operating-reserve price it receivs at the second stage.
Theorem 3.5.2. Let x∗ = {x∗g}g∈G be such that OPF problem(3.32) has a feasible solution andΠ∗Rg (xg) is
finite for all g∈ G in the neighborhood of x∗. Then x∗ is an equilibrium of the first-stage game if and only if
there existsβ ∗ and y∗ such that
0≤−β ∗gik − rp(ex
∗−ey∗,x∗,d)+κk ⊥ x∗gik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg. (3.34)
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.
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3.5.2 The Perfect Competition Equilibrium under Demand Uncertainty
We next formulate the two-stage game including operating-reserve pricing scheme when demand,dn(ω),
at each noden is random having a general distributionΨn. Let (Ω,F ,Ψ) denote the common underly-
ing probability space whereΨ represents the joint probability distribution for the random demand vector
d(ω) := {dn(ω)}n∈N with E[|d(ω)|]< ∞.
Second Stage: Let γ(ω) be the unit price of reserved capacity at demand realizationω ∈ Ω. As mentioned
earlier, it is exogenous to the firms at both stages since theyare price-takers and is set by the regulator at a level
where the spot market clears itself:γ∗(ω) = rp(ex−ey∗(ω),x,d(ω)).
For givenω ∈ Ω, the second stage game is identical to its deterministic formulation given in Section 3.5.1
except with explicit dependence onω . Hence, the arguments in Section 3.5.1 hold when demand is stochastic
as well. That is, for eachω , Π∗Rg (ω ,xg) is a concave function ofxg andβ
∗g
ik (ω)+ γ
∗(ω) is a subgradient of
Π∗Rg (ω ,xg) at a givenxg. Moreover, one can solve the OPF problem (3.35) to find an equilibri m of the spot
market at the second stage.
For givenx andω ∈ Ω, we haveR(ex−ey(ω),x,d(ω)) =
∫ ex−ey(ω)
0
rp(s,x,d(ω))ds. Then the correspond-
ing OPF problem at the second stage is formulated as:
min












s.t. (y(ω),δ (ω), f (ω)) satisfyConsMarket(ω)
f (ω) satisfyConsTSO(ω)
yg(ω) satisfyConsg(ω ,xg) ∀g∈ G.
(3.35)









where, for givenxg, Π∗Rg (ω ,xg) is the optimal value of firmg’s problem in the spot market(short term profit of
firm g∈ G) at realizationω ∈ Ω.
Similar to Lemma 3.3.6, it is possible to write the equilibrium conditions of the first stage game in terms of
expected scarcity rent and operating-reserve prices that the firms receive at the second stage which is stated in
the next theorem.
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Theorem 3.5.3.LetΠ∗Rg (ω ,xg) be finite at the neighborhood of a point x∗ = {x∗g}g∈G for almost everyω ∈ Ω.
For investment choice x∗g, let Eω [β ∗gik (ω)+ rp(ex
∗ −ey∗(ω),x∗,d(ω))] be the expected marginal revenue that
firm g∈ G receives at the second stage for using technology k∈ Kg at node i∈ Ig. Then x∗ is an equilibrium of
the first stage game if and only if there existsβ ∗(ω) and y∗(ω) such that
−Eω [β ∗gik (ω)+ rp(ex
∗−ey∗(ω),x∗,d(ω))]+κk ⊥ x∗gik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg. (3.37)
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.
3.5.3 Operating-reserve Price Curve
Operating-reserve prices are based on predetermined reserve target levels set by the regulator. How to determine
these target levels is an important issue since they would have an effect on the investment incentives. Moreover,
the formulation of therp(·) function would also effect the mathematical properties of the resulting two-stage
game. Next, we give two different formulations for therp(·) function. In the first one, the reserve targets are set
by predetermined ratios of observed demand. In the latter on, the reserve targets are set by the predetermined
ratios of installed capacity. We show that while the two-stage game with the first formulation is still convertible
to a single-stage optimization problem in the deterministic etting and to a two-stage stochastic program in the
stochastic setting, this simplicity is lost when the targetlevels depend on the installed capacity.
3.5.3.1 Setting Reserve Targets Based on Observed Demand
In this case, the regulator determines the reserve targets based on observed demand. Therefore, we take the
operating-reserve price function as




An example of the corresponding price curve for a total fixed dmand level (ed), taken from Hogan (2005), is
depicted in Figure 3.1. Thex-axis denotes the percentage of over-capacity (or operating-reserves) with respect
to the observed demand. For givenx andd, rp demand(ex−eyed ) is a piecewise linear decreasing function of
operating-reserves. In the operating-reserve price curveof Hogan (2005), the critical operating-reserve levels
predetermined by the regulator are the minimum level of reserv (3% of demand) and the nominal reserve
target (7% of demand). The minimum level of reserves is set bythe regulator to prevent a catastrophic failure
through a widespread and uncontrolled blackout in the system. The regulator would not go below this level
of reserves even if this required curtailment of inflexible demand. Above this minimum level, there would be
more flexibility up to nominal reserve target (7%). This is the price-sensitive part of the operating-reserve price
curve illustrated in Figure 3.1. In the range between 3%−7%, as reserve levels approach the nominal target,
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the operating-reserve price would be decreasing.
Note that Hogan’s operating-reserve price curve given in Figure 3.1 is piecewise linear. In our analysis,
in order to preserve twice differentiability in OPF problems (3.32) and (3.35), we assume a differentiable
operating-reserve price curve which is a smooth approximation of Hogan’s curve. The details of this approx-
imation using a sigmoid function are given in Section 3.9 andexample of the corresponding differentiable
operating-reserve price curve is illustrated in Figure 3.1.



























operating reserve price curve of Hogan (2005) 
Figure 3.1: Operating-reserve price curve which is a smoothapproximation of Hogan’s curve on
basis of observed demand
Next, for givenx andd, we can calculateR(ex−ey,x,d) as












We know from Assumption 3.5.1 thatrp demand(ex−eyed ) is a monotone decreasing function of
ex−ey
ed ; there-
fore R demand(ex−eyed ) is concave in
ex−ey
ed which is an affine function of(x,y). As we mentioned above, we
assume thatrp demand(ex−eyed ) is differentiable; henceR demand(
ex−ey
ed ) is twice differentiable. Moreover, it







∂ 2R demand(ex−eyed )
∂ (xgik)2
=
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Remark3.5.4. Joint concavity in(x,y) of R demand(ex−eyed ) can be seen by constructing its Hessian matrix of
and showing that it is negative semi-definite. The details ofthe proof are given in Appendix 3.A.
(3.38) indicates that a unit increase ofxgik indeed entails a marginal revenue for firmg from operating-
reserves, which is equal to the operating-reserve price. Byutilizing (3.38), we next show that a solution to



















s.t. (y,δ , f ) satisfyConsMarket
f satisfyConsTSO
yg satisfyConsg(xg) ∀g∈ G
x ≥ 0.
(3.39)
Theorem 3.5.5.A solution to the optimization problem(3.39), if it exists, is a solution of the two-stage deter-
ministic game with operating-reserve pricing. Moreover, if there exists a solution of the two-stage deterministic
game, then it is also a solution of the optimization problem(3.39).
Proof. The nonlinear program in (3.39) is convex in(x,y,δ , f ). The necessary and sufficient optimality condi-
tions of NLP (3.39) is equivalent to the first and second stageequilibrium conditions given in (3.34) and (3.31)
respectively. The result follows immediately.
Next, we obtain the corresponding result in the stochastic se ting; that is, a solution to the two-stage stochas-
tic program given in (3.40) is a perfect competition equilibr um of the two-stage stochastic game.
min
x≥0






Z∗R(ω ,x) = min















s.t. (y(ω),δ (ω), f (ω)) satisfyConsMarket(ω)
f (ω) satisfyConsTSO(ω)
yg(ω) satisfyConsg(ω ,xg) ∀g∈ G.
Theorem 3.5.6.Let x∗ be an optimal solution of the two-stage stochastic program for ulated in(3.40)where
Z∗R(ω ,x) andΠ∗R(ω ,xg) are finite in the neighborhood of x∗ for almost everyω ∈ Ω. Then x∗ is also a perfect
competition equilibrium of the two-stage stochastic game with operating-reserve pricing and vice versa.
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Proof. By using the concavity ofR demand(ex−ey(ω)ed(ω) ) in x, we know thatZ
∗R(ω ,x) is a convex function ofx
for all ω ∈ Ω which implies the convexity ofEω [Z∗R(ω ,x)]. One can compute the components of the gradient













=−β ∗gik (ω)− rp demand(
ex−ey∗(ω)
ed(ω) ),
except on a set L of Lebesgue measure zero.








Then one can easily derive the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions of the two-stage stochastic pro-
gram (3.40) which are equivalent to the equilibrium conditions of the first stage game given in (3.37) and the
optimality conditions of OPF problem (3.35).
3.5.3.2 Setting Reserve Targets Based on Installed Capacity
Next, we deal with the case that the regulator determines thereserve targets based on total installed capacity.
An example of the corresponding operating-reserve price curve for a fixed total installed capacity (ex) is given
in Figure 3.2. This time thex-axis denotes the percentage of unused capacity with respect to the total available
capacity. We assume the same minimum level of reserve (3% of total capacity) and the nominal reserve target
(7% of total capacity) as in Figure 3.1. This time, working with an operating-reserve price curve like Figure
3.2 would mean that we takerp(ey− ex,x,d) := rp capacity(ex−eyex ) which is again a differentiable function.
Then, for givenx, we can compute the corresponding willingness to pay for impoved reliability as:












Since rp capacity(ex−eyex ) is differentiable, R capacity(
ex−ey
ex ) is twice differentiable. Moreover,
R capacity(ex−eyex ) is concave in(x,y) with














∂ 2R capacity(ex−eyex )
∂ (xgik)2
=




≤ 0, ∀x≥ 0,
(3.41)
whereey2 is the sum of squares for all the elements of a vectory andex3 is the sum of cubes for all the elements
of a vectorx.



























Figure 3.2: Operating-reserve price curve on basis of installed capacity
Remark3.5.7. Similar to Remark 3.5.4, joint concavity in(x,y) of R capacity(ex−eyex ) can be seen by construct-
ing the Hessian matrix ofR capacity(ex−eyex ) and showing that it is negative semi-definite. The details ofthe
proof are given in Appendix 3.A.
The first equation in (3.41) indicates that a unit increase ofxgik entails a marginal revenue from operating-
reserves, which is different from the operating-reserve price. In other words, when we calculate the derivative of
R capacitywith respect toxgik, we do not getrp capacity(
ex−ey
ex ). Therefore, we cannot get the KKT conditions
given in (3.11) from an optimization problem; hence, we can no longer reduce the two-stage game formula-
tion to a single optimization problem in the deterministic setting and to a two-stage stochastic program in the
stochastic setting. However, we can still formulate a mixedcomplementarity problem (MCP) which involves
the equilibrium conditions of both first and second stage games and solve the corresponding MCP. We explain
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the details of solution methods for these problems in Section 3.8.
3.6 Demand-side Bidding (or an Endogenous Demand Curve)
In previous sections we consider three different ways of regulator’s intervention to provide incentives for
sufficient investment levels in electricity markets. Without the intervention of the regulator, the power systems
tend to underinvest in generation capacity because of imperfections in the market due to unresponsive demand.
When demand responds to price, regulator’s intervention iseeded less and the electricity market is more
likely to operate normally such that the prices clear the market where supply meets the demand without any
curtailments (e.g., Allcott (2012)). Therefore, if we consider “demand-side bidding” as a mechanism to ensure
a price responsive demand, then it can be thought of as an alter ative way of addressing the resource adequacy
issue. In this section, we briefly comment on an electricity market where consumers can respond to prices.
When consumers respond to prices, we have an elastic demand and we represent the reaction of consumers
to the prices by decreasing price-demand curvespn(d) with pn(0) < ∞ for each demand noden∈ N. On such
a curve, consumers at demand noden choose their consumption level which maximizes their surplus at a given
price pn. We may represent the decision making process of the consumer at the second stage by incorporating,
for each demand noden, an optimization problem which maximizes the consumer surplus. Letd∗n denote the







pn(s)dsdenotes the willingness to pay function.
Incorporating the consumers’ problem will slightly changeth equilibrium conditions of the second stage
game. Note thatp(·) is a decreasing function which leads toUn(·) being a concave function. Therefore, we can
still formulate a convex OPF problem whose solution maximizes the profit of firms, the surplus of consumers,
and the profit of TSO in charge of operating the network as indicated in Boucher and Smeers (2001). The
modified OPF problem will slightly be different from the onesintroduced previously such that its objective
functions will also include maximizingUn(·). For example, the OPF problem involving price-demand curves


















ygjk + f j ≥ d j (p j) ∀ j ∈ {N∪ I} (3.43)
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d ≥ 0
f satisfyConsTSO
yg satisfyConsg(xg) ∀g∈ G,
wheredn is the demand of consumers as a reaction of pricepn at noden.
When the parameters in the price-demand curve are assumed tobe deterministic, we end up with a two-
stage deterministic game in which the first and second stage optimization problems of firmg∈ G are still the
same. Hence, the arguments in Lemmas 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 still hold. Moreover,Z∗(x) in OPF problem (3.43) is
a convex function ofx. By using similar arguments inProof of Theorem 3.3.4, one can still formulate a single
optimization problem which finds an equilibrium of the corresponding two-stage deterministic game.
Furthermore, the approach in previous sections that assumes a fixed random demand can be extended to
a random demand function where key parameters such as reference consumption for a given reference price
and elasticities are random. Price elasticities are only known with very little accuracy. It thus makes sense
to treat them as uncertain and to embed such parameters in thestate of the world. When some parameters
in price-demand curves are random, we have a two-stage stocha tic game in which the first and second stage
optimization problems of firmg ∈ G in Section 3.3.2 remain the same. Similarly, the arguments in Lemma
3.3.6 and Theorem 3.3.8 still hold. One can write OPF problem(3.43) with explicit dependency onω and the
corresponding optimal valueZ∗(ω ,x) will be a convex function ofx for everyω ∈ Ω. Therefore,Eω [Z∗(ω , ·)]
is also convex. By using a similar argument inProof of Theorem 3.3.7, one can still formulate a two-stage
stochastic program which solves the corresponding two-stage stochastic game.
The standard view in the approach outlined so far is to assumea demand response with a particular func-
tional form and possibly with some random parameters. This idea raises some questions though. The power
generation part of the model discussed so far is long-term, in the sense that investments can change the capacity
structure of the generation system; therefore, the response f the power system to price changes takes place
both through modifications of plant operations and capacities. In contrast, the representation of consumption
embedded in a demand function such as (3.42) does not offer that dual long and short term representation.
Its most standard interpretation is to assume that it reflects demand-side bidding; that is, participation of the
demand to the short-term power market.pn(d) is typically a short-run response of the demand to price with
given capacity in the consuming sector. This creates a modelinconsistency between the representation of the
supply and demand sectors that can only be removed by introducing a more complex demand model that ac-
counts for both the long run changes of capacity structure inthe consuming sector and the short run response of
demand with given capacity; for example a representation ofconsumer decision making including investments
in durable energy, using equipment, and habit formation which results in a short run (very low) elasticity, but a
longer term adjustment with higher long term elasticity (e.g., Celebi and Fuller (2012)). This discussion goes
beyond the scope of this thesis.
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3.7 More General Forms of Uncertainties in Spot Markets
In this section, we give a summary of possible extensions to generalize the basic assumption of uncertain
demand. In the previous sections, we assume that the demand in the spot market is possibly random. It is
also possible to view some of the other parameters as random.These parameters include generation costs
c(ω), transmission capacitieshl (ω), and power transfer distribution factorsPTDF(ω) with Eω [| c(ω) |] < ∞,
Eω [| hl (ω) |]< ∞, andEω [| PTDF(ω) |]< ∞, respectively. When these parameters are random, one can prove
that the results obtained throughout this chapter still hold as argued briefly in the following propositions.
Proposition 3.7.1. Let c, h, and PTDF be random and let the second stage problem ofeach firm g∈ G and
TSO be feasible and bounded in the neighborhood of a feasiblepoint x∗. Then the equilibrium conditions of
the first stage game given in Lemma 3.3.6 (energy-only market), MCP (3.28) (energy market with capacity
requirements), and Theorem 3.5.3 (energy market with operating-reserve pricing) still hold.
Proof: The second stage revenues of firmg∈ G, Π∗g(ω , ·) andΠ∗Rg (ω , ·), are concave functions ofxg for every
ω ∈ Ω andg ∈ G regardless of the random parameter. By similar arguments inProofs of Lemma 3.3.6and
Theorem 3.5.3, one can derive the equilibrium conditions (3.18), (3.28),and (3.37) for the first stage game.
Proposition 3.7.2. Let c, h, and PTDF be random and let the corresponding lower level problem(3.16) be
feasible and bounded in the neighborhood of a feasible pointx∗. Then in case of an energy-only market, an
energy market with capacity requirements, an energy marketwith operating-reserve pricing based on observed
demand as given in Figure 3.1, or an energy market with demandbid ing, the equivalence result with respect
to the equilibrium of the two-stage game and the solution of atwo-stage stochastic program established under
random demand in previous sections (e.g., Theorem 3.3.7) still holds. That is, one can find a perfect competition
equilibrium of these markets by solving the corresponding two-stage stochastic program (from the perspective
of a central planner).
Proof: The optimal value of the corresponding OPF problem,Z∗(ω ,x), is a convex function ofx for every
ω ∈Ω regardless of the random parameter which implies the convexity of the expected system costEω [Z∗(ω , ·)]
incurred at the second stage. By utilizing Proposition 3.7.1 and using a similar argument inProof of Theorem
3.3.7, the results follow.
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3.8 Computational Methods for Solving Two-stage Equilibrium Models
In this section, we discuss the possible computational methods for solving the two-stage games numerically
in four different market settings we have considered; namely energy-only markets, energy markets including
forward capacity market, energy markets with operating-reserve pricing, and demand bidding.
3.8.1 Solving Two-stage Deterministic Equilibrium Models
MCP Approach
We showed that when we have constant demand, we can always write the equilibrium conditions of the two-
stage game as a mixed complementarity problem; for instancethe MCP (3.12) in energy-only markets, the MCP
consisting of the KKT conditions of (3.27) in energy marketswith forward capacity market, the MCP consisting
of (3.31) and (3.34) in energy markets with operating-reserve pricing, and finally the MCP consisting of (3.11)
and the KKT conditions of (3.43) in energy markets with demand bidding. We can solve these MCPs by using
a state of the art MCP solver such as PATH (Dirkse and Ferris (1995b) and Ferris and Munson (2008)). Our
results ensure that a point satisfying such an MCP is indeed asolution to the original two-stage game.
(N)LP Approach
We showed in Section 3.3.1.2 that we can find an equilibrium ofthe two stage game in energy-only markets
by solving the linear program (3.14). In Sections 3.4 and 3.5.3.1, we showed that we can extend this result
to energy markets with forward capacity market and energy markets with operating-reserve pricing based on
an observed demand. Hence instead of solving the MCPs of these wo-stage games, we can solve the corre-
sponding (N)LPs (3.14), (3.27), and (3.39) respectively and take the solution as an equilibrium point of the
corresponding two-stage game in these market designs. Moreover as mentioned in Section 3.6, under the
assumption of demand response we can again formulate a single optimization problem which is a nonlinear
program, solve it using an off the shelf nonlinear programming solver, and take its optimal solution as an equi-
librium point of the corresponding market. LPs may be much simpler to solve compared to MCPs, especially
when we have realistic systems of large networks. Dependingon the problem, NLPs may or may not be easier
to solve than MCPs.
One should also note that it may not be possible to formulate asingle optimization problem for every two-
stage game under perfect competition as we elaborate this issue n Section 3.5.3.2 for energy markets with
operating-reserve pricing based on installed capacities;n that case, one needs to resort to an MCP approach to
provide numerical solutions.
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3.8.2 Solving Two-stage Stochastic Equilibrium Models
In general, when we have demand uncertainty, we cannot observe the expected function values explicitly; hence
we propose to approximate them by the corresponding sample average functions and solve the resulting approx-
imate problem. The basic method we use is known assample-path methodor sample average approximation
methoddescribed briefly in Section 2.4; see for example Robinson (1996) and Shapiro and Homem-De-Mello
(1998) for the theoretical background in optimization context. Roughly speaking, in sample-path methods the
stochastic problem is observed for a fixed and long sample-path by fixing a large sample size and using the
method of common random numbers. Since the sample path and length are fixed, the approximate problem
actually becomes a deterministic problem. The resulting deterministic problem is solved by fast and effective
solution methods available and its solution is taken as the approximate solution of the stochastic problem. We
refer the interested reader to Gürkan et al. (1999a) and Gürkan and Pang (2009) for the theoretical analysis of
the sample-path method for solving stochastic equilibriummodels.
Next, we explain how we use the basic idea ofsample-path methodsto solve the two-stage stochastic
games in each market setting. We again propose two differentsolu ion approaches; in the solution approaches
outlined below, we use a large, fixed sample sizeM and an i.i.d. sample pointω := {ω1,ω2 . . . ,ωM}. Let
β (ω1),β (ω2), . . . ,β (ωM) be the vectors of scarcity rents corresponding to this sample.
MCP Approach
We can always formulate the approximate two-stage stochasti game as a potentially very large MCP. This
MCP consists of the KKT conditions of every firm’s first and second-stage problems for all realizations in
the sample{ωm}Mm=1. For instance, consider the energy-only market in Section 3.3. We cannot observe
Eω [β ∗gik (ω)]; however using our random sample of sizeM, we can approximate it by a sample average func-










ik (ωm) converges to
Eω [β ∗gik (ω)] with probability 1 asM gets large. We can then solve the MCP system which actually consists
of (3.44) below and the KKT conditions of OPF problem (3.16) for all {ωm}Mm=1 and take its solution as an







β ∗gik (ωm)+κk ⊥ x
∗g
ik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg. (3.44)
We can use the same approach for formulating the MCPs of the other three electricity market designs;
namely energy markets including forward capacity market, with operating-reserve pricing, and with demand
response. Then we can solve the corresponding MCP by a deterministic solver such as PATH. However, this
approach has the following drawback: The size of the MCP increases rapidly with the sample sizeM and the
size of the network. Therefore, straightforward construction of an MCP in the stochastic setting for realistic
networks and solving this large scale system by using the curr ntly available software may be a computational
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challenge, as we briefly illustrate in Section 3.9.
Implicit Function Approach
Energy-only Markets: We showed in Section 3.3.2.2 that we can find an equilibrium ofthe two-stage stochas-
tic game in an energy-only market by solving a two-stage stochastic program. The first and second stages
of this two-stage program are formulated in (3.19) and (3.16) respectively. As mentioned earlier, we cannot
observe the expected cost functionEω [Z∗(ω ,x)] in the first-stage problem (3.19); however we can again ap-
proximate it by a sample-average function using the sample{ωm}Mm=1 and solve the approximate problem by
using sample-path optimization.

















asM → ∞ almost surely.
(3.45)















Note that (3.46) is in general an NLP and we can try to solve it by using a standard NLP solver. An efficient
NLP solver would require us to provide function values as well as (sub)gradient values of the objective function
(3.46) as input. Although we do not have an explicit expression forZ∗(ωm,x), givenωm andx, we can solve the
second stage problem (3.16) numerically (by using a standard LP solver) to obtainZ∗(ωm,x) at that point. Once
the optimal solution of (3.16) is found, we also haveβ ∗gik (ωm) ∈
∂Z∗(ωm,x)
∂xgik
for everyg, i, andk as a by-product.
Sincex is a right-hand side parameter in (3.16),β ∗gik (ωm) is simply the associated multiplier.
To summarize, this approach would involve solvingM consecutive LPs of format (3.16) at any pointx that
the NLP solver (used for solving (3.46)) would like to evaluate its optimality. The illustration of the corre-
sponding sample-path method is given in Figure 2.2.
Energy Markets with a Forward Capacity Market: In Section 3.4, we showed that the main results of
Section 3.3.2.2 can directly be extended to the two-stage game of Section 3.4, namely energy markets with
forward capacity market. In this market setting, we can still find an equilibrium of the corresponding two-stage
stochastic game by solving the two-stage stochastic program (3.29). By using the fixed sample point{ωm}Mm=1,
CHAPTER 3. Generation Capacity Investments in ElectricityMarkets: Perfect Competition 85



















The only difference between the approximate problems (3.46) and (3.47) is that a deterministic capacity
regulation constraint is imposed in the latter. Hence, the arguments for solving (3.46) are also valid for (3.47).
Energy Markets with Operating-reserve Pricing: In Section 3.5.3, we showed that it is not always possible
to formulate a two-stage stochastic program that finds an equilibri m of the two-stage stochastic game under
perfect competition. If one can formulate a two-stage program as in Section 3.5.3.1, then it is possible to solve
(3.40) in a similar way used for (3.19), as explained inimplicit function approachfor energy-only markets.
If one cannot formulate a two-stage program as in Section 3.5.3.2, then in order to find an equilibrium of the
corresponding two-stage stochastic game, one has to solve the stochastic complementarity problem (3.37) at
the first stage and the optimization problem (3.35) at the second stage.
As explained before, one possible approach is solving the corresponding aggregate MCP system (that is,
MCP (3.37) and KKT conditions of (3.35)) to find an approximate equilibrium point of the two-stage stochastic
game, as described in MCP approach for stochastic systems. However, the size of the resulting aggregate
MCP system grows rapidly with the sample sizeM. Hence, it may be computationally very time-consuming or
impossible to solve such an MCP system for realistic networks.
We next propose another way for finding an approximate equilibrium of the two-stage stochastic game of
Section 3.5.3.2 by implicit function approach. First, we approximate (3.37) by using sample average approxi-
mations of the expected functions. For givenx, one can easily approximateEω [β ∗gik (ω)+rp capacity(
ex−ey∗ (ω)
ex )]














[β ∗gik (ωm)+ rp capacity(
ex∗ −ey∗(ωm)
ex∗
)]+κk ⊥ x∗gik ≥ 0, ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg. (3.48)
As mentioned, we would like to solve (3.48) reminiscent of the implicit function approach. Note that the
size of (3.48) does not depend on the sample sizeM. In order to solve (3.48), we need to provide function




ik (ωm) + rp capacity(
ex−ey∗ (ωm)
ex )] at anyx that PATH would like to
explore. Given anyx, we can solve the second stage OPF problem (3.35)M consecutive times and obtain the
values ofβ ∗gik (ωm) andrp capacity(
ex−ey∗ (ωm)
ex ) for eachm∈ M.
Unfortunately, to approximate the (sub)gradient ofEω [β ∗gik (ω)+ rp capacity(
ex−ey∗ (ω)
ex )], we cannot directly
use the (sub)gradient values ofβ ∗gik (ωm). AlthoughE[β
∗g






ik (ωm) becomes almost
continuous for largeM, β ∗gik (ωm) is actually a piecewise constant function ofx. Thus, the (sub)gradient of
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β ∗gik (ωm) is either zero or undefined for a givenx and ωm. Hence, we use the following steps to obtain an






ik > 0 :
• By using (3.31), for anyω with y∗ik(ω)> 0:
Eω [β ∗gik (ω)+ rp capacity(
ex−ey∗ (ω)





• Again, by (3.31), for anyω with y∗ik(ω) = 0, we haveβ
∗g
ik (ω) = 0. Thus:
Eω [β ∗gik (ω)+ rp capacity(
ex−ey∗ (ω)
ex )] = Eω [rp capacity(
ex−ey∗ (ω)
ex )].
• Hence, by these two together, we can write:
Eω [β ∗gik (ω)+ rp capacity(
ex−ey∗ (ω)









By calculating the subgradients of (3.49), we get
















• Note that for a fixed sample{ωm}Mm=1, we can always perturbx
g





and the values of the indicator functionsI{y∗ik(ω)>0} andI{y∗ik(ω)=0} do not change; hence they can be treated
as constants.





ex )I{y∗ik(ω)=0}] for any x
g

































asM → ∞ almost surely.
(3.51)
Given any x, we can calculate the the corresponding (sub)gradient values by using (3.50)
and (3.51). Thus, one needs to calculate the values(y∗(ωm),u(ωm)) and the subgradients




ik. Once the functionrp capacity(·) is
explicitly defined, all of these values, except subgradientof p∗i (ωm), are straightforward to calculate from











For the calculation of the subgradient ofp∗i (ωm), Castillo et al. (2006) gives an integrated approach
which at once yields all the sensitivities of the optimal soluti n of an NLP problem to changes in the
parameter values. They illustrate how to obtain the directional and partial derivatives of the optimal
objective function value, optimal primal, and dual variable values with respect to the parameters of a
general NLP problem by a single calculation. Once we solve the OPF problem (3.35), we utilize the
approach of Castillo et al. (2006) to calculate the subgradient of p∗i (ωm).
Energy Markets with Demand-side bidding: Similar to the energy-only market, the first stage problem
of the two-stage stochastic model can be approximated by (3.46). The only difference between the
approximate problems of energy-only market and energy market with demand response is the second
stage OPF problem. The second stage OPF problem of energy market with demand response would be
almost identical to (3.43) with explicit depends onωm. Hence, the discussion related to solving (3.46)
remain applicable in this case as well.
3.9 Numerical Illustration
The numerical experiments reported here have been conducted to serve two purposes. Firstly, we would
like to compare the performance of the computational methods discussed in Section 3.8 and secondly
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we would like to see the impact of the market designs discussed in this chapter on investment incentives
of the firms. To this end, we apply in this section the methods proposed in Section 3.8 to solve the
equilibrium for the electricity markets discussed throughout this chapter under both deterministic and
stochastic setting.
All the numerical experiments reported are performed by a Dell PC with Dual-Intel Xeon, 575 2.66
GHz processors, and 2 GB 266 MHz DDR Non-ECC SDRAM Memory using 576 Windows 2000.
The solvers utilized for each problem depend on both the typeof application problem and the method,
which are summarized in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Note that the methodologies discussed in Section 3.8 allow
modularity; that is, one can always use any off-the-shelf solvers. In Table 3.2, (Non)Linear Program
((N)LP) and Mixed Linear/Nonlinear Complementarity Problem (MLCP/MNCP) are used to solve first
and second stage problems simultaneously whereas Stochastic Program (SP) and MCP s.t. NLP are
based on implicit function approach discussed in Section 3.8; that is, first stage problem and second stage
problems at each realization are solved iteratively. Thus,one can use a separate solver for each stage.
In our case, we use CONOPT(warm start) and SNOPT sequentially for SPs and PATH for MCPs to find
an equilibrium of the first stage. These first stage solvers call the second stage solverM consecutive
times at a pointx to explore its optimality. The up-to-date information on the first stage solvers can be
found in the online documentations available by GAMS (see GAMS (2012)). In addition, for solving
the second stage OPF problem we use the deterministic nonlinear optimization code E04UCC of NAG C
library, Mark 7, NAG (2002). E04UCC is designed to minimize an arbitrary smooth function subject to
constraints, which may include simple bounds on the variables, linear constraints, and smooth nonlinear
constraints. Essentially, it is a sequential quadratic programming method incorporating an augmented
Lagrangian merit function and a BFGS quasi-Newton approximation to the Hessian of the Lagrangian.
Application
Problem Remedy Mechanism
EO Energy-only with VOLL pricing
ECAP Capacity markets
EORP1 Operating-reserve pricing based on demand
EORP2 Operating-reserve pricing based on capacity
Table 3.1: Overview of application problems
We consider a competitive power market of six nodes given by Chao and Peck (1998) in Figure 3.3,
which has the following characteristics:
– The nodes 1, 2, and 4 are supply nodes (I := {1,2,4}) and the nodes 3, 5, and 6 are demand nodes
(N := {3,5,6}).
– Without loss of generality, at each supply node there is a single firm investing in one technology
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Application Solver Solver
Method Problem First Stage Second Stage
LP/NLP All except EORP2 CPLEX/SNOPT(GAMS) with 1st stage
(1st and 2nd stage)
MLCP/MNCP All PATH(GAMS) with 1st stage
(1st and 2nd stage)
SP All except EORP2 CONOPT(warm start) E04UCC
and SNOPT(GAMS) (NAG C)
MNCP s.t. NLP EORP2 E04UCC
PATH(GAMS) (NAG C)
Table 3.2: Overview of solvers utilized for each method and problem type
(g= i = k). The unit generation and investment costs of these firms are given in Figure 3.3. The
corresponding data for marginal costs for these three generator types are taken from Schulkin et al.
(2010).
– The demand in nodes 3, 5, and 6 are uniformly distributed withcorresponding upper (Dmax) and
lower bounds (Dmin) given in Figure 3.3.
– To analyze the electricity market with limited network capacity, we assume all lines have infinite
capacities except for the lines (1-6) and (2-5) whereh16 = 8 andh25 = 8. All line impedances are
equal to 1 except for (1-6) and (2-5) that have impedances equal to 2. The PTDFs in Table 3.3
indicate the flows through lines (1-6) and (2-5) resulting from one unit injection at each node of the
network and withdrawal at node 6, which is taken as the hub.
– VOLL is taken as 10,000 Euro/MWh which is a standard value of lost oad used in the literature
(e.g., Stoft (2002), Hogan (2005)).
– In case of operating-reserve pricing, both operating-reserv price curves introduced in Sections
3.5.3.1 and 3.5.3.2 are assumed to be smooth sigmoid functions as given in Figures 3.1 and 3.2,




Fmax is the maximum value of the function.Fmid gives the mid value of the function (F Fmid) =
Fmax/2). Finally, k gives the curvature information centered onFmid. Regarding the approximat-
ing function of the operating-reserve price curve offered by Hogan (2005) in Figure 3.1 and the
operating-reserve price curve based on installed capacityin Figure 3.2, one should takeFmax=
10,000 andFmid = 0.05. In order to determine the value ofk, the error between the real function
and the approximating function is calculated for differentvalues ofk andk = 133 gives the best
approximation with the smallest error. Therefore for the numerical results reported in this section,
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we use the formulationrp( f (x,y,d)) =
10000
1+e133( f (x,y,d)−0.05)
for the operating-reserve price curves,
rp demand(ex−ey
∗
ed ) andrp capacity(
ex−ey∗
ex ), given in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. The unit of





Figure 3.3: The data of 6-node example
Next, we solve two-stage deterministic and two-stage stochastic games by using the approaches proposed
in Section 3.8.
Example 3.9.1. Perfect competition equilibria under deterministic demand
We first consider the situation in which the firms solve their first stage problem by simply taking the
expected values of the demand:d3 = 10,d5 = 4, andd6 = 17.5. Then the corresponding game is a two-
stage deterministic game. In the energy-only (EO) market, energy market with forward capacity market
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Table 3.3: Power distribution factors (PTDFl , j)
(ECAP), and energy market with operating-reserve pricing based on the observed demand (EORP1), we
find the equilibrium of the two-stage deterministic game by utilizing both MCP and (N)LP approaches.
In the energy market with operating-reserve pricing based on installed capacity (EORP2), we find the
equilibrium of the two-stage deterministic game by utilizing MCP approach. In the ECAP market, we
impose that the capacity market requires 11.2% more capacity than the total expected demand (H = 35.2)
which results in same reserve capacity as in EORP2 market. Thresults are presented in Tables 3.4 and
3.5. Furthermore, the results obtained by MCP approach and (N)LP approach for EO, ECAP, and EORP1
markets are identical and the computation time for both approaches takes less than a second.
Investment Incentives:Regarding the EO market result as reference, Tables 3.4 and 3.5 indicate that
the investments increase when there is capacity market or operating-reserve pricing. The prices in both
EORP markets remain identical whereas the prices in ECAP market e lower. However, there is an extra
capacity priceλ ∗ = 5.7 euro/MWh paid to the firms in ECAP market. If the consumers are paying this
capacity price, then one can conclude that ECAP market results in identical prices as well.
Compared to EO market, total generation capacity investments are higher in ECAP and EORP markets;
hence the system has higher investment costs in these markets. Regarding the comparison between
different market designs, investment incentives are higher in EORP2 market than in EORP1 market. In
addition, ECAP market results in identical investment levels as in EORP2 market sinceH is chosen to
be equal to the total generation capacity in EORP2 market. IfH were chosen to be equal to the total
generation capacity in EORP1 market, then ECAP market wouldresult in identical investment levels as
in EORP1 market. Based on our extensive numerical experiments, we conjecture that for any operating-
reserve functionrp in EORP1 or EORP2 market, there is a correspondingH in ECAP market which
results in identical total reserve capacity and mix of technologies. This observation is also made by Hobbs
et al. (2001). Furthermore, if the “correct” extra capacityprice (λ ∗ = 5.7) is paid by the consumers, then
one can conclude that whenH is equal to the total generation capacity in an EORP market, th re is no
difference between ECAP and the corresponding EORP market.
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GW euro / MWh Investment and










6 Operational Cost (k Euro)
EO 31.5 0 0 33.7 33.7 33.7 1061.5
EORP1 31.5 3.3 0 33.7 33.7 33.7 1080.4
EORP2 31.5 3.7 0 33.7 33.7 33.7 1082.6
ECAP 31.5 3.7 0 28.0 28.0 28.0 1082.6
Table 3.4: Equilibrium in two-stage deterministic game with infinite transmission line capacities
GW euro / MWh Investment and










6 Operational Cost (k Euro)
EO 21.6 0 9.9 35.4 46.9 50.3 1208.9
EORP1 21.6 3.3 9.9 35.4 46.9 50.3 1227.9
EORP2 21.6 3.7 9.9 35.4 46.9 50.3 1230.1
ECAP 21.6 3.7 9.9 29.7 41.2 44.6 1230.0
Table 3.5: Equilibrium in two-stage deterministic game with l mited network capacity
Example 3.9.2. Perfect competition equilibria under demand uncertainty
We now consider the situation in which the firms take the randomness of demand into account and the cor-
responding two-stage stochastic game needs to be solved. Wefirst solve the two-stage stochastic games
in EO, ECAP, and EORP2 markets by using both MCP and implicit function approaches discussed in
Section 3.8 and compare the performance of these approaches. We use sample sizes ofM = 1000 and
M = 8760 and compare the computational performance of these twoapproaches in the energy-only mar-
ket in Table 3.6, in EORP2 market in Table 3.7, and in ECAP market in Table 3.8, respectively. We report
optimal capacities installed together with the solution time. We skip the comparison of the computational
performance of these approaches for EORP1 market since the corresponding solution times are similar
to that of EO market. Note that the particular problem being solved in the MCP approach is referred as
mixed linear complementarity problem (MLCP) for energy-only and ECAP markets and mixed nonlinear
complementarity problem (MNCP) for EORP2 market. Moreover, the particular problem being solved in
the implicit function approach is referred as stochastic program (SP) for energy-only and ECAP markets
and MNLCP s.t. NLP in EOPR2 market (since mixed nonlinear comple entarity problem is solved at
the upper level subject to the optimal solution set of the nonli ear program at the lower level). Next for
M = 8760, we compare the corresponding generation capacity investments, average consumer prices,
and average investment and operational (generation and curtailment) costs for EO, ECAP, and EORP
markets for both unlimited and limited network in Tables 3.10 and 3.11, respectively.
Computational Performance:The comparisons between the MCP approach (MLCP or MNCP) and im-
plicit function approach (SP or MNCP s.t. NLP) in all tables indicate that the computational time to
solve the two-stage stochastic game by MCP approach increases r pidly with the sample sizeM. Since
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the implicit function approach involves solving the lower lvel (N)LP problemM consecutive times, the
computational time increases with sample sizeM in a linear way. Hence, the MCP approach is more
efficient in solving problems with smaller sample size (e.g., M = 1000) and implicit function approach
is more efficient in solving problems with large sample size (e.g.,M = 8760). We note that the solutions
of the approximating problem with small sample size (M = 1000) are almost identical to the solutions of
the approximating problem with large sample size (M = 8760) in Tables 3.6-3.8. This is mainly a con-
sequence of using uniform distribution in which case the approximation functions converge to their limit
very rapidly. Next, we consider an example in the energy-onlmarket in which the stochastic demand in
nodes 3,5, and 6 has triangular distribution with peak values 9,3.5, and 16, respectively. Table 3.9 con-
tains the equilibrium points of this two-stage game. We see that the equilibria for different sample sizes
show wider variations in this case. Therefore, depending onthe variability of the underlying random data
and the final accuracy desired, one may sometimes prefer to solve the two-stage game for larger sample
sizes (e.g.,M = 8760) which get closer to the true solution.
Investment Incentives:The comparison of investment capacities installed by each te nology, average
consumer prices, and total investment and operational costof the system under each market design is
given in Tables 3.10 and 3.11. The values in these tables repres nt the computations done with sample
size of 8760. The results indicate that the total generationcapacity in energy-only market is 1-2% less
than the total peak demand, whereas ECAP and operating-reserve pricing in EORP1 and EORP2 markets
result in total generation capacities that are about 4.5% - 5.0% above the total peak demand level. Thus,
energy-only markets with VOLL pricing tend to lead to total generation capacity below the peak load
with a certain probability whereas energy markets with a forward capacity market or operating-reserve
pricing result in higher investments. VOLL pricing (with hig values of VOLL) may also result in
similar investment levels as the other market designs if forced outages are taken into account and the
demand is assumed to have a distribution without a finite support (see the result of Hobbs et al. (2001)).
In our experiments, since we do not consider forced outages and we assume demand distributions with
finite support, the regulator’s reserve target assumptions(in case of capacity markets or operating-reserve
pricing) result in total generation capacity higher than the peak demand level which cannot be achieved
by VOLL pricing.
As observed in the deterministic case, EORP2 market resultsin higher investment level of peak unit
compared to EORP1 market. Different from the deterministiccase, the average consumer prices in
EORP2 market are slightly higher than the average prices in EORP1 market. In ECAP market, we used
the total capacity requirementH = 38.8. As one can see in Tables 3.10 and 3.11, the investment levels
obtained in ECAP market are close to the investment levels inEORP markets. Similar to the deterministic
case, we conjecture a similar result of Hobbs et al. (2001) that for any operating-reserve functionrp in
EORP1 or EORP2 market, there is a correspondingH in ECAP market which results in identical total
reserve capacity and mix of technologies.
94 3.10. Conclusions
Although the average prices in ECAP market are the lowest, there is again an extra capacity priceλ ∗ = 5.7
euro/MWh which is likely be paid by the consumers. Furthermore compared to the EO market, the
relative increase in system operational and investment cost in ECAP and EORP markets under uncertainty
is lower than the increase in the total cost for the deterministic case. This can be explained by the
impact of higher operational cost due to the curtailment at some realizations and lower investment cost
in EO market versus lower operational and higher investmentcosts in the other market designs. Finally,
the comparison of the results in deterministic and stochastic settings indicate that when uncertainty of
future demand is taken into account by the risk neutral generators, their investments result in higher total
generation capacity and a broader mix of technologies compared to the case when generators invest based
on the expected demand.












Sample size CPU time CPU time
M MLCP SP MLCP SP
1000 (32.9, 2.0, 1.5) (32.9, 2.0, 1.5) (22.1, 1.3, 13.0) (22.1, 1.3, 13.0)
00h 00’47” 00h 13’46” 00h 05’04” 00h 27’45’
8760 (32.9, 2.1, 1.5) (32.9, 2.1, 1.5) (22.0, 1.2, 13.3) (22.0, 1.2, 13.3)
06h 16’ 49” 01h 36’ 25” 23h 01’ 09” 02h 32’ 38”
Table 3.6: Equilibrium of two-stage stochastic game in energy-only markets (EO)












Sample size CPU time CPU time
M MNCP MNCP s.t. NLP MNCP MNCP s.t. NLP
1000 (32.9, 4.4, 1.5) (32.3, 3.6, 2.9) (22.1, 3.7, 12.9) (22.1, 3.7, 12.9)
00h 01’05” 01h 0’07” 00h 05’04” 01h 15’53”
8760 (32.9, 4.5, 1.5) (32.9, 4.5, 1.5) NA (time limit) (22.0, 3.8, 13.0)
10h 46’ 22” 09h 31’ 38” 75h 48’ 19” 08h 19’ 42”
Table 3.7: Equilibrium of two-stage stochastic game in energy markets with operating-reserve price
(EORP2)
3.10 Conclusions
We have considered alternative market designs which may remedy the resource adequacy problem in
restructured electricity markets. Each market design corresponds to a different type of multi-agent model
formulation depending on the remedy mechanism and the assumption on the market agents’ behaviors.
Taking into account the uncertainty or variability of parameters in these multi-agent models may lead
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Sample size CPU time CPU time
M MNCP MNCP s.t. NLP MNCP MNCP s.t. NLP
1000 (32.9, 4.4, 1.5) (32.9, 4.4, 1.5) (22.1, 3.7, 12.9) (22.1, 3.7, 12.9)
00h 00’33” 00h 27’48” 00h 02’21” 00h 24’50”
8760 (32.9, 4.4, 1.5) (32.9, 4.4, 1.5) (22.1,3.6,13.1) (22.1, 3.6, 13.1)
4h 44’ 11” 01h 54’ 11” 21h 38’ 34” 01h 54’ 49”
Table 3.8: Equilibrium of two-stage stochastic game in energy markets with forward capacity re-
quirements (ECAP)












Sample size CPU time CPU time
M MLCP SP MLCP SP
1000 (31.5, 2.2, 1.1) (31.5, 2.2, 1.1) (21.5, 1.0, 12.3) (21.5, 1.0, 12.3)
00h 00’51” 00h 14’18” 00h 02’21” 00h 23’48’
8760 (31.5, 2.4, 1.2) (31.5, 2.4, 1.2) (21.5, 0.8, 12.8) (21.5, 0.8, 12.8)
10h 43’ 53” 02h 06’ 01” 34h 18’ 31” 04h 59’ 28”
Table 3.9: Equilibrium of two-stage stochastic game in EO markets with stochastic demand sampled
from triangular distribution
GW euro / MWh Average Investment and










6] Operational Cost (k Euro)
EO 32.9 2.1 1.5 33.6 33.6 33.6 1113.6
EORP1 32.9 4.3 1.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 1125.7
EORP2 32.9 4.5 1.5 33.8 33.8 33.8 1126.8
ECAP 32.9 4.4 1.5 28.0 28.0 28.0 1126.3
Table 3.10: Equilibrium in two-stage stochastic game with infin te transmission line capacities
GW euro / MWh Average Investment and










6] Operational Cost (k Euro)
EO 22.0 1.2 13.3 36.0 46.5 49.5 1256.8
EORP1 22.1 3.5 13.1 35.4 46.6 49.8 1268.6
EORP2 22.0 3.8 13.0 38.5 50.2 53.6 1269.3
ECAP 22.1 3.6 13.1 29.8 41.0 44.3 1269.1
Table 3.11: Equilibrium in two-stage stochastic game with limited network capacity
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to large-scale problems which are computationally complexto solve due to scarcity of resources (e.g.,
available memory and speed of computers). We show that, in perfectly competitive markets, most of
the market models can be cast into deterministic or stochasti op imization problems similar to the early
capacity expansion models of a regulated monopoly. This result also suggests that an equilibrium of a
single-stage (open loop) model in which investment and operation decisions are made simultaneously
coincides with an equilibrium of a two-stage (closed loop) model where investment and operation de-
cisions are made sequentially. By using this result, we showthat we can utilize sample-path methods
together with the powerful available solvers for deterministic optimization problems, which provides
computational simplicity for solving such models of realistic systems with stochastic elements.
By utilizing numerical experiments, we also provide insights on the impact of demand uncertainty
and to what extend these market designs provide incentives to invest in generation capacities. Firstly,
uncertainty of demand leads to higher investments in total generation capacity and a broader mix of
technologies compared to the investment decisions assuming average demand levels. Furthermore in
energy-only markets, peak-load generators tend to under-iv st and curtail peak load so that they re-
ceive positive margin via high prices (e.g., VOLL) to cover their long-run marginal costs. In energy
markets with a forward capacity market or with operating-rese ve pricing, peak-load generators receive
positive margin not only via curtailment but also by providing more capacity to the system. Therefore
for the same VOLL (or price cap) level, energy-only markets with VOLL pricing tend to lead to total
generation capacity below the peak load with a certain probability whereas energy markets with a for-
ward capacity market or operating-reserve pricing result in higher investments under the assumptions
of random demand with finite support and no forced outages. Moreover given similar regulator targets,
operating-reserve pricing based on installed capacity provides higher incentives than operating-reserve
pricing based on observed demand and it does not increase thetotal investment and operational cost in
the system significantly. Lastly, the regulator decisions (e.g., reserve capacity target) in capacity markets
and operating-reserve pricing can be chosen in such a way that results in very similar investment levels
and fuel mix of generation capacities in both market designs.
Finally, the result of the prevalence of stochastic programming for providing solutions to stochastic
equilibrium models can be extended to generation capacity investment strategies in perfectly competitive
electricity markets with different regulatory mechanismssuch as emission trading scheme (Gürkan et al.
(2012)) or renewable obligations (Gürkan and Langestraat(2012)). In addition, risk aversion can also be
included by using “coherent risk measures” in the first stageproblem of the firms. This allows assessment
of investment incentives of risk averse generators by utilizing a two-stage stochastic program when the
markets are perfectly competitive and “complete” (Ralph and Smeers (2011)). However, this does not
necessarily guarantee that every equilibrium model under perfect competition can be cast as two-stage
stochastic program since equilibrium problems are indeed broader than optimization problems. The
natural approach is to resort initially to complementarityformulations as to model competitive electricity
markets. Depending on the structure of the market and regulatory intervention, market equilibrium may
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or may not be equivalent to the solution of a system optimization. For instance in one case of operating-
reserve pricing, we obtain an equilibrium problem that is not equivalent to an optimization problem.
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3.A Proofs of Lemmas and Theorems
Proof of Lemma 3.3.3. The first stage problem (3.10) is concave inxg and the second stage problem
(3.9) is a linear program and therefore is convex. Hence, (3.11) and (3.8) are necessary and sufficient
optimality conditions for all firms at both stages. By using the result,x∗ = y∗, from Lemma 3.3.1, we can
rewrite (3.8) by replacingy∗gik with x
∗g
ik . Thus, the first two complementarity equations in (3.8) reduc to:






ik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg
(ii) β g∗ik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg.
In addition by Lemma 3.3.2,
(iii ) 0≤−β ∗gik +κk ⊥ x
∗g
ik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg
should hold at the first stage. As a result, a solutionx∗ which satisfies(i)-(iii) would satisfy the following
complementarity conditions as well:
0≤ cgik − p
∗
i +κk ⊥ x
∗g
ik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg.
On the other hand, letx∗ be a solution to the complementarity conditions in (3.12). Then it is an equilib-




ik = κk for x
∗g
ik > 0 and 0≤ β
∗g
ik ≤ κk for x
∗g
ik = 0.









whereΠ∗g(ω ,xg) is the optimal value of the firmg’s second stage problem (3.15) at realizationω ∈ Ω.
Similar to the arguments inProof of Lemma 3.3.2, Π∗g(ω ,xg) is a concave function ofxg for all fixed
ω ∈ Ω; hence the expectationEω [Π∗g(ω ,xg)] is a concave function ofxg as well. By using the fact
that (3.15) is a linear program, we know that at any givenxg if Π∗g(ω ,xg) is finite thenβ
∗g
ik (ω) is a
subgradient ofΠ∗g(ω , ·). Moreover,β
∗g
ik (ω) is unique andΠ
∗
g(ω , ·) is differentiable except on a setL of
Lebesgue measure zero. Thus,
∂Π∗g(ω , ·)
∂xgik
= β ∗gik (ω) except onL.
Sinceβ ∗gik (ω) is a subgradient ofΠ
∗
g(ω , ·), Eω [β
∗g
ik (ω)] is a subgradient ofEω [Π
∗
g(ω , ·)]. Moreoverd(ω)
is a continuous random variable; henceL has a probability measure zero. Therefore,Eω [β ∗gik (ω)] is
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unique and
∂Eω [Π∗g(ω , ·)]
∂xgik
= Eω [β ∗gik (ω)]. (A3)
As a result, we can conclude thatEω [Π∗g(ω , ·)] is concave and differentiable. Hence,x∗g is optimal for




+κk ⊥ x∗gik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg.
By using the equality in (A3), we get the following equilibrium conditions for the first-stage game:
0≤−Eω [β ∗gik (ω)]+κk ⊥ x
∗g
ik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.8. Both (3.23) and (3.24) are convex problems. The necessary and sufficient
KKT optimality conditions of (3.23) and (3.24) for all firms and TSO together with the market clearing





πmβ ∗gik (ωm)+κk ⊥ x
∗g
ik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg; (A4)
where form= 1,2, . . . ,M :
(y∗(ωm),β ∗(ωm), p∗(ωm)) satisfyMCP Firms(ωm,x)
( f ∗(ωm),ρ∗(ωm),λ ∗+l (ωm),λ
∗−
l (ωm)) satisfyMCP TSO(ωm)
(y∗(ωm),δ ∗(ωm), f ∗(ωm), p∗(ωm)) satisfyMCP Market(ωm).
In (A4), the first line is equivalent to the equilibrium conditions of the first stage game given in (3.22)
and the rest is KKT optimality conditions of the OPF problem (3.16) for everyωm. Hence, a solution to
the MCP (A4) is an equilibrium of the corresponding two-stage stochastic game with finite number of
demand scenarios. Furthermore, since (A4) consists of necessary and sufficient optimality conditions of
every firm’s problem in both two-stage and single-stage games, an equilibrium of the two-stage stochastic
game, if it exists, is also an equilibrium of the single-stage stochastic game.
Proof of Theorem 3.5.2. The second stage problem (3.30) of each firmg∈G is a linear program wherexg
appears both as a coefficient in the objective function and asa the right side parameter in the constraints.
Since the objective function is a concave function ofxg and the corresponding constraints are convex in
xg, the optimal objective function value,Π∗Rg (xg), is a concave function ofxg in (3.30). WhenΠ∗Rg (xg)
is finite in the neighborhood ofx∗g, it is also subdifferentiable atx∗g and (β ∗gik + γ
∗) is a subgradient
of Π∗Rg (x∗g). Hence,x∗g is an optimal solution of (3.33) for each firmg ∈ G if and only if there exists
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satisfying the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions
0≤−(β ∗gik + γ
∗)+κk ⊥ x∗gik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg.
After plugging inγ∗ = rp(ex∗−ey∗,x∗,d), we get the equilibrium conditions in first stage game as
0≤−β ∗gik − rp(ex
∗−ey∗,x∗,d)+κk ⊥ x∗gik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg.
Proof of Theorem 3.5.3. Π∗Rg (ω ,xg) is the optimal objective function value of the second stage problem
(3.30) in stochastic setting defined for eachω ∈ Ω. As argued inProof of Theorem 3.5.2, Π∗Rg (ω ,xg) is
a concave function ofxg; henceEω [Π∗Rg (ω , ·)] is concave. By using an argument similar to the one in
Proof of Lemma 3.3.6, we can conclude thatEω [Π∗Rg (ω , ·)] is differentiable and
∂Eω [Π∗Rg (ω , ·)]
∂xgik
= Eω [β ∗gik (ω)+ γ
∗(ω)].
Hence,x∗g is an optimal solution of (3.36) for each firmg ∈ G if and only if it satisfies the optimality
conditions
0≤−Eω [β ∗gik (ω)+ γ
∗(ω)]+κk ⊥ x∗gik ≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg.
After plugging inγ∗(ω) = rp(ex∗ −y∗(ω),x∗,d(ω)), we get the equilibrium conditions in (3.37).
Proof of Remark 3.5.4. (x,y) ∈ ℜM×M+ whereM := G× I ×K. R demand(
ex−ey
ed ) is concave in(x,y) iff
its HessianH := ℜ2M×2M is negative semidefinite. Next we calculate the Hessian ofR demand(ex−eyed ):




) = ∇2yyR demand(
ex−ey
ed








whereH1i j = h1(ex,ey) =







∀i, j ∈ M and h1(ex,ey) ≤ 0 by using Assumption
3.5.1. Then the Hessian matrix can be formulated as







LetzT = [z1 z2] wherez1,z2 ∈ℜM. Next we show thatH is negative semidefinite; that is,zTH(x,y)z≤
0 for eachz∈ ℜ2M and(x,y) ∈ ℜM×M+ :









Sinceh1(ex,ey) ≤ 0, zTH(x,y)z≤ 0 for eachz∈ ℜ2M. Thus,H is negative semidefinite.
Proof of Remark 3.5.7. (x,y) ∈ ℜM×M+ whereM := G× I ×K. R demand(
ex−ey
ex ) is concave in(x,y) iff
its HessianH := ℜ2M×2M is negative semidefinite. Next we calculate the Hessian ofR demand(ex−eyex ):
















where for(x,y) ∈ ℜM×M+ and by using Assumption 3.5.1:
(i) H1i j =







≤ 0, ∀i, j ∈ M.
(ii) H2i j =




≤ 0, ∀i, j ∈ M.
(iii) H3i j =−




≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈ M.
Note thatey2 denotes the sum of squares for all the elements of a vectory andex3 denotes the sum of








LetzT = [z1 z2] wherez1,z2 ∈ℜM. Next we show thatH is negative semidefinite; that is,zTH(x,y)z≤
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0 for eachz∈ ℜ2M and(x,y) ∈ ℜM×M+ :











By usingH1i j =−
ey
ex





H3i j , andH
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In the above equation, one of the three cases hold forez1,ez2:







































Hence,zTH(x,y)z≤ 0 for eachz∈ ℜ2M andH is negative semidefinite.
Chapter 4
Strategic Generation Capacity Choice
under Demand Uncertainty: Analysis of
Nash Equilibria in Electricity Markets
Abstract
We analyze a two-stage game of strategic firms facing uncertain demand and exerting market power in decentralized
electricity markets. These firms choose their generation capa ities at the first stage while anticipating a perfectly
competitive future electricity spot market outcome at the second stage; thus it is a closed loop game. In general,
such games can be formulated as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) and examples have
been posed in the literature that have multiple or no equilibria. Therefore, it is of interest to define general sets of
conditions under which solutions exist and are unique, which would enhance the value of such models for policy
and market intelligence purposes. In this chapter, we consider various types of such a closed loop model regarding
the underlying price-demand relations (elastic and inelastic demand), the assumed demand uncertainty with a
broad class of continuous distributions, and any finite number of players with symmetric or asymmetric costs.
We establish sufficient conditions for the random demand’s probability distribution which guarantee existence and
uniqueness of equilibria in most of the cases of this closed loop model. We identify a broad class of commonly
used continuous probability distributions satisfying these conditions.
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we establish sufficient conditions which guarantee existence and uniqueness of equi-
libria in oligopolistic electricity markets where strategic electricity generators (anticipating a perfectly
competitive spot market outcome) make capacity choices about future market conditions under demand
uncertainty and the power generation is dispatched after the level of demand is realized; thus it is a closed
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loop game. In general, such games can be formulated as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium con-
straints (EPEC) which may have multiple or no equilibria. Therefore, it is of interest to define general sets
of conditions under which solutions exist and are unique, which would enhance the value of such models
for policy and market intelligence purposes (e.g., Schroeder (2012), Allcott (2012)). Furthermore, when
firms anticipate a perfectly competitive spot market outcome, an equilibrium of the closed loop1 model
may not be found by solving a less complicated open loop model1 (s e Wogrin et al. (2012)). Thus, it
is of interest to users of these models to know whether their assumptions satisfy some conditions which
guarantee the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium before solving such complicated closed loop
models.
Short term aspects of market power (related to choices of production when capacities are given) within
various specific market design assumptions have been extensively analyzed in the literature. Among
these, equilibrium modeling of Nash games in quantities is acommon approach (e.g., see Borenstein
and Bushnell (1999), Wei and Smeers (1999), Hobbs (2001) forreviews). Long term aspects of market
power related to generation capacity expansion have also received growing attention. Among the most
important works in the literature, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) analyze capacity choice at the first stage
prior to price competition at the second stage (e.g., Bertrand) with deterministic demand. They show that
there exists a unique equilibrium which is equivalent to thesingle stage Cournot outcomes. Gabszewicz
and Poddar (1997) analyze capacity choices of two symmetricfirms at the first stage prior to a Cournot
market at the second stage with demand uncertainty. They prove existence of symmetric equilibrium and
compare it with the deterministic solution of using expected d mand. Murphy and Smeers (2005) move
one step further and formulate open and closed loop market models with two asymmetric Cournot players
and finite number of demand scenarios, each having a linear demand curve with respective probabilities.
In their analysis, Murphy and Smeers (2005) conclude that the complexity of solving capacity expansion
increases with a closed loop model even without consideringthe network limitations. They find closed
loop examples which may not have an equilibrium. They show that if an equilibrium exists, then it is
unique and falls between the perfect competition and open loop equilibria.
All the models mentioned above assume an elastic demand represented by a linear price-demand
curve with random intercept and the structure of the assumedprobability distribution is in general simple
(i.e., uniform demand segments). Furthermore, their analysis are in general based on limited number
of players (e.g., two players). In this chapter, we considerboth inelastic random demand and an elastic
demand represented by a linear price-demand curve with random intercept having a general underlying
continuous probability distribution. In addition, we analyze the capacity choices of both symmetric and
asymmetric firms. We establish existence and uniqueness results under a broader scope in terms of the
underlying price-demand relations (elastic and inelasticdemand), the assumed demand uncertainty with
a broad class of continuous distributions, and any finite number of players with symmetric or asymmetric
1In an open loop model, firms sell electricity production simultaneously with their investment decision, while in a closed loop model
firms choose their capacity at the first stage and sell production a the second stage.
CHAPTER 4. Strategic Generation Capacity Choice under Demand Uncertainty: Analysis of Nash Equilibria
in Electricity Markets 105
costs.
In a similar closed loop model with symmetric firms and elastic demand, Grimm and Zoettl (2008)
analyze strategic capacity choices under more general assumptions of a monotone random demand curve
and its underlying probability distribution. They establish existence and uniqueness results when firms
engage in Cournot competition at the second stage. They alsoshow existence of equilibrium when firms
anticipate competitive spot market outcomes at the second stage; however the uniqueness of equilib-
rium cannot be established under their general assumptions. In our analysis, the closed loop game with
symmetric firms facing a linear demand curve with random intercept is indeed a subclass of their model
whereas the closed loop model with inelastic random demand co stitutes another type. For both cases,
we establish sufficient conditions for the random demand’s probability distribution which guarantee a
unique equilibrium for symmetric firms anticipating competitive spot market outcomes. Furthermore,
we establish sufficient conditions for a unique equilibriumof such a closed loop game with asymmetric
firms facing an elastic random demand (i.e., a linear demand curve with random intercept). We explain
our analysis in more detail below and elaborate on our results and contributions.
In a single stage Cournot model where symmetric firms choose their production output under uncer-
tainty about the intercept of a linear price-demand functio, Lagerlöf (2006) shows that if the distribution
of the demand has a monotone hazard rate then the uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed. In this chap-
ter, we establish an extension of that result for a two-stagegame in oligopolistic energy-only electricity
markets. As we mention before, we consider strategic firms facing uncertain demand and competing
as Cournot players when they choose their generation capacities at the first stage while anticipating a
perfectly competitive future spot market outcome based on their choices (for example they may expect
regulatory intervention at the spot market). After a firm install its capacity at the first stage, its produc-
tion takes place in electricity spot market at the second stage which represents a competitive energy-only
market. We look into both symmetric and asymmetric firms facing inelastic or elastic demand. In real-
ity, electricity demand is uncertain and/or fluctuating with a very low elasticity. We focus on two cases
of demand uncertainty:(i) an inelastic random demand drawn from a continuous distribution; or (ii)
price-demand relationship that can be well approximated bya linear curve with a random intercept hav-
ing a general underlying continuous probability distributon. Due to demand uncertainty, firms’ capacity
choices at the first stage may not be utilized for all the demand realizations at the second stage. For such
a two-stage game, we characterize the class of problems and continuous probability distributions under
which we can show that a unique equilibrium exists. We show that one general class of distributions hav-
ing a monotone increasing hazard rate are logconcave distributions under which existence and uniqueness
of equilibria is guaranteed for symmetric generators facing a inelastic or elastic random demand. When
firms have asymmetric costs and the demand curve is elastic (represented by a linear demand curve with
random intercept), uniqueness of equilibria can still be established under some sufficient conditions of
demand’s probability distribution which are similar to a stndard assumption used for the demand func-
tion itself in the literature (see Sherali et al. (1983), Wolf and Smeers (1997), Grimm and Zoettl (2008),
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and Xu (2005)).
Finding optimal capacity choices of oligopolistic firms in aclosed loop model is in general complex.
In the absence of market power, the corresponding two-stagec pacity investment problem is a convex
problem and, as shown in Chapter 3 of this thesis, most of the two-s age capacity investment equilibrium
problems in competitive markets can be cast into convex non(li ear) optimization problems similar to the
early capacity expansion models. However, convexity is in ge eral lost when market power is introduced.
The two-stage capacity investment problem of a strategic firm may be formulated as a bilevel problem,
to be more precise as a stochastic MPEC (mathematical program with equilibrium constraints). We
consider in this chapter multiple strategic firms having an MPEC problem each, then one can speak of
finding a Nash equilibrium toan equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). It is well
known that EPECs are in general nonconvex problems and they may have multiple or no solutions (e.g.,
Hu (2003), Ehrenmann (2004), Hu and Ralph (2007), Gabriel etal. (2012)). As a consequence, an
equilibrium for the corresponding two-stage game may not exist or, if exists, it is in general not unique.
Thus, establishing a set of general conditions for existence and uniqueness is desirable for policy and
market models including strategic firms so that users can have confidence in their solutions. Throughout
the analysis in this chapter, we aim to shed light on the charateristics of the random demand affecting
the continuity, differentiability, and generalized concavity of each firm’s expected payoff at the first stage
which are crucial in establishing the existence and uniqueness of the equilibria of the two-stage strategic
capacity choice game.
In the first part of the analysis, we consider an inelastic random demand and strategic firms antic-
ipating a competitive energy-only spot market with VOLL pricing (or price cap). The idea of VOLL
pricing is to price electricity at a high value that is supposed to reflect the value of lost load (VOLL)
when demand is curtailed. In reality since VOLL is difficult to estimate, a high price cap (which is in
general lower than VOLL) is used. As a preliminary, we first establish that whether strategic firms sell
their power via central auction or bilateral contracts in the competitive spot market, the corresponding
two-stage games yield the same equilibrium, if it exists. A similar result has also been established by
Metzler et al. (2003) for a short-run Cournot competition inelectricity spot markets where generation
capacities are fixed. Metzler et al. (2003) show that a bilateral market model with Cournot producers
and perfect arbitrageurs yields the same Nash-Cournot equilibrium (e.g., prices, generation) as a pool
market with Cournot players. We extend their result for the two-stage capacity expansion equilibrium
problem we consider here. As a result, we continue our analysis with the bilevel problem of each firm
under the assumption of a stylized pool market model and in order to preserve analytical tractability we
do not consider any network constraints. We note that the continuity of random demand distribution is a
necessary condition for the rest of the analysis and the results we present below.
For the bilevel problem of each strategic firm maximizing itsexpected profit, the constraint set is
closed and convex; however, the objective function is in general not concave. Hence, continuity and
(strict) quasiconcavity of the objective function are desirable properties for establishing existence and
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uniqueness results for the corresponding two-stage stochasti game. We first show that each firm’s ex-
pected profit is continuous provided that the probability distribution of the demand is continuous. More-
over, when firms are symmetric and the distribution of randome and has a monotone hazard rate, each
firm’s expected profit is strictly quasiconcave and hence thecorresponding two-stage game has a unique
equilibrium. One class of probability distributions having a monotone increasing hazard functions is
logconcave probability distributions. The random demand vector is log-concavely distributed if the log-
arithm of its probability density function is concave on itssupport. Logconcave probability distributions
constitute a broad class (e.g., the uniform, normal, exponential, logistic, Weibull, gamma). Bagnoli and
Bergstrom (2005) give a systematic treatment of the logconcave distributions and their crucial role in a
wide variety of economic models. As a result, we show that in case of symmetric firms, random demand
with a monotone increasing hazard function is sufficient to guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium. When
firms are asymmetric, quasiconcavity of the expected profit function is lost for the ones investing in
base-load technologies whereas the objective function of the firm investing in a peak load technology has
similar characteristics to that of symmetric firms. Hence, th quasiconcavity of a firm’s expected profit is
dependent both on the characteristics of the underlying continuous probability distribution of the demand
and on whether it is investing in a marginal unit or not. We also show by an example that even with two
generators (e.g., peak-load and base-load) facing uniformexogenous demand, the first stage objective
function of the base-load generator may not satisfy generaliz d concavity. Hence, an equilibrium may
not exist.
In the second part of our analysis, instead of VOLL pricing weconsider a linear price-demand curve
with a random intercept, which implies random or fluctuatingconsumption levels for a given price. Under
this setting, we can show that each firm’s expected profit is differentiable provided that the probability
density function of the intercept is continuous. Moreover when firms are symmetric and the underlying
probability density function of the random intercept is logc ncave, each firm’s expected profit is strictly
logconcave. Thus logconcavity of the underlying probability distribution is again a sufficient condition
guaranteeing existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for the two-stage capacity investment game
between symmetric firms. When firms are asymmetric, the unique ess of equilibrium is guaranteed for
another condition (different than logconcavity) of probability distribution under which we prove strict
concavity of all firms’ expected profit functions. The corresponding condition is also similar to a standard
assumption in the literature used for the demand function itself (see Sherali et al. (1983), Wolf and Smeers
(1997), Grimm and Zoettl (2008), and Xu (2005)). We also conjecture that the logconcavity of probability
distributions may also be sufficient to guarantee the existence of a unique equilibrium for closed loop
games with asymmetric firms when demand is endogenous. Although we could not establish a theoretical
proof for this conjecture, we observed it numerically. In a closed loop game with two asymmetric firms
facing an elastic demand, we numerically computed the expected profit function of each firm under
various logconcave probability distributions of random intercept (e.g., uniform, normal, exponential,
Weibull, gamma, beta) and we observed that each firm’s expected profit is strictly quasiconcave in all the
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cases.
To summarize, we take up a closed loop game in oligopolistic ele tricity markets which has received
growing attention in the literature. In such a game, we formulate the two-stage investment model of
multiple strategic firms which make generation capacity choices about future market conditions under
demand uncertainty while anticipating a perfectly competitiv spot market outcome. We contribute to
existing literature along two dimensions:
– We show that whether strategic firms sell their power via central auction or bilateral contracts in
the competitive spot market, the corresponding closed loopgames yield the same equilibrium, if
it exists. Thus, when the spot market is perfectly competitiv , different structures of buying and
selling electricity do not affect the generation capacity choi es of strategic firms.
– In general, such two-stage games can be formulated as an EPECand examples have been posed
in the literature that have multiple or no equilibria. We consider various types of the two-stage
investment model of firms regarding the underlying price-demand relations, the assumed demand
uncertainty, and any finite number of players with symmetrico asymmetric costs. In most of the
cases, we establish sufficient conditions under which solutions exist and are unique and we identify
a broad class of commonly used continuous probability distributions of the random demand satisfy-
ing these conditions, which will enhance the value of such models for policy and market intelligence
purposes. In particular, establishing a set of general conditi s for existence and uniqueness is de-
sirable for policy and market models including strategic firms so that users can have confidence in
their solutions before solving such complicated closed loop models.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.2, we introduce the notation and some characteris-
tics of short-run competitive equilibria in spot markets established in the literature. In Section 4.3, we
formulate the two-stage game of multiple strategic firms in an energy-only electricity market with VOLL
pricing in which we consider two different market structures of buying and selling electricity at the sec-
ond stage. We first formulate the second stage game representing a spot market with a central auction
(pool market) in Section 4.3.1. Then we consider, in Section4.3.2, a bilateral market where firms trade
bilaterally at the second stage. When the spot market is competitive, Boucher and Smeers (2001) show
that for given capacities and fixed demand bilateral and poolmarkets yield the same equilibrium. By
using their result, Section 4.3.3 concludes that the two-stage game with pool market and the two stage
game with bilateral market yield the same equilibrium (e.g., capacities, prices, generation) when demand
is random and capacities are endogenous. We analyze in Section 4.3.4 a simplified pool market model
with exogenous random demand. For this simplified model, we show strict quasiconcavity of a firm’s
expected profit and existence and uniqueness of equilibria under symmetric costs and random demand
having logconcave continuous probability distribution. Then in Section 4.4, we replace VOLL pricing
with linear price-demand curves with random intercepts. Similar to the exogenous demand case, we show
strict log-concavity of a firm’s expected profit and existencand uniqueness of equilibria when firms have
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same costs and the corresponding probability density function is logconcave. When firms have different
costs, a sufficient condition which grantees existence and uniqueness of equilibria is also established. We




We consider an energy-only electricity market model in which there are three types of agents; namely
generators, a transmission system operator (TSO), and consumer . We consider this model in a two-stage
set-up: firms invest in generation capacity in the first stagend the market clears to satisfy demand in
the spot market at the second stage. Firms maximize their profits at the first stage while anticipating a
competitive spot market outcome at the second stage. They compete “a la Cournot” while choosing their
generation capacities. That is, each firm chooses its generation capacity taking as given the investment
strategies of its rivals. In reality, electricity demand istime varying and future demand is uncertain. We
represent both phenomena by assuming that demand can take differ nt values in different states of the
world ω ∈ Ω, each occurring with some probability. The following notation is similar to the one given in
Chapter 3 and would apply in state of the worldω ∈ Ω:
Sets
N : set of all demand nodes
G : set of all firms
Ig : set of supply nodes of firmg∈ G
I : set of all supply nodes (I := ∪gIg)
Kg : set of plant types of firmg∈ G
L : set of electricity transmission lines in the network
Parameters
cgik : unit generation cost of plant typek∈ Kg owned by firmg∈ G at supply nodei ∈ Ig
κk : unit capacity cost of plant typek∈ Kg
dn(ω) : demand at noden∈ N
PTDFl , j : power transmitted through linel ∈ L due to one unit of power injection from node
j ∈ {N∪ I} to an arbitrary hub2 node
hl : capacity limit of linel ∈ L
VOLL : the value of unserved energy or lost load
2PTDF is calculated based on a hub node inn∈ N in a standard DC load flow model. The choice of hub node is arbitr ry. That is,
the flows resulting from a power injection at one node and an equal withdrawal at another do not depend on the location of thehub.
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Variables:
Second Stage:
ygik(ω) : quantity of power generated by plant typek∈ Kg of firm g∈ G at supply nodei ∈ Ig
f j(ω) : net power flow dispatched by TSO from nodej ∈ {N∪ I}
δn : unserved (curtailed) energy at noden∈ N
p j(ω) : locational market price (nodal price) at nodej ∈ {N∪ I} which corresponds to
shadow price of market clearing constraint
First Stage:
xgik : the capacity of plant typek∈ Kg owned by firmg∈ G at nodei ∈ Ig.
4.2.2 Characterizations of Perfectly Competitive Spot Markets
The spot market at the second stage may be considered under two different market structures, namely
bilateral and pool spot markets. Boucher and Smeers (2001) consider a competitive equilibrium of a
game in both pool and bilateral spot markets where all parameters are deterministic and none of the
agents (firms, consumers, and TSO) has market power. Boucherand Smeers (2001) also consider, for
pool and bilateral spot markets, a corresponding optimization problem referred to as Optimal Power Flow
Problem (OPF) which minimizes the total system cost of the spot market. We will use their following
result to formulate the second stage problem of each firm and to establish the equivalence of two-stage
game in bilateral and pool markets.
Proposition 4.2.1. [Theorem 1 of Boucher and Smeers (2001)] Consider a power system in a competitive
pool or bilateral spot markets when capacities are given andll parameters are deterministic. If there
exists an optimal dispatch, then there exists at least one equilibrium, which is a competitive equilibrium,
for each of these markets. Moreover:
(i) There is one-to-one correspondence between the equilibriaof these spot markets; that is any equilib-
rium of the pool market can be written as an equilibrium of thebilateral spot market and vice versa.
(ii) The equilibria of both pool and bilateral spot markets are equivalent to the solution of their associated
OPF problems (which are specified later in Sections 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.1).
4.3 Two-stage Capacity Choice Model under Exogenous RandomDemand
In this section, we formulate the generation capacity investm nt model of a strategic firm anticipating the
competitive energy-only spot market outcome under demand uncertainty. We focus on theVOLLpricing
mechanism in the spot market which gives the firms the incentiv to build peak capacity. Whenever there
is a shortage of capacity, there is curtailment and the electricity price becomes a very high value (the
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VOLL or a price cap) set by the regulator where
VOLL> max{cgik|g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg}.
Hence, only when there is curtailment, the peak generator sells power at a price (theVOLL) higher
than its marginal production cost. The difference between th VOLL and the marginal cost of the peak
generator operating contributes to covering its investmencost.
We also consider an exogenous random demand which varies, say, over a year. Let(Ω,F ,Ψ) denote
the common underlying probability space whereΨ represents the joint probability distribution for the
random demand vectord(ω) := {dn(ω)}n∈N,ω∈Ω with E[|d(ω)|]< ∞. Then eachdn(ω), demand at node





Next, we formulate the two-stage game under two different market structures, namely bilateral and
pool markets. Each of these market structures gives rise to different types of model formulations as
outlined in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. As mentioned earlier,Boucher and Smeers (2001) address the
equivalence of pool and bilateral markets in a single-stageperfectly competitive game when capacities
are given and demand is deterministic. Section 4.3.3 is an extension of their result in our setting. First,
instead of a single-stage perfectly competitive model we have a two-stage game and the firms may exert
market power at the fist stage. Second, the generation capacities are decision variables of the firms at
the first stage. Finally, instead of deterministic demand weconsider stochastic demand at the second
stage. We show in Section 4.3.3 that the two-stage games withpool and bilateral markets, outlined in
Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, respectively, yield the same firstand the second stage equilibria; hence they are
equivalent.
4.3.1 Pool Market Model
We first consider the two-stage game in pool market in which competitive firms sell power to a central
auction operated by the Transmission System Operator (TSO)at the price of their supply nodes and the
TSO dispatches this power to the consumers at demand nodes. Next, we give details of the two stages in
this setting.
4.3.1.1 Perfect Competition Equilibrium at Second Stage
By Proposition 4.2.1 (ii) we know that, in deterministic setting, competitive equilibria of the perfectly
competitive pool market is equivalent to the solution of itsas ociated OPF problem. Indeed, this result
holds for each state of the world in our setting. For each state of the worldω ∈ Ω, one can find a
competitive equilibrium of the pool market at the second stage by solving the following OPF (Optimal
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Power Flow) problem:
Z∗pool(ω ,x) := min


















ygjk(ω)+δ j(ω)+ f j(ω)≥ d j(ω) (p j(ω)) ∀ j ∈ {N∪ I}
∑
j∈{N∪I}
f j(ω) = 0 (ρ(ω))








PTDFl , j f j(ω)≥ 0 (λ+l (ω)) ∀l
hl + ∑
j∈{N∪I}
PTDFl , j f j(ω)≥ 0 (λ−l (ω)) ∀l
y(ω)≥ 0, δ (ω)≥ 0, (4.1)




ik(ω) are Lagrange multipliers; in particular,p j(ω) is the price
of unit power (e/MWh) at nodej ∈ {N∪ I}. In OPF problem (4.1),ConsBalancepool(ω) is the set of
energy balance equations which state that the difference between total generation and demand at any
node has to be balanced by injections into or withdrawals from the grid and the sum of all injections into
and withdrawals from the grid should be zero.ConsPTDF(ω) is the set of constraints for the technical
network limits while the generation capacity constraints are given inConsCap(ω) which indicate that
firms cannot produce more than their maximum capacity. KKT conditions of the OPF problem (4.1),
which is a linear program, yield the following equilibrium conditions of the pool market:
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For eachω ∈ Ω andx,




ik (ω) ⊥ y
∗g
ik (ω)≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg







j (ω)− f ∗j (ω)−d j(ω) ⊥ p∗j (ω)≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ {N∪ I}
p∗j (ω)−ρ∗(ω)+∑
l∈L
PTDFl , j(λ ∗+l (ω)−λ
∗−
l (ω)) = 0 ∀ j ∈ {N∪ I}
∑
j∈{N∪I}
f ∗j (ω) = 0
0≤ xgik −y
∗g
ik (ω) ⊥ β
∗g
ik (ω)≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg
0≤ hl − ∑
j∈{N∪I}
PTDFl , j f
∗
j (ω) ⊥ λ ∗+l (ω)≥ 0 ∀l
0≤ hl + ∑
j∈{N∪I}
PTDFl , j f
∗
j (ω) ⊥ λ ∗−l (ω)≥ 0 ∀l .
(4.2)
4.3.1.2 First Stage Behavior with Market Power
If firm g∈ G operates at nodei ∈ Ig, then it sells power to TSO in the spot market at the price of node i.
Consequently, it receives a marginal profit equal to unit price(p∗i (ω , .)) minus unit cost of its production
(cgik) at nodei for realizationω ∈ Ω. The long run profit of each firm at the first stage is determinedby
its investment costs. Letx−g be the set of investment decisions of the rival firms. For fixedbut arbitrary
















For givenx−g, firm g∈ G determines its optimal investment decisionx∗g by solving its profit maxi-
mization problem:
χgpool(x





−g) is the set of solutions which maximize firmg’s long run profit for givenx−g.
4.3.2 Bilateral Market Model
In a bilateral market, competitive firms supply power by bilater l transactions and purchase transmission
services for these transactions from TSO who prices transmission capacity based on a congestion pricing
scheme. The TSO charges a congestion based wheeling feeν j ( /MWh) for transmitting power from an
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arbitrary hub node to nodej. Firm g∈G pays−νi to get power to the hub from its supply nodei ∈ Ig and
νn to convey power for sale from the hub to customers at noden∈ N. The additional decision variables
of the bilateral market at the second stage are the following:
sgn(ω) : quantity of power sold by firmg∈ G at demand noden∈ N at demand realizationd(ω)
ν j(ω) : wheeling fee for transmitting power from an arbitrary hub node to nodej ∈ {N∪ I} at demand
realizationd(ω).
Next, we formulate the two-stage model of each firm in a bilateral market.
4.3.2.1 Perfect Competition Equilibrium at Second Stage
Again by using Proposition 4.2.1 (ii), we know that the soluti n of OPF problem (4.3) is a competitive
equilibrium of the bilateral spot market for eachω ∈ Ω. It can be easily observed that the only difference
between OPF problems (4.1) and (4.3) is the energy balance constraints:
Z∗bilateral(ω ,x) := min






























sgn(ω) = 0 (ρg(ω)) ∀g∈ G
y(ω) satisfyConsCap(ω ,x), f (ω) satisfyConsPTDF(ω)
y(ω)≥ 0, δ (ω)≥ 0, s(ω)≥ 0.
(4.3)
Again,ρg(ω), pn(ω), andν j(ω), are Lagrange multipliers; in particular,pn(ω) is the price of unit power
(e/MWh) at demand noden and, as mentioned earlier,ν j(ω) is the congestion based wheeling fee
(e/MWh) for transmitting power from an arbitrary node to nodej. ρg(ω) is the dual variable of the
energy balance equation of firmg∈ G at the hub; hence its standard interpretation is the marginal cost of
firm g at the hub of the linearized DC network. The KKT conditions ofthe OPF problem (4.3) yield the
following equilibrium conditions of the bilateral market:
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l (ω) are Lagrange multipliers ofConsPTDF(ω) andβ (ω) is the vector of Lan-
grange multipliers associated toConsCap(ω ,x).
4.3.2.2 First Stage Behavior with Market Power
At the first stage, each firm maximizes its revenue minus costs. The revenue of a firm from each demand
noden∈ N is the unit price multiplied by the number of units sold by that firm at that demand noden.
There are three components of the firm’s total cost; namely investment, production, and shipment costs.
The unit shipment cost consists of the wheeling fee for the generation at supply nodes (−νi) and the
wheeling fee for the sales at demand nodes (νn). For fixed but arbitraryx−g, the profit of firmg∈ G in



















Thus for givenx−g, each firmg ∈ G determines its optimal investment decisionx∗g by solving its
profit maximization problem:
χgbilateral(x
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whereχgbilateral(x
−g) is the set of solutions which maximize firmg’s long run profit for givenx−g.
4.3.3 Equivalence of Two-stage Bilateral and Pool Market Models
In this section, we show that the capacity choice set of the firms anticipating the competitive outcome of
a pool market is equivalent to that of the firms anticipating the competitive outcome of a bilateral market.
Proposition 4.2.1 (i) addresses the equivalence of the equilibria in bilateral and pool markets (i.e., same
prices, production quantities, and scarcity rents) when capa ities are given. By using this result in our
setting, we can easily conclude that for given anyx andω ∈ Ω:
– p∗p(ω ,xg,x−g) = p∗b(ω ,xg,x−g),
– y∗pg(ω ,xg,x−g) = y∗bg(ω ,xg,x−g),
– β ∗pg(ω ,xg,x−g) = β ∗bg(ω ,xg,x−g),
where we put superscriptsp andb to indicate the variables in pool and bilateral markets, respectively. By
using the above equalities, we next show that when demand is stochastic and generation capacities are
endogenously chosen at the first stage in which firms may exertmarket power, the first and the second
stage problems still yield the same equilibria (i.e., same capa ities, prices, production quantities, and
scarcity rents) for both market models.
Proposition 4.3.1. For a firm anticipating the competitive spot market outcome of the the second stage,
Eω [Πgpool(ω ,x
g,x−g)] = Eω [Πgbilateral(ω ,x
g,x−g)] holds for all g∈ G at any given(xg,x−g). This implies
that the two-stage game models with pool and bilateral markets not only yield the same second-stage
equilibria at eachω but also the solution sets of the first stage game in these markets are equal, which
implies both markets yield the same first stage equilibria.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
Proposition 4.3.1 also holds when firms are Cournot players at the second stage by using the equiv-
alence result of Metzler et al. (2003) (i.e., Theorem 1) for bilateral and pool spot market models. When
capacities are given, Metzler et al. (2003) show that Cournot generators in bilateral spot markets with
perfectly competitive arbitrageurs yield the same Nash equilibri m as Cournot competition in pool spot
markets. Due to the equivalence of pool and bilateral marketmodels, we continue our analysis with pool
market model. Thus, we ignore the superscriptp in the corresponding variables and useΠg(·) to refer to
the profit function of firmg∈ G in pool market model.
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4.3.4 Characterization of the Two-stage Game
In this section, we investigate the characteristics of the expected profit function of a strategic firm antic-
ipating a competitive market outcome under a continuous random demand with a general distribution.
In order to preserve analytical tractability, we consider an electricity market without any network limi-
tations; this in turn collapses the problem to a single node case. In such a single node market, there are
several suppliers coping with an aggregated demand. LetD = ∑
n∈N
dn denote the aggregated continuous
random demand. The following assumptions hold for the two-stage model.
Assumption 4.3.2.D is a continuous random demand with a cumulative distribution Ψ and a continuous
probability density functionΨ′ whose support is on some interval[D,D].
Assumption 4.3.3. (i) There is a single firm at each supply node and each firm invests in only one
technology; that is| G |=| I |=| K |. Firm 1 owns the cheapest generator and firm K owns the peak
generator where c1 < c2 < .. . < cK andκ1 > κ2 > .. . > κK .
(ii) For at least one technology k∈ K, it holds that VOLL> ck+κk.
From now on, we usex−k := (x j)Kj=1, j 6=k to denote the vector of strategies of the rival firms of firm




j=1, j 6=k is the vector of their optimal decisions at equilibrium.
The continuity of the probability density function in Assumption 4.3.2 is crucial for establishing our
results in this section. Furthermore, Assumption 4.3.3 (ii) guarantees that the equilibrium of the two-stage




x j < D).
Then, the market prices would be equal toVOLL for all demand realizations in the perfectly competitive
spot market. According to Assumption 4.3.3 (ii),VOLL is higher than the unit investment and operation
cost for at least one technology, sayk′ ∈ K. This, in turn, implies that when there isn’t sufficient capacity
for any demand realization, the expected scarcity rent of atleast one firm investing in technologyk′,





= VOLL− ck′ − κk′ > 0 for xk′ ∈ [0,D− x−k′). Thus, firmk′ would be able to
increase its expected profit by investing in technologyk′ until there is sufficient capacity at least for
the minimum demand level. Thus, Assumption 4.3.3 (ii) guarantees that total investment capacity at





As given in Section 4.3.1.2, for each fixed and arbitraryx−k, firm k ∈ K obtains its expected profit
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Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] and determines its optimal strategy by solving its profit maxi ization problem:
max
xk≥0
Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)]. (4.5)
For any givenx−k, let χk(x−k) denote the solution set of problem (4.5). Then a Nash equilibri m
is a point such thatx∗k ∈ χk(x∗−k) for all k ∈ K. Next, we assess the properties ofEω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] in
(4.5). Based on the corresponding properties, we will analyze the existence and uniqueness of equilibria
x∗k ∈ χk(x∗k) for all k∈ K.
From the proof of Proposition 4.3.1 given in Appendix 4.A, one can easily see that, at the first stage,
the expected profit function of each firmk ∈ K for givenx−k can be formulated in terms of its expected
scarcity rent:
Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] = (Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)]−κk)xk.
For given(xk,x−k) at the second stage, Figure 4.1 illustrates the stepwise supply curve and some
demand realizations within[D, D] in a single-node spot market. As illustrated in Figure 4.1 unless the
capacity of all firms are fully utilized at realizationω ∈ Ω, the market price (p∗(ω ,xk,x−k)) is equal
to one of the marginal generating cost values where the corresponding demand realization crosses the
stepwise supply curve. Otherwise, the market price is equalto VOLL. Note that when demand is elastic
with a random inverse demand curve, the market prices can also take values betweenck andck+1 for all
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K −1} or betweencK andVOLL for some realizationsω ∈ Ω as illustrated in Section 4.4.2
(See Figures 4.3 and 4.4).
Next, we derive a closed form expression for the expected scarcity rent of firmk and establish two
basic functional properties; namely its continuity and monot icity in xk. For givenx−k, we denote the




x j , for
k≤m≤ K. ThenXm−1(k)+xk is the total capacity of themcheapest firms including firmk in the market.
Proposition 4.3.4. Under Assumption 4.3.2, for given x−k, the expected scarcity rent of firm k∈ K can
be formulated in a closed form expression as follows:






Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
We may also write expression (4.6) in terms of probabilities(that are both driven from equation (4.20)
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of a single-node market with stepwise supply function for givenx and ex-
ogenous random demand
given inProof of Proposition 4.3.4in Appendix 4.A) which makes it easier to interpret:




(cm+1−ck)P(Xm−1(k)+xk ≤ D ≤ Xm(k)+xk)
+(VOLL−ck)P(D ≥ XK−1(k)+xk).
The above expression indicates the following: Firmk receives a positive scarcity rent either when
there is at least one other firm operating with a higher marginl generation cost in the market or when
demand exceeds the total generation capacity and the marketpric is set atVOLL. The price of the
electricity iscm+1 with probability P(Xm−1(k)+ xk ≤ D ≤ Xm(k)+ xk) in which case the firm operating
with the highest marginal generation cost is using the technologym+1,m≥ k. The price of the electricity
may go up toVOLLwith probabilityP(D ≥ XK−1(k)+xk) in which case the demand is so high that there
is not enough generating capacity in the market. Since the marginal generation cost of firmk is ck,
its scarcity rent from the second stage would be(cm+1 − ck) with probability P(Xm−1(k)+ xk ≤ D ≤
Xm(k)+xk), m≥ k, and(VOLL−ck) with probabilityP(D ≥ XK−1(k)+xk). Note that for givenx−k, the
values of these probabilities depend onxk which changes the corresponding ranges.
Lemma 4.3.5.Under Assumption 4.3.2, the following properties hold for the expected scarcity rent func-
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tion (4.6) of firm k∈ K:
(i) Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] is a continuous function of(xk,x−k) ∈ RK+ , and
(ii) Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] is nonincreasing in xk ∈ R+.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
Next, by using the functional properties of the expected scarcity rent function of firmk∈ K, we will
explore the functional properties - such as continuity, differentiability and concavity - of the expected
profit function of firm k. In doing so, we will differentiate between two cases. The first one is the
simpler case of symmetric firms using the same technology; hence having the same operational and
investment costs. We show that when firms are symmetric, the exp cted profit of each firm is continuous
and strictly quasiconcave under certain conditions and there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. Then
we will consider asymmetric firms whose expected profit functions are more complicated and may be
analytically intractable in general.
4.3.4.1 Symmetric Firms
In the symmetric case, the unit production and investment costs f all firms have the same value; that is,
c1 = c2 = . . .= cK = c andκ1 = κ2 = · · ·= κK = κ . This yields an identical profit function for all firms,
Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] = (Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)]−κ)xk, and (4.6) reduces to (4.7):





x j is the total capacity of all the rival firms. Next, we show in Lemma 4.3.6
that the expected scarcity rent function of each firmk in (4.7) is differentiable with respect toxk almost
everywhere except at three breakpointsxk ∈ {0,max(0,D−XK−1(k)),max(0,D−XK−1(k))}. Among
these breakpoints,xmink = D−XK−1(k) is the investment level below which the probability of demand
exceeding total investment capacity is 1 andxmaxk = D−XK−1(k)) is the investment level above which
probability of demand exceeding total investment capacityis zero.
Lemma 4.3.6. For given x−k, if Ψ is differentiable on[D,D], then Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] in (4.7) is differen-
tiable w.r.t. xk ∈ R+ almost everywhere except xk ∈ {0,xmink ,x
max
k }.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
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In Theorems 4.3.8 and 4.3.10 we show thatEω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] is a continuous function and (strictly)
quasiconcave inxk under certain conditions on the cumulative distribution fuction Ψ. It is well known
that games possess a Nash equilibrium if (1) the strategy space re nonempty, convex and compact,
and (2) players have continuous and quasiconcave payoff functions [e.g., Debreu (1952), Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991)]. For completeness, we give the result by Debreu (1952) in the following proposition. This
result can be used to establish existence of a Nash equilibrim for our symmetric game which is given by
Theorem 4.3.13.
Proposition 4.3.7. [Debreu (1952)]An n-persons strategic game has a Nash equilibrium if the strategy
spaces Si , i = 1. . .n, in this game are non-empty, compact, convex subsets of a Euclidian space and the
payoff functions ui are continuous at s and quasiconcave in si where si ∈ Si is the strategy of player i.
Theorem 4.3.8.Let Ψ be twice continuously differentiable function on[D, D] whereΨ′ andΨ′′ are the
first and second derivatives ofΨ. Then the expected profit function of each firm k∈ K has the following
properties:
(i) Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)]] is continuous at(xk,x−k) ∈ RK+ ;




(iii) For given x−k, Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] is (strictly) concave for xk ∈ (xmink ,x
max
k ) iff −Ψ
′′
(s+C)s−Ψ′(s+
C) (<)≤ 0 for ∀s,C∈ R+ where C is some constant. Whenever this condition holds, Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)]
is a (strictly) quasiconcave function of xk onR+.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
Remark4.3.9. If the probability density function,Ψ′ , is nondecreasing, then−Ψ′′(xk+XK−1)xk−Ψ
′
(xk+
XK−1)≤ 0 holds for allxk ∈R+. Therefore, the nondecreasing property of a probability density function
is a sufficient condition for quasiconcavity ofEω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] on [0 ∞). In particular, the uniform
distribution satisfies this property.
The condition stated in(iii) of Theorem 4.3.8 is similar to a standard assumption used in the literature
(see Sherali et al. (1983), Wolf and Smeers (1997), Grimm andZoettl (2008), and Xu (2005)). In these
references, the corresponding assumption is given for a random inverse demand function. In our setting
with random exogenous demand, Theorem 4.3.8 indicates thata similar condition needs to be assumed
for the cumulative probability function of demand. Aside from this standard condition, we identify, in the
next theorem, a large class of probability distributions having a monotone increasing hazard function that
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guarantees the strict quasiconcavity ofEω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] w.r.t. xk. In particular, logconcave probability
distributions have a monotone increasing hazard function which is a milder condition than the condition
stated in Remark 4.3.9. We will come back to this in Remark 4.3.1 .
Theorem 4.3.10.Under Assumption 4.3.2, let the hazard function of demand, H(s) = Ψ′(s)/(1−Ψ(s)),
be monotone increasing on[D, D]. Then for any k∈ K and x−k, Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] is strictly quasicon-
cave for xk ∈ [xmink ,x
max
k ] which implies that it is also strictly quasiconcave w.r.t. xk onR+.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
The strategy space of each firmk ∈ K can be represented by a nonempty, compact, and convex set
which is shown in the next lemma. Then in Lemma 4.3.12, we establi h the boundaries for the total
generation capacity at the first-stage equilibrium problem. Finally, in Theorem 4.3.13, we establish
the existence and uniqueness result and characterize the Nash equilibrium for the generation capacity
investment game of the symmetric firms.
Lemma 4.3.11.The strategy space of each firm k∈ K is Sk := [0,D] which is nonempty, compact, and
convex.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
Lemma 4.3.12.Assume that there exists an equilibrium,(x∗k)
K
k=1, for the symmetric game. Then, under





Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
Theorem 4.3.13(Existence and Uniqueness). Under Assumptions 4.3.3 and 4.3.2, let the hazard func-
tion of demand, H(s) = Ψ′(s)/(1−Ψ(s)), be monotone increasing on[D, D]. Then for the games defined
in Sections 4.3.1.2 and 4.3.2.2 with symmetric firms and unlimited transmission capacity, there exists a
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, x∗ = x∗1 = . . .= x
∗





and D≤ Kx∗ ≤ D.
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Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
Remark4.3.14. By Corollary 2 of Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005), we know that if the probability density
function Ψ′(s) is logconcave on[D, D], then the hazard functionH(s) is monotone increasing on[D,
D]. Hence, the log-concavity of probability density functionf demand implies strict quasiconcavity of
Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] w.r.t. xk for eachk. By Remark 1 of Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005), the converse
is not true because there exists probability distributionswith monotone increasing hazard functions but
without logconcave density functions.
By Remark 4.3.14, we can identify a broad class of commonly used continuous probability distri-
butions which guarantee the strict quasiconcavity of profitfunction of each firm at the first stage and
hence the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria characterized as in Theorem 4.3.13. Bagnoli and
Bergstrom (2005) list a number of distributions with logconave density functions in their Table 1. These
include several widely used distributions such as uniform,normal, exponential, Gamma (parameter≥ 1),
Weibull (parameter≥ 1), Beta (both parameters≥ 1), among others.
4.3.4.2 Asymmetric Firms
In the asymmetric case, firms may not have identical profit functio s since each firm’s marginal gener-
ation and investment costs are different. In the symmetric case, we have seen that the expected scarcity
rent function of each firm is a continuous piecewise functionwith at most three breakpoints including
zero. In the asymmetric case, for each firmk ∈ K, Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] will be a piecewise continuous
function which may have between 3 and 2(K −1)+3 breakpoints. The number of breakpoints depends
on the position of the firm in the merit order in the spot market. A firm with the highest marginal
generation cost (cK) will have a similar expected scarcity rent function with atmost 3 breakpoints as
in the symmetric case whereas a firm with the lowest marginal generation cost (c1) will have at most
2(K −1)+3 breakpoints. To generalize, a firmk∈ K with marginal generation costck will have at most
2(K − k)+ 3 breakpoints which can be calculated by doing a careful accounting of the breakpoints in
(4.6). Letxk(m) = max(0,D−Xm(k)) andxk(m) = max(0,D−Xm(k)). The breakpoints of the firmk’s
expected scarcity rent function will be 0,{xk(m)}K−1m=k−1,{xk(m)}
K−1
m=k−1.
As a result of expected scarcity rent being a piecewise continuous function,Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] is also
piecewise and continuous for each firmk. Moreover,Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] consists of at most 2(K −k)+4
function pieces with 2(K −k)+3 breakpoints. To establish conditions that guarantee quasiconcavity of
Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] w.r.t. xk for each firmk under a general distribution is more complicated here. This
can be done fork= K,
Eω [β ∗K(ω ,xK ,x−K)] = (VOLL−cK)(1−Ψ(xK +XK−1(k))
which is similar to (4.7). Therefore, the results in Theorems 4.3.8, 4.3.10, 4.3.13 and Remarks 4.3.9 and
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4.3.14 also hold for the profit function of the most expensivefirm (k = K) but not necessarily for the
other firms (k< K).
Next, we give an example with two firms (a base-load and a peak gnerator) to illustrate the expected
scarcity rent and expected profit functions of these firms when d mand is uniformly distributed. The
example clearly illustrates that for when the demand is uniformly distributed, the expected scarcity rent
functions of the firms are piecewise linear. However even in this very simple case, the expected profit
function of the base-load generator is not necessarily quasiconcave.
Assume that there are two generators: base-load (g= 1) and peak (g= 2) with c1 < c2 andκ1 > κ2.
Let the transmission capacities be infinite (h= ∞) and the aggregated demand of all nodes be uniformly
distributed on[dmin, dmax]; that is d ∼ U [dmin, dmax]. Next, we give the formulation of the expected
scarcity rent function of each firm given a investment strategy of its rival firm. Without loss of generality,
we will give the formulations when the given investment strategies satisfyx1 < dmin andx2 < dmin since
this will yield the maximum number of breakpoints for the expcted scarcity rent and the expected profit
functions for both firms. Depending on the values ofx1 andx2, the number of breakpoints may be lower
but the formulations of corresponding function segments will remain the same.










β1 > 0 which satisfy




VOLL−c1, if 0≤ x1 < dmin−x2
a1β1 −b
1
β1x1, if dmin−x2 ≤ x1 < dmin
a2β1 −b
2
β1x1, if dmin ≤ x1 < dmax−x2
a3β1 −b
3
β1x1, if dmax−x2 ≤ x1 < dmax
0 otherwise.
Similarly for given x1 ≥ 0, there are constants aβ2 ∈ R, and bβ2 > 0 satisfying




VOLL−c2, if 0≤ x2 < dmin−x1
aβ2 −bβ2x2, if dmin−x1 ≤ x2 < dmax−x1
0 otherwise.
Furthermore, these constants can be explicitly found.
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Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
Obviously, by using Lemma 4.3.15, the expected profit functions of firm 1 and 2 can also be explicitly
formulated as follows (see the proof of Lemma 4.3.15 in Appendix 4.A for the associated constants):
For givenx2 ≥ 0,



















1, if dmax−x2 ≤ x1 < dmax
−κ1x1 otherwise.
Similarly for givenx1 ≥ 0,




(VOLL−c2−κ2)x2, if 0 ≤ x2 < dmin−x1
(aβ2 −κ2)x2−bβ2x
2
2, if dmin−x1 ≤ x2 < dmax−x1
−κ2x2 otherwise.
Lemma 4.3.16.Eω [Π1(ω ,x1,x2)] and Eω [Π2(ω ,x2,x1)] are continuous functions of x1 ∈ R+ and x2 ∈
R+, respectively; however Eω [Π1(ω ,x1,x2)] is not differentiable at points x1 ∈ {dmin− x2,dmin,dmax−
x2,dmax} and Eω [Π2(ω ,x2,x1)] is not differentiable at points x2 ∈ {dmin − x1,dmax− x1}. Moreover,
Eω [Π2(ω ,x2,x1)] is quasiconcave in x2.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.






be the right-hand and left-hand side derivatives w.r.t.









which implies wheneverEω [Π1(ω ,x1,x2)] starts to decrease, it does not increase again.
Since we know the constants explicitly, we can calculate theright and left derivatives at each break-
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point and identify the cases whenEω [Π1(ω ,x1,x2)] will be quasiconcave. For the above example, all the
breakpoints, exceptx1 = dmax−x2, always satisfy condition (4.9) regardless of the constantv lues. Thus






β1 satisfying condition (4.9) guarantee the quasiconcavity














Since there are two firms in the example above, the expected profit functions of base-load and peak
generators are piecewise continuous functions with maximum 5 and 3 breakpoints, respectively. Since
the demand is uniformly distributed, each function piece islinear or quadratic. However, even for uni-
form demand the expected profit function of base-load generator may not be quasiconcave if it does not
satisfy the condition given in (4.10). For instance, let[dmin, dmax] := [100,500] andVOLL= 10000,c1 =
10,c2 = 200,κ1 = 20, then whenx2 = 400, condition (4.10) does not hold; henceEω [Π1(ω ,x1,x2)] is not
quasiconcave as shown in Figure 4.2. Thus, the conditions ofTheorem 4.3.7 for existence of equilibrium
are not satisfied.
























Figure 4.2: Expected profit function of firm 1 (base-load generator) atx2 = 400
4.4 Two-stage Capacity Choice Model with Endogenous RandomLinear
Price-Demand Curve
In this section, instead of VOLL pricing we consider an electricity market where consumers can respond
to prices and give firms an incentive to build generation capaity. When consumers respond to prices,
we have an elastic demand and we represent the reaction of consumers to the prices by decreasing linear
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price-demand curves. The standard linear inverse demand function with random parameters may be
represented byPn(ω ,dn):
Pn(ω ,dn) = αn(ω)− γn(ω)dn,
wherePn(ω ,0) = αn(ω) < ∞,∀ω . For givenω , dn is not fixed as in Section 4.3 but it is a decision
variable which depends on the price of electricity at noden.
We focus on the case of random intercept:Pn(ω ,d) = αn(ω)− γndn. This a standard assumption in
general in the literature (e.g., Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997), Xu (2005), Murphy and Smeers (2005),
Lagerlöf (2006)). We denote the cumulative distribution of α(ω) by Φ whose support is on some interval
[αmin,αmax].
Dealing with an elastic demand (without VOLL pricing) instead of a fixed demand with VOLL pricing
will slightly change the equilibrium conditions of the second stage game and the corresponding OPF
problem for pool and bilateral markets. For inelastic demand in Section 4.3, we showed that the first and
second stage equilibrium of bilateral and pool market models are equivalent. This result will also hold
when demand is endogenous. Hence, we will continue this section with pool market model formulation.
4.4.1 Pool Market Model
Perfect Competition Equilibrium at Second Stage: When demand responds to prices, the corresponding
Optimal Power Flow Problem (OPF) will slightly be differentfrom the OPF Problem (4.1). For any
ω ∈ Ω andx,



















ygjk(ω)+ f j(ω)≥ d j(ω) (p j(ω)) ∀ j ∈ {N∪ I}
y(ω) satisfyConsCap(ω ,x)
f (ω) satisfyConsPTDF(ω)
y(ω)≥ 0, d(ω)≥ 0,
(4.11)
wheredn(ω) is the decision variable representing endogenous demand inthe state of the worldω and∫ dn(ω)
0 Pn(ω ,s)dscan be interpreted as the consumer’s willingness to pay in the state of the worldω . The
endogenous demand assumption results in the second stage equilibrium conditions in which the following
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conditions are different compared to the equilibrium conditions given in (4.2). For eachω ∈ Ω andx,




ik (ω) ⊥ y
∗g
ik (ω)≥ 0 ∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg







j (ω)−d∗j (ω) ⊥ p∗j (ω)≥ 0 j ∈ {N∪ I}.
The above conditions imply that, at equilibrium, if any generator sells power at demand noden
(d∗n(ω) > 0) then the market price at noden is equal to the price which consumers are willing to pay.
Moreover, if any firm produces power at nodei (y∗gik (ω) > 0), then the market price at nodei is equal to
its marginal cost plus scarcity rent. Then for givenx andω ∈ Ω, the KKT conditions associated with a
positive consumption and generation can be stated as:
p∗n(ω ,x) = P(ω ,d∗n(ω ,x)),∀n∈ N,




ik (ω ,x),∀g∈ G, i ∈ Ig,k∈ Kg.
(4.12)
First Stage Behavior with Market Power: For givenx∗−g, each firm’s behavior and equilibrium condi-
tions at first stage is the same. The profit function (Πgpool(ω ,x
g,x−g)) for firm g∈ G at each realization
ω ∈ Ω and the solution setχgpool(x
−g) can be formulated similar to the first stage profit function and the
solution set given in Section 4.3.1.2.
4.4.2 Characterization of the Two-stage Game
In order to preserve analytical tractability as in Section 4.3.4, we again consider a simplified model with-
out any network limits. Then the model reduces to a single node electricity market where all demand
and supply is concentrated at one node (∗(ω) = ∑
n
d∗n(ω)) and Assumption 4.3.3(i) holds. Combin-
ing Assumption 4.3.3(i) and equation (4.12), the KKT condition associated with a positive generation
y∗k(ω ,x) > 0 in a single node market can be stated, for givenx a dω ∈ Ω, as
p∗(ω ,x) = P(ω ,d∗(ω ,x)) = ck+β ∗k (ω ,x),∀k∈ K. (4.13)
According to (4.13), consumers’ willingness to pay is equalto a single market price paid to each firm
when the spot market is cleared. Furthermore, each generatig firm receives scarcity rent being equal to
the market price minus its marginal cost. Thus, from now onp∗(ω ,x) andP(ω ,d∗(ω ,x)) will be used
interchangeably when we formulate the first stage problem ofthe firms.
Besides Assumption 4.3.3(i), we also make the following assumptions for the two-stage model with
linear price-demand curve.
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Assumption 4.4.1.α is a continuous random variable with a cumulative distributon Φ and a continuous
probability density functionΦ′ whose support is on some interval[αmin,αmax].






When there is zero capacity (∑Kj=1x j = 0), consumers are not supplied with any power (d∗(ω) = 0)






as the expected price that consumers are willing to pay for the first unit of power. According to Assump-
tion 4.4.2, there exists at least one technology, sayk′ ∈ K, such that the expected price that consumers
are willing to pay for the first unit of power from technologyk′ is higher than its cost of investment and
operation. Therefore, firmk′ will be able to increase its expected profit by investing at a positive level in
technologyk′; i.e.,xk′ > 0. Thus, Assumption 4.4.2 guarantees that∑Kj=1x∗j > 0.
Similar to the exogenous demand case, the expected profit function of firm k ∈ K for givenx−k can
be formulated in terms of its expected scarcity rent:
Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] = (Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)]−κk)xk.
Next, we derive a closed form expression for the expected scarcity rent function for cases with sym-
metric and asymmetric firms and establish the characteristics of the expected scarcity rent and the ex-
pected profit functions for each firm. Different from the casewith exogenous demand, the expected
scarcity rent and the expected profit function of each firm arediff rentiable everywhere. On the other
hand, similar to the case with exogenous demand, when firms are ymmetric we show that the expected
profit of each firm is strictly quasiconcave under logconcavity assumption of underlying probability den-
sity function and there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibri m. In case of asymmetric firms, we can
still show existence and uniqueness of equilibria under a sticter condition than logconcavity of proba-
bility density function.
4.4.2.1 Symmetric Firms
As mentioned in Section 4.3 for the exogenous demand case, the assumption of symmetric firms implies
that the unit costs are the same for all firms; that is,c1 = c2 = . . .= cK = c andκ1 = κ2 = · · ·= κK = κ .
This yields an identical expected scarcity rent and profit function for all firms as shown in Proposition
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4.4.3.
For given(xk,x−k), Figure 4.3 illustrates the competitive equilibrium in thespot market for a subset
of realizations of the demand curve. As illustrated in the figure, there is a threshold value of inter-
cept, sayα(ω̂), which depends on(xk,x−k) and from which all firms’ capacities are fully utilized. For
realizationsα(ω)≤ α(ω̂), firms’ total available generation capacity is not fully utilized and the compet-
itive market price is equal to the firms’ marginal generatingcost where the corresponding demand curve
crosses the supply curve. According to (4.13), this yields zero scarcity rent for all firms. For realizations





x j ) and the market price is higher than the firms’ marginal generating cost,
which yields a positive scarcity rent equal toP(ω ,XK−1(k)+xk)−c for all firms.
Figure 4.3: Illustration of a single-node market with symmetric firms and linear demand curve with
random intercept for givenx
As mentioned before, the value ofα(ω̂) depends on(xk,x−k) which can be easily derived from Figure
4.3 as:
α(ω̂) = c+ γ · (XK−1(k)+xk).
Next, we derive the closed form expression of firmk’s expected scarcity rent function for givenx−k.
Proposition 4.4.3. Under Assumption 4.4.1, for given x−k, the expected scarcity rent of firm k∈ K can
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be formulated as follows:




whereα(ω̂) = c+ γ · (XK−1(k)+xk).
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
In the following lemmas, we establish the differentiability of both expected scarcity rent and expected
profit functions with respect toxk which also imply their continuity. Then, we show in Theorem 4.4.5
thatEω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] is strictly logconcave under certain conditions on the support of cumulative dis-
tribution functionΦ.
Lemma 4.4.4.LetΦ be a differentiable function on its support. For given x−k, the expected scarcity rent
of each firm k∈ K given in (4.14) is differentiable and nonincreasing w.r.t. xk ∈ R+ with:
∂Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)]
∂xk
=−γ · (1−Φ(α(ω̂))≤ 0. (4.15)
Moreover, Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] is a convex function of xk ∈ R+.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
Theorem 4.4.5.Let Φ be a differentiable function on its support. For given k∈ K and x−k,
(i) Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] is differentiable w.r.t. xk ∈ R+, and
(ii) if the probability density functionΦ′ is logconcave, then Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] is a strictly logconcave
function of xk ∈ R+.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
As in the exogenous demand case, we prove in the next lemmas that the strategy space of each firm is
bounded and convex. Then in Theorem 4.4.7, we show existenceand uniqueness of Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 4.4.6. The strategy space of each firm k∈ K is Sk := [0,
αmax−c
γ ] which is nonempty, compact,
and convex.
132 4.4. Two-stage Capacity Choice Model with Endogenous Random Linear Price-Demand Curve
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
Theorem 4.4.7(Existence and Uniqueness). Let Φ be a differentiable function on its support and the
probability density functionΦ′ be logconcave and Assumption 4.4.2 holds. Then for the game define in
Section 4.4.1 with symmetric firms and endogenous demand curve with random intercept, there exists a
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, x∗ = x∗1 = . . .= x
∗







and x∗ > 0 whereω̂ is such thatα(ω̂) = c+Kγx∗.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
4.4.2.2 Asymmetric Firms
For given(xk,x−k), Figure 4.4 illustrates the competitive equilibrium in thespot market for a subset of
realizations of demand curve. In comparison to Figure 4.3 ofthe symmetric case, the supply curve of
asymmetric generators is a piecewise constant function having more than one piece. Thus, there are
multiple threshold values of intercept,α(ω1) < α(ω1) < α(ω2) < α(ω2) < .. . < α(ωK) < α(ωK),
at which the market price changes as explained below. For instance, let’s takek = 1 in Figure 4.4 and
consider the set of realizations[α(ω1),α(ω1)] and[α(ω1),α(ω2)] at which firm 1 is the marginal unit
and the other firms do not generate at all. For givenx1, the market price is equal to the sum of the
marginal cost and the scarcity rent of firm 1 (c1 andβ ∗1 ) for the realizations within these sets:
(a) forα(ω)∈ [α(ω1),α(ω1)), the capacity of firm 1 is not binding (i.e.,d(ω)< x1), hence the market
price is equal toc1 andβ ∗1 (ω ,x1,x−1) = 0,
(b) for α(ω) ∈ [α(ω1),α(ω2)], the capacity of firm 1 is binding (i.e.,d(ω) = x1) and the market price
is equal toP(ω ,x1) andβ ∗1 (ω ,x1,x−1) = P(ω ,x1)−c1.
Similarly, let’s consider the set of realizations[α(ω2),α(ω2)] and [α(ω2),α(ω3)] at which firm 1’s
capacity is fully utilized and firm 2 is the marginal unit. Theother firms having higher marginal costs
do not generate at all. Then for givenx1, the market price is equal to the sum of the marginal cost and
scarcity rent of firm 2 (c2 andβ ∗2 ) for the realizations within these sets:
(c) for α(ω) ∈ [α(ω2),α(ω2)), the capacity of firm 2 is not binding (i.e.,x1 < d(ω) < x1+x2) hence
the market price is equal toc2 andβ ∗1 (ω ,x1,x−1) = c2−c1,
(d) for α(ω) ∈ [α(ω2),α(ω3)], the capacity of firm 2 is binding (i.e.,d(ω) = x1+x2) and the market
price is equal toP(ω ,x1+x2) andβ ∗1 (ω ,x1,x−1) = P(ω ,x1+x2)−c1.
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of a single-node market with asymmetric firms and linear demand curve with
random intercept for givenx
Next we will generalize the formulation ofβ ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k) for eachk andα(ω) ∈ [αmin,αmax]. The
value ofβ ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k) depends on the type of firm being the marginal unit at eachα(ω) as explained
above. At a realizationα(ω), if firms 1,2, . . . ,m are generating, then firm is called the marginal unit
since it is the most expensive firm setting the market price. Furthermore, the scarcity rent of firmk is
equal to the market price minus the marginal cost of firmk. For a givenk, we will specify a range ofα(ω)
where the marginal unit is firm with a higher marginal cost (m≥ k). Otherwise when the marginal unit
is with lower marginal cost (m< k), firm k is not generating at all and its scarcity rent is zero. Note that in
the above example, (a) and (b) show the situation wherek=m= 1 whereas (c) and (d) show the situation
wherek= 1 andm= 2.
For k≤ m≤ K−1, letΩm := [α(ωm),α(ωm+1)] denote the set of realizations where the capacity of




x j . Similarly, ΩK := [α(ωK),αmax] is the set of realizations
where all firms’ capacities are binding. In addition, fork < m≤ K, let Ωm := [α(ωm),α(ωm)) denote








x j . Then for each firmk∈ K, the following holds:
(i) For αmin ≤ α(ω)< α(ωk), the capacity of firmk is not fully utilized, henceβ ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k) = 0.
(ii) For α(ω) ∈ Ωm(m≥ k), firm k and marginal unitm generate at full capacity and market price is









x j)−ck ≥ 0.
(iii) For α(ω)∈ Ωm(m≥ k+1), firm k generates at full capacity but marginal unitmgenerates less than
its capacity. Then the market price is equal to the marginal cost of unitm. Thus,P(ω ,d(ω)) = cm
andβ ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k) = cm−ck > 0.
Recall that for givenx−k, we denote the total capacity of the(m−1) cheapest firms excluding firmk




x j , for k ≤ m≤ K. ThenXm−1(k)+ xk is the total capacity of them
cheapest firms including firmk in the market. Then by using (i)-(iii) above and for givenx−k, we get:












ThenEω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] can be formulated as follows:



















By using the explicit formulation of the linear price-demand function, (4.17) can further be simplified
as a closed form expression as given in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.4.8. Under Assumption 4.4.1, for given xk, the expected scarcity rent of firm k∈ K can be
formulated in a closed form expression as follows:










where, for m= k, . . . ,K−1, the threshold valuesα(ωm) andα(ωm+1) depend on the capacities of firms
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generating atωm andωm+1, respectively and they can be easily derived from Figure 4.4:
α(ωm) = cm+ γ · (Xm−1(k)+xk) andα(ωm+1) = cm+1+ γ · (Xm−1(k)+xk),∀m≥ k. (4.19)
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
Note that when firms are symmetriccK = ck = c andα(ωm) = α(ωm+1),∀m. Then, (4.18) is reduced
to (4.14). The expected scarcity rent function of each firm given in (4.18) is differentiable and decreasing
as shown in the next lemma.
Lemma 4.4.9. Let Φ be a differentiable function on its support. For given x−k, the expected scarcity
rent of each firm k∈ K given in(4.18) is differentiable w.r.t. xk ∈ R+. Moreover,(4.18) is a decreasing
function of xk ∈ R+.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
Next, we can show strict concavity of the expected profit functio of each firm under a sufficient
condition satisfied by the probability distribution function.
Theorem 4.4.10.Let Φ be a differentiable function on its support. For given x−k,
(i) the expected profit function of each firm k is differentiable w.r.t. xk ∈ R+, and
(ii) the expected profit function of each firm k is (strictly) con ave if
−Φ′(s+C)−s·Φ′′(s+C)(<)≤ 0, for all s,C ∈ R+, where C is some constant.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
The condition stated in Theorem 4.4.10(ii) is again similar to the standard assumption used in the
literature (see Sherali et al. (1983), Wolf and Smeers (1997), Grimm and Zoettl (2008), and Xu (2005)).
Rosen (1965) shows that there is a unique equilibrium point fr every strictly concave game. We next
show that the strategy space of each firm is bounded and convex. Finally, in Theorem 4.4.12, we conclude
with existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for the two-stage game with asymmetric firms by
using the result of Rosen (1965).
Lemma 4.4.11.The strategy space of each firm k∈ K is Sk := [0,
αmax−ck
γ ] which is nonempty, compact,
and convex.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
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Theorem 4.4.12. [Existence and Uniqueness] Let Φ be a differentiable function on its support and
−Φ′(s+C)− s·Φ′′(s+C) < 0, for all s,C ∈ R+, where C is some constant. Then, under Assumption
4.4.2, for the game with asymmetric firms and endogenous demand curve with random intercept, there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we establish sufficient conditions which guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria
in oligopolistic electricity markets where strategic electricity generators anticipate perfectly competitive
spot market outcomes with demand uncertainty while choosing their capacities and their power genera-
tion is dispatched after the level of demand is realized. In case of symmetric firms, we show that a large
class of continuous probability distributions guarantee uniq eness of equilibrium for the two-stage game.
In case of asymmetric firms, equilibrium may not exist since the first-stage payoff functions of firms do
not, in general, satisfy generalized concavity when demandis exogenous. When demand is endogenous,
a condition on probability distribution function, which issimilar to the standard assumption used in the
literature for inverse demand curve, is sufficient to guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium.
In general, two-stage closed loop models with strategic firms are nonconvex problems and examples
have been posed in the literature that have multiple or no equilibria. Therefore, it is of interest to users of
such closed loop models to know general sets of conditions, as we define here, under which the existence
of a unique equilibrium is guaranteed. Availability of suchonditions will enhance the value of these
closed loop models for their implementation for policy and market intelligence purposes.
As a final remark, in a closed loop game with two asymmetric firms facing an elastic demand, we
numerically computed the expected profit function of each firm under various logconcave probability
distributions of random intercept (e.g., uniform, normal,exponential, Weibull, gamma, beta) and we
observed that each firm’s expected profit is strictly quasiconcave in all the cases. Thus, we conjecture that
the logconcavity of probability distributions may also be sufficient to guarantee the existence of a unique
equilibrium for closed loop games with asymmetric firms whend mand is endogenous. However, we
could not establish a theoretical proof for this conjecturewhich remains to be a topic for future research.
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4.A Proofs of Propositions, Lemmas, and Theorems
Proof of Proposition 4.3.1. First, we look at the profit of firmg∈ G at realizationω ∈ Ω in a bilateral



















From the KKT conditions in (4.4), we have:
If y∗bgik (ω ,x






If s∗bgn (ω ,xg,x−g)> 0, thenν∗bn (ω ,xg,x−g) = p∗bn (ω ,xg,x−g)−ρ∗bg (ω ,xg,x−g).














We also know that ifβ ∗bgik (ω ,x
g,x−g) > 0, theny∗bgik (ω ,x
g,x−g) = xgik; hence the profit function of the



























From the KKT conditions in (4.2), we have:
If y∗pgik (ω ,x





























The last equality follows with a similar reasoning used for the bilateral case.
The result given in Proposition 4.2.1 (i) indicates that at any given (xg,x−g), β ∗pgik (ω ,x
g,x−g) =
β ∗bgik (ω ,x
g,x−g). Therefore,Πgpool(ω ,x
g,x−g)=Πgbilateral(ω ,x
g,x−g) which in turn impliesEω [Πgpool(ω ,x
g,x−g)]=
Eω [Πgbilateral(ω ,x
g,x−g)]. Thus, for givenx−g, if there exists ax∗g ∈ χbilateral(x−g) then it also holds that
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x∗g ∈ χpool(x−g) for all g∈G and vice versa. Hence, the optimal solution sets of the upperlev l problems
in both market structures are identical which implies both markets yield the same first stage equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 4.3.4. We know thatβ ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)= p∗(ω ,xk,x−k)−ck. Thus, for given{Xm−1(k)}Km=k,
the scarcity rent paid to firmk∈ K at realizationωΩ can be formulated as follows:






+ (VOLL−ck)I{XK−1(k)+xk <D≤ D}.
Then calculation ofEω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] will yield the following:

















The expression (4.20) can be simplified to:





Proof of Lemma 4.3.5.
(i) From (4.6), it is easy to see thatEω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] is a continuous function of(xk,x−k) ∈ R
K
+ since
Ψ is the cumulative distribution function of continuous random demand.
(ii) We know thatΨ is a nondecreasing function of its argument. Fix ak, then for all 0≤ a< b:
0 ≤ Ψ(Xl (k)+a)≤ Ψ(Xl (k)+b)≤ 1, k−1≤ l ≤ K−1 which implies









(cm+1− cm)Ψ(Xm−1(k)+a) = Eω [β ∗k (ω ,a,x−k)].
Proof of Lemma 4.3.6. By Lemma 4.3.5, we know thatEω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] in (4.7) is a continuous
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function on[0, ∞] where




VOLL−c, 0≤ xk < xmink





Therefore, wheneverΨ is differentiable, thenEω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] is also differentiable w.r.t.xk ∈ R+
except at the breakpoints given in (4.21):






0, xk ∈ [0, xmink ) ∪ [x
max
k , ∞)




Proof of Theorem 4.3.8. SinceEω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] = (Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)]−κ)xk, (i) and(ii) directly fol-
low from Lemma 4.3.5(i) and Lemma 4.3.6, respectively.
(iii) E ω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] is continuous and differentiable w.r.t.xk on S := (xmink ,x
max
k ). Therefore, we
know that it is also (strictly) concave onS if and only if
∂ 2Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k))]
∂x2k
(<)≤ 0, ∀xk ∈ S
⇔
∂ 2Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k))]
∂x2k
xk+2
∂Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k))]
∂xk
(<)≤ 0, ∀xk ∈ S
⇔ −Ψ′′(xk+XK−1(k))xk−2Ψ
′
(xk+XK−1(k)) (<)≤ 0, ∀xk ∈ S.
SinceΨ′(xk +XK−1(k)) is nonnegative, the last inequality holds iff−Ψ
′′




Outside ofS, Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] is equal to(VOLL−c−κ)xk on (0,xmink ) and−κxk on (x
max
k ,∞) which
are increasing and decreasing linear functions, respectively. Therefore, whenever the stated condition
holds,Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] is a (strictly) quasiconcave function ofxk onR+.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.10. Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] is equal to(VOLL− c− κ)xk on [0,xmink ) and−κxk on
(xmaxk ,∞)which are increasing and decreasing linear functions, respectively. Therefore, ifEω [Π
k(ω ,xk,x−k)]
is strictly quasiconcave on[xmink ,x
max
k ], it is also strictly quasiconcave onR+, which we prove next.





∂Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)]
∂xk
xk+Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)]−κ ,







VOLL− c−κ , xk ∈ [0, xmink )
(VOLL− c)[1−Ψ(xk+XK−1(k))−Ψ
′
(xk+XK−1(k))xk]−κ , xk ∈ [xmink , x
max
k )
−κ , xk ∈ [xmaxk , ∞).








is the gradient ofEω [Πk(ω ,xmink ,x−k)].
– For the breakpointsxk ∈ {xmink ,x
max
k },
∂Eω [Πk(ω ,xmink ,x−k)]
∂xk
:= [VOLL−c−κ , (VOLL−c)(1−Ψ′(D)xmink )−κ ],
∂Eω [Πk(ω ,xmaxk ,x−k)]
∂xk
:= [−κ , −(VOLL−c)Ψ′(D)xmaxk −κ ]< 0.
(4.23)
are the subdifferentials ofEω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] atxk = xmink andxk = x
max
k , respectively.








is a nondecreasing function ofxk.
Next, we differentiate the three only possible cases :
Case (1)xmink > 0: We know thatEω [Π
k(ω ,xk,x−k)] is continuous, and it is an increasing function on
[0,xmink ) and a decreasing function on(x
max




k ) such that
0∈
∂Eω [Πk(ω , x̃k,x−k)]
∂xk
.
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Note that ˜xk 6= xmaxk since
∂Eω [Πk(ω ,xmaxk ,x−k)]
∂xk
< 0 from (4.23). For ˜xk, the following holds:
−(VOLL−c)Ψ
′








Next we distinguish between the cases ˜xk = xmink andx̃k > x
min
k :
(1a) Whenx̃k = xmink , by utilizing (i) and(ii) , for x
min
























Thus,Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] is a decreasing function and hence strictly quasiconcave on[xmink ,x
max
k ].
(1b) Whenx̃k > xmink , again by utilizing(i) and(ii) for x
min
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We can conclude in this case thatEω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] is an increasing function forxk ∈ [xmink , x̃k] and a
decreasing function forxk ∈ [x̃k,xmaxk ]. Then we can conclude thatEω [Π
k(ω ,xk,x−k)] is strictly quasicon-
cave on[xmink ,x
max
k ] by using the above arguments.
Case (2)xmink = 0 andx
max
k > 0: Eω [Π
k(ω ,xk,x−k)] is continuous and decreasing on(xmaxk ,∞). Moreover,
from (4.23) and Assumption (4.3.3) (ii), we know that
∂Eω [Πk(ω ,xmink ,x−k)]
∂xk
=VOLL−c−κ > 0,
∂Eω [Πk(ω ,xmaxk ,x−k)]
∂xk
< 0.
Then there exists an ˜xk ∈ (0,xmaxk ) such that 0∈
∂Eω [Πk(ω , x̃k,x−k)]
∂xk
and we are back in Case (1). Thus,
Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] is a strictly quasiconcave function.
Case (3)xmaxk = 0: ThenEω [β
∗
k (ω ,xk,x−k)] = 0 and Eω [Π
k(ω ,xk,x−k)] = −κxk on [0,∞). Hence,
Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] is decreasing and strictly quasiconcave.
Proof of Lemma 4.3.11. One can easily see that the strategy space is nonempty sincexk = 0 is feasible




for all xk > D.




x∗k ≥ D. Let x
1 be the the vector of investment
decisions of all firms where the total generation capacity isequal to the maximum demand levelD; that is




k = D}. Now assume any candidatex
2 for the equilibrium of all firms where




k > D}. Then the following holds:
(i) At both x1 andx2, the market price is equal toc for all demand realizations and the expected scarcity
rents of all firms are zero which implies that all firms have negative profits equal to−κx1k and−κx2k,
respectively.
(ii) Sincex1k < x
2
k for at least one firmk, the profit of at least one firm decreases fromx
1 to x2; that is,
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−κx2k <−κx1k for at least one firmk.
Thenx2 cannot be an equilibrium since at least one firm has incentiveto deviate from this point tox1 to




x∗k ≤ D holds at equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.13. From Lemma 4.3.11, we know that the strategy spaces of the firms a e non-
empty, compact and convex. Continuity and quasiconcavity of their payoff functions directly follow
from Theorems 4.3.8 and 4.3.10, respectively. Then by utilizing Proposition 4.3.7, there exits a Nash
equilibrium.





Let χk(x−k) denote the solution set of firmk for givenx−k. Then a Nash equilibrium is a point such that
x∗k ∈ χk(x∗−k) for all k∈ K and the following first-stage optimality conditions will hold for all firms at an




⊥ x∗k ≥ 0 ∀k. (4.25)
Next we show that(i) no asymmetric equilibria exist for the symmetric game and(ii) for symmetric
equilibria, denoted byx∗ for each firm, (4.8) holds andD ≤ Kx∗ ≤ D, (iii) finally symmetric equilibrium
satisfying (4.8) is unique.
(i) First we assume that there is an asymmetric equilibrium. Anycandidatex∗ for an asymmetric equi-
librium of arbitrary firmsi and j can be ordered as 0≤ x∗i < x
∗
j . Next we show by contradiction that an
asymmetric equilibrium cannot exist since the first-stage optimality conditions of firmsi and j are not
simultaneously satisfied at(x∗i ,x
∗
j ):
– If 0 < x∗i < x
∗
j , then the first-stage optimality conditions (4.25) for bothfirms i and j should satisfy
the following:
∂Eω [Πi(ω ,x∗i ,x∗−i)]
∂xi
=
∂Eω [Π j(ω ,x∗j ,x∗− j)]
∂x j
= 0.
We next show that whenever one of the equations above holds, the other cannot hold. Let
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If the above equation holds then we get














x∗k))−κ < 0 sincex∗i < x∗j .
– If 0 = x∗i < x
∗







x∗k))−κ ≤ 0 and
Eω [Π j(ω ,x∗j ,x∗− j)]
∂x j
= 0.
By using a similar reasoning to the case above, whenever the first quation holds, then














x∗k))−κ < 0 sincex∗j > 0.
Hence, no asymmetric equilibria exits.
(ii) Any symmetric equilibrium can be denoted byx∗ = x∗1 = . . . = x
∗
K . Next we identify the symmet-
ric equilibrium by using Lemma 4.3.12 and the optimality conditions of the first stage:













, we are either in Case (1) or in Case (2) (i.e.,D = 0) of Proof of Theorem 4.3.10.
Hence, there existsx∗ which satisfies
∂Eω [Πk(ω ,x∗,(K −1)x∗)]
∂xk
= 0. By using the equality (4.24)





(iii) From the above arguments we know that each firm’s first stage problem (4.26) is equivalent and
has at least one symmetric equilibriumx∗ = x∗1 = . . . = x
∗
K . Thus, at equilibrium, we know thatx
∗ will
be the optimal investment strategy of firmk whenx−k := ex∗ (wheree is the vector of 1’s of appropriate
dimension). Therefore for givenx−k := ex∗, we would like to findx∗ which is the solution to the following
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problem of any firmk:
x∗ = argmax
xk∈S
Eω [Π(ω ,xk,ex∗)], (4.26)
By Lemma 4.3.12,S := {xk|D − (K − 1)x∗ ≤ xk ≤ D − (K − 1)x∗} which is equivalent toxk ∈
[xmink ,x
max
k ]. By Theorem 4.3.10, we know that if the hazard rate functionH(s) = Ψ
′(s)/(1−Ψ(s)) is
monotone increasing, thenEω [Π(ω ,xk,ex∗)] is strictly quasiconcave onS. Thus, there exists a uniquex∗
which maximizes the problem (4.26).
Proof of Lemma 4.3.15. From derivation of (4.20), recall that for givenx2 and realizationω ,
β ∗1 (ω ,x1,x2) = 0I{d(ω)≤x1}+(c2−c1)I{x1<d(ω)≤x1+x2}+(VOLL−c1)I{x1+x2<d(ω)}
and hence:







When demand is uniformly distributed over[dmin,dmax], Ψ(s) =
s−dmin
dmax−dmin
is the cumulative distribu-
tion function. Therefore:
1) If 0 ≤ x1 < dmin−x2, thenΨ(x1) = Ψ(x1+x2) = 0 andEω [β ∗1 (ω ,x1,x2)] =VOLL−c1.



















3) Fordmin ≤ x1 < dmax−x2, Ψ(x1) =
x1−dmin
dmax−dmin
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4) Fordmax−x2 ≤ x1 < dmax, Ψ(x1) =
x1−dmin
dmax−dmin
≥ 0, andΨ(x1+x2) = 1. Then,














5) If x1 ≥ dmax, thenΨ(x1) = Ψ(x1+x2) = 1 andEω [β ∗1 (ω ,x1,x2)] = 0.
Similarly, for a givenx1 and realizationω ,
β ∗2 (ω ,x2,x1) = 0I{d(ω)≤x1+x2}+(VOLL−c2)I{x1+x2<d(ω)} which yields





When we haved ∼U [dmin, dmax], we get:
1) If 0 ≤ x2 < dmin−x1, thenΨ(x1+x2) = 0 andEω [β ∗2 (ω ,x2,x1)] =VOLL−c2.
2) Fordmin−x1 ≤ x2 < dmax−x1,





















3) If x2 ≥ dmax−x1, thenΨ(x1+x2) = 1 andEω [β ∗2 (ω ,x2,x1)] = 0.
Proof of Lemma 4.3.16. We can write the expected profit functions asEω [Π1(ω ,x1,x2)] =
(Eω [β ∗1 (ω ,x1,x2)]− κ1)x1 and Eω [Π2(ω ,x2,x1)] = (Eω [β ∗2 (ω ,x2,x1)]− κ2)x2. From Lemma 4.3.15,
we know that bothEω [β ∗1 (ω ,x1,x2)] and Eω [β ∗2 (ω ,x2,x1)] are continuous piecewise linear functions
of x1 ∈ R+ andx2 ∈ R+, respectively; therefore the expected profit functions arecontinuous as well.
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They are also differentiable w.r.t.x1 ∈ R+ and x2 ∈ R+ in each region, respectively, due to the
differentiability of expected scarcity rent functions in those regions. However, they are not differentiable
at the breakpoints of the corresponding expected scarcity rent functions.
Given x2, Eω [Π1(ω ,x1,x2)] is concave inx1 in each region 0≤ x1 < dmin− x2, dmin− x2 ≤ x1 < dmin,
dmin ≤ x1 < dmax− x2, dmax− x2 ≤ x1 < dmax, andx1 ≥ dmax since it is a linear or quadratic function
in these regions. However, it is not necessarily quasiconcave on R+. On the other hand, givenx1,
Eω [Π2(ω ,x2,x1)] is an increasing linear function ofx2 on(0,dmin−x1), concave on[dmin−x1,dmax−x1],
and a decreasing linear function on(dmax−x1,∞). Hence it is a quasiconcave function onR+.
Proof of Proposition 4.4.3. From the illustration in Figure 4.3 and equation (4.13), we know that
β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k) has a positive value which is equal toP(ω ,XK−1(k)+xk)−c whenα(ω)> α(ω̂):
β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k) = 0I{αmin ≤ α(ω)≤ α(ω̂)}
+ [α(ω)− γ · (XK−1(k)+xk)−c]I{α(ω̂) < α(ω)≤ αmax}.
Then calculation ofEω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] will yield the following:
Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] =
∫ αmax
α(ω̂)




sd(Φ(s))− [c+ γ · (XK−1(k)+xk)][1−Φ(α(ω̂)].
By using integration by parts and the equalityα(ω̂) = c+ γ · (XK−1(k)+xk),










SinceΦ(αmax)=1, the above equation yields








Proof of Lemma 4.4.4. Φ is a differentiable function andα(ω̂) = c+γ ·(XK−1(k)+xk), which is the limit
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of the integral in (4.14), is also differentiable w.r.t.xk ∈ R+. ThenEω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] is differentiable
w.r.t. xk ∈ R+. By using Leibniz rule and the fundamental theorem of calculus for differentiation of
integral, we get:






=−γ · (1−Φ(α(ω̂)))≤ 0.
Moreover, the second derivative ofEω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] w.r.t. xk will yield the following:
∂ 2Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)]
∂x2k
= γ2Φ′(α(ω̂))≥ 0.
Hence,Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] is a non-increasing convex function ofxk ∈ R+.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.5. SinceEω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] = (Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)]−κk)xk, (i) immediately follows
from Lemma 4.4.4.
For (ii) , note that
log(Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)]) = logxk+ log(Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)]−κ).
We know that logxk is strictly concave. We next show that if the probability density function Φ′ is
logconcave thenB(xk) := Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)]−κ is logconcave.
By using Theorem 3 of Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005), we know that log-concavity ofΦ′ implies the



















(1−Φ(s))ds− (1−Φ(t))2 ≤ 0.
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Hence,(Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)]−κ) is a logconcave function ofxk. The sum of a strictly concave function,
logxk, and a concave function, log(Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)]−κ), is strictly concave. Thus,Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)]
is strictly logconcave inxk.
Proof of Lemma 4.4.6. The strategy space is nonempty since the strategyxk = 0 is feasible for all
firms. For any firmk, if xk >
αmax−c
γ
then, by Proposition 4.4.3,Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] = 0 (note that
α(ω̂) > αmax for all xk >
αmax−c
γ






= −κ < 0 which
implies that firmk’s profit for this set of investment strategies is lower than its profit gained by the
strategies inSk := [0,
αmax−c
γ
] and therefore can be excluded from its strategy space.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.7. From Lemma 4.4.6, we know that the strategy spaces are non-empty, compact,
and convex. Continuity of the payoff functions directly follows from Theorem 4.4.5. Boyd and Van-
denberghe (2004) gives a composition theorem which shows the preservation of quasiconcavity under
monotonic functions (see Section 3.4.4 on pages 101/102 andSection 3.5 on page 104). Utilizing this
result, we know that (strict) log-concavity implies (stric) quasiconcavity of firms’ payoff functions. A
similar result can also be found in Theorem 3.3 of Avriel (1972) under the notion ofρ-concavity. Then
by utilizing Theorem 4.4.5 and Proposition 4.3.7, there exists a Nash equilibrium.
Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] is differentiable and strictly logconcave inxk. Each firmk ∈ K is interested in




Let χk(x−k) denote the solution set of firmk for givenx−k. Then a Nash equilibrium is a point such that
x∗k ∈ χk(x∗−k) for all k∈ K and the following first-stage optimality conditions will hold for all firms at an




⊥ x∗k ≥ 0,∀k∈ K, (4.27)














Next we show that(i) no asymmetric equilibria exist,(ii) for symmetric equilibria, denoted byx∗ for
each firm, (4.16) holds and 0< x∗ <
αmax−c
Kγ
, and(iii ) finally symmetric equilibrium satisfying (4.16)
is unique.
(i) We first assume that there is an asymmetric equilibrium. Any candidatex∗ for an asymmetric equi-
librium of arbitrary firmsi and j can be ordered as 0≤ x∗i < x
∗
j . Next we show by contradiction that
an asymmetric equilibrium cannot exist since the first stageoptimality conditions given in (4.27) are not
simultaneously satisfied for firmsi and j .
– If 0 < x∗i < x
∗
j , then the first stage optimality conditions (4.27) for firmsi and j should satisfy the
following
∂Eω [Πi(ω ,x∗i ,x∗−i)]
∂xi
=
∂Eω [Π j(ω ,x∗j ,x∗− j)]
∂x j
= 0.
We next show that whenever one of the equations above holds, the other cannot hold. Let





(1−Φ(s))ds− γ · (1−Φ(α(ω̂)))x∗i −κ = 0.
If the above equation holds then sincex∗i < x
∗
j ,





(1−Φ(s))ds− γ · (1−Φ(α(ω̂)))x∗j −κ < 0.
– If 0 = x∗i < x
∗
j , then the first-stage optimality conditions of firmi and j should satisfy





(1−Φ(s))ds−κ ≤ 0, and
∂Eω [Πi(ω ,x∗j ,x∗−i)]
∂xi
= 0.
By using a similar reasoning to the case above, whenever the first quation holds then sincex∗j > 0





(1−Φ(s))ds− γ · (1−Φ(α(ω̂)))x∗j −κ < 0.
Hence, no asymmetric equilibria exits.
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(ii) Any symmetric equilibrium can be denoted byx∗ = x∗1 = . . . = x
∗
K . Next we identify the symmetric
equilibrium by using Assumption 4.4.2 and the optimality conditions of the first stage:
– By Assumption 4.4.2,x∗ > 0.
– At x∗ > 0, the following optimality conditions are satisfied for each firm









(1−Φ(s))ds−κ = γ · (1−Φ(α(ω̂)))x∗ which yields (4.16).
(iii ) From the above arguments we know that each firm’s first stage problem (4.28) is equivalent and
has at least one symmetric equilibriumx∗ = x∗1 = . . .= x
∗
K . Thus, at equilibrium, we know thatx
∗ will be
the optimal investment strategy of firmk whenx∗−k := ex
∗ (wheree is the vector of 1’s of appropriate di-




Eω [Π(ω ,xk,ex∗)], (4.28)
By Theorem 4.4.5(ii), we know that ifΦ′ is logconcave, thenEω [Π(ω ,xk,ex∗)] is strictly logconcave for
xk ∈ ℜ+ which implies its strict quasiconcavity forxk ∈ ℜ+. Thus, there exists a uniquex∗ maximizing
Eω [Π(ω ,xk,ex∗)] in (4.28).
Proof of Proposition 4.4.8. By using explicit formulation of linear price demand curve,we get:
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Next we simplify the above formulation:






















−(ck+ γ · (XK−1(k)+xk))[Φ(αmax)−Φ(α(ωK)), ]




























−(cK − ck)Φ(α(ωK))+αmax− (ck+ γ · (XK−1(k)+ xk)





















Finally, we addcK −cK to the equation above, then we get:










Proof of Lemma 4.4.9. P(ω , ·) andΦ are differentiable w.r.t. their arguments andΦ is independent from
xk. From (4.19) we know that, form≥ k, (α(ωm),α(ωm+1)) are differentiable w.r.t.xk ∈ R+. Then
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being a sum of differentiable functions in (4.17),Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] is differentiable w.r.t.xk ∈ R+. By
using Leibniz rule and the fundamental theorem of calculus for differentiation of integral in (4.17) and
by utilizing (4.19) which simplifiesP(ωm+1,Xm−1(k)+ xk) = cm+1 andP(ωm,Xm−1(k)+ xk) = cm, we
get











































The expression in (4.29) can be simplified to:























Thus,Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] is decreasing.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.10. SinceEω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] = (Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)]−κk)xk, (i) follows immedi-
ately from Lemma 4.4.9. For(ii) , we know that
Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] = xk(Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)]−κ).
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∂Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)]
∂xk
+Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)]−κ .
∂Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)]
∂xk




















which can further be rewritten as
∂Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)]
∂xk
















We know thatcK −ck−κ is constant. In addition under the condition−Φ′(s+C)−s· γΦ′′(s+C)(<






(<) ≤ 0, which implies
∂ 2Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)]
∂x2k
(<) ≤ 0. Hence,Eω [Πk(ω ,xk,x−k)] is (strictly)
concave if−Φ′(s+C)−s· γΦ′′(s+C)(<)≤ 0 for all s,C ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 4.4.11. The strategy space is nonempty since the strategyxk = 0 is feasible for all
firms. For any firmk ∈ K, if xk >
αmax−ck
γ
then p∗k(ω ,xk,x−k) = ck for all ω ∈ Ω when firm k’s
generation is positive. Thus,Eω [β ∗k (ω ,xk,x−k)] = 0 for all xk >
αmax−ck
γ






= −κ < 0 which implies that firmk’s profit for this set of investment strategies is
lower than its profit gained by the strategies inSk := [0,
αmax−ck
γ
] and therefore can be excluded from
its strategy space.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.12. From Lemma 4.4.11, we know that the strategy spaces are non-empty, com-
pact, and convex. Continuity of the payoff functions directly follows from Theorem 4.4.10. Then by
Proposition 4.3.7, there exits a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, Rosen (1965) shows that there exists
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a unique equilibrium point when the payoff function of everyplayer is strictly concave. By using the
result of Rosen (1965), there exists a unique equilibrium since the expected profit function of each firm
is strictly concave under the given condition.
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Chapter 5
Optimal Threshold Levels in Stochastic
Fluid Models via Simulation-Based
Optimization
Abstract
A number of important problems in production and inventory control involve optimization of multiple threshold
levels or hedging points. We address the problem of finding such levels in a stochastic system whose dynamics
can be modelled using generalized semi-Markov processes (GSMP). The GSMP framework enables us to compute
several performance measures and their sensitivities froma single simulation run for a general system with sev-
eral states and fairly general state transitions. We then usa simulation-based optimization method, sample-path
optimization, for finding optimal hedging points. We reportnumerical results for systems with more than twenty
hedging points and service-level type probabilistic constrain s. In these numerical studies, our method performs
quite well even on problems with nonconvex objective functions and probabilistic constraints, which are consid-
ered very difficult to solve by current standards. In addition, we obtain insights on the structure of optimal hedging
points for much larger systems than is usually reported in the li erature. In particular, we observe that production
and demand variability has an important effect on the optimal threshold levels of a system. As the production
and demand variability increases, the optimal threshold levels also increase to hold enough safety stock against
the uncertainty in production and demand rates. Furthermore, as the utilization of a system converges to one, the
optimal threshold levels get close to each other and converge to a single threshold level. Some applications falling
into this framework include designing manufacturing flow contr llers, using capacity options and subcontracting




In an influential paper, Kimemia and Gershwin (1983) proposea framework for studying production
control problems as optimal control problems for stochastic fluid systems. This framework, usually
referred to as manufacturing flow control, assumes that the production/inventory processes of interest are
governed by flows that correspond to deterministic production and demand rates and that the randomness
in the system can be captured by changes in production or demand rates according to some stationary
stochastic process governing the possible input and outputrates. Since then, there has been a strong
interest in the development of models and in their analysis within this framework; Sethi et al. (2002)
provide a comprehensive review of this literature.
The particular manufacturing flow control problem that we consider in this chapter is that of a single
resource (a “machine” for simplicity) coping with a flow of demand whose rate varies randomly. The
production capacity of the machine can take any of a number ofalternative values according to some
external stationary stochastic process. Similarly the demand rate at any given time is governed by another
external and uncontrollable stationary stochastic process. The objective then is to dynamically select the
production rate of the machine (within the capacity constrain s) in order to minimize expected inventory
and backorder costs. Under the general assumptions we consider here (multiple machine and demand
states and general transition times), the exact solution ofthe optimal control problem is unknown and
even if it were known the exact optimal policy is likely to be extr mely complicated. On the other
hand, there is a plausible class of policies called “hedgingpoint” policies that are described by a few
parameters and therefore are extremely useful for implementatio in practice. A hedging point policy,
in general, requires determining a parameter corresponding to each machine and demand state. The
corresponding parameter (hedging point) acts as an inventory target threshold in each machine/demand
state. The machine should produce at the maximum rate if the inventory level is below the current
threshold, should stop if the inventory level is above the current threshold, and should produce at the rate
that would keep the inventory level at the current thresholdlevel when it reaches there.
As described further in Section 5.2, hedging point policiesare attractive not only due to their sim-
plicity but also because they turn out to be optimal in a number of important special cases studied in the
literature. In addition, if the production policy is required to depend only on the inventory level (and
not on elapsed times since previous transitions), hedging point olicies seem to be the only practical
alternative for implementation. In turn, these type of policies are used not only for designing manufac-
turing controllers, but also for using capacity options andsubcontracting strategies, and for coordinating
production and marketing decisions.
Focusing on the class of hedging point policies reduces the optimal control problem to the optimiza-
tion of a finite number of parameters: the hedging points. This optimization problem is the main focus of
this chapter. In particular, we propose a simulation-basedapproach, namely sample-path optimization,
to tackle this problem. To this end, we first model the evolutin of the system using a generalized semi-
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Markov Process (GSMP) framework. Although in the past the GSMPs were mainly used for modeling
systems with discrete entities, they can also be well suitedfor modeling fluid systems (see Suri and Fu
(1994) and Gürkan (2000) for example). Here, we also adapt the GSMP framework to our continuous-
time continuous-state space problem. Utilizing the GSMP representation, we then obtain gradient es-
timates of the performance measures using infinitesimal perturbation analysis (IPA) (see Ho and Cao
(1991) and Glassermann (1991)). Finally, we implement the relatively recent technique of sample-path
optimization to find the optimal hedging points.
Sample-path optimization is a simulation-based optimization method to optimize performance func-
tions of complex stochastic systems; it can be used for providing solutions to difficult stochastic opti-
mization problems (including ones with stochastic constrain s), stochastic variational inequalities, and
equilibrium models. The basic idea is to observe a fixed sample path (by using the method of common
random numbers from the simulation literature), solve the resulting deterministic problem using fast and
effective methods from nonlinear programming, and then usethe resulting solutions to infer information
about the solution of the original stochastic problem. In Section 5.2, we briefly explain the underlying
basic ideas and give references in which more details can be found.
To date, there have been several successful implementations of simulation-based optimization in the
context of manufacturing flow control. Most of those papers,mentioned in Section 5.2, use IPA coupled
with some form of stochastic approximation (SA) technique on the optimization side. More precisely,
they apply SA-IPA framework to particular models and/or establish the validity of that approach for those
particular models. There seems to be a number of valid reasons for focusing on particular models. To
start with, proving the validity and unbiasedness of the IPAestimate can be extremely challenging and
is usually dependent on the particular model representatio. Moreover, the practical implementation of
stochastic approximation (or its variants) has to be carefully adapted and fine tuned to the context even
when unbiased derivative estimates are available. Partly as a consequence of these, the existing literature
doesn’t go beyond the unconstrained optimization of two hedging points.
In contrast with most of the existing literature, we start bya fairly general single-stage model allowing
any number of machine and demand states and general state transitions. Our main contributions are two-
fold. First, using the GSMP framework, we obtain a flexible and general representation of the system
evolution, and derive gradient estimates. Even though these estimates may be obtained by other means,
the GSMP approach significantly facilitates obtaining transparent estimates by simulation and proving
the unbiasedness of these estimates. Second, using sample-path optimization we avoid certain drawbacks
associated with stochastic approximation type methods such as the number of parameters to fine tune,
slow convergence, and ad-hoc handling of constraints. These two complementary features enable us to
investigate much larger systems than is usually reported incomparable simulation-based optimization
studies and to obtain insights on the structure of optimal hedging points for large systems. Furthermore,
we also report numerical experiments with service-level type probabilistic constraints. Our highlights
from these numerical experiments can be summarized as follows:
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– In one of the systems, we ignore the demand variability and use the average demand rate instead.
When we compare the solution of the system based on the average demand rate with the solution
of the same system including demand variability, we observesignificant differences between the
optimal hedging points. Thus, the variability of demand hasan important effect on the optimal
hedging points. Therefore, considering only the average demand without taking into account its
variability leads to incorrect decisions.
– The load (utilization) of a system depends on the average production and demand rates. In our
numerical experiments, we observe that as the utilization of a system converges to one, the optimal
hedging points get close to each other and converge to a single hedging point.
– The differences between the optimal hedging points of a system also depend on the transition di-
agram and the transition probabilities. The more the machine states communicate with each other
and the more the state transition probabilities are close tounif rm distribution, the more the optimal
hedging points get close to each other. As the transition probabilities between the machine states
become less uniform, the optimal hedging points move away from each other.
– In a system, as the production and demand variability increases, the optimal hedging points also
increase to hold enough safety stock against the uncertainty in production and demand rates.
– In a system, as the ratio of holding and backorder costs gets smaller, that is the system has very low
holding cost compared to its backorder cost, the average syst m cost gets flatter near the optimum
points suggesting multiple optima.
– As also mentioned in Brémaud et al. (1997), the long run average cost function is generally not
convex in systems with two or more hedging points, which we also observe in some of our numer-
ical experiments. In some of the systems, we reach to different optimal hedging levels when we
start from different initial points, which can be expected when dealing with nonconvex functions.
However, we do not encounter any numerical difficulties in finding the local optimal solutions even
in large systems despite the nonconvex nature of the averagecost function and the probabilistic
constraints. Furthermore, it is worth to note that these different local optimal solutions result in
very similar performance measures. However, additional testing is necessary to be sure whether
this multiplicity is due to several local isolated optima ormultiple optima or both.
We would like to emphasize that although the main focus of this c apter is the analysis of a particular
manufacturing flow control model, the scope of application fr the developed techniques is potentially
much wider. Threshold-based control of stochastic fluid models have useful applications in other related
problems in manufacturing control (e.g., Tan and Gershwin (2004), Hu et al. (2004), Panayiotou and
Cassandras (2006), Gershwin et al. (2009), Zhao and Melamed(2006, 2007), Melamed et al. (2010)) and
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queueing-based admission control and routing models commonly used in telecommunications (e.g., Sun
et al. (2004), Wardi et al. (2010)). The general approach proposed here may be utilized with appropriate
modifications for such models as well. Cassandras (2007) provides an overview of the theory of stochas-
tic fluid models and their applications with threshold-based controllers in various fields such as finance,
telecommunications, and engineering.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we present a review of the related
literature. Section 5.3 provides a detailed description ofthe problem. The GSMP framework and gradient
estimation are presented in Section 5.4. The numerical resuts can be found in Section 5.5 and the
conclusions are presented in Section 5.6. To improve readability, we deal with the details of our technical
analysis in several appendices. Appendix 5.A provides a proof of a sufficient condition for the stability
of the system under consideration. Appendix 5.B deals with so-called “similarity properties” needed for
rigorous analysis of our gradient estimation. Appendix 5.Ccontains the proofs of several technical results
of Section 5.4. Finally, Appendix 5.D gives the pseudo-codefor simulation and gradient estimation.
5.2 Literature
The research in manufacturing flow control can roughly be classified in two directions: papers directly
addressing optimal control issues and papers that analyze and optimize the performance of plausible
policies. Our work falls in the latter category but the policies we employ are strongly motivated by the
former.
Kimemia and Gershwin (1983) propose formal optimal controltheory as an approach for studying
general manufacturing flow control problems. They also propose a plausible class of control policies.
The first formal proofs of optimality of a certain policy, however, were established later by Akella and
Kumar (1986) and Bielecki and Kumar (1988) for a two machine state system with exponential up and
down times, constant demand, linear holding and backorder costs. In particular, these papers establish
the optimality of a hedging point policy: whenever up, the machine should produce at full capacity below
a target inventory level called the hedging point and produce at a rate which enables it to stay there once
it reaches this target.
There are several extensions of the hedging point type optimali y structure. For instance, for a multiple
machine state system with a Markovian transition structure, a multiple hedging point type policy is
optimal: for each machine state where capacity exceeds demand rate, there is a corresponding hedging
point; see Sethi et al. (2002) for related results. It is alsokn wn that with non-exponential machine state
transitions, the structure of the optimal policy becomes more c mplex (see Hu and Xiang (1995) for an
example) but hedging point policies remain useful due to their simplicity.
In addition, there is also a considerable literature on the performance analysis side. Sharifnia (1988)
investigates the multiple machine state problem with Markovian transitions when a multiple hedging
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point policy is used and presents analytical results for theperformance measures of the system. Finding
the optimal hedging points, however, remains difficult. Liberopoulos and Hu (1995) also investigate the
multiple machine state problem with Markovian transitionswith a different focus. They establish useful
monotonicity properties of the optimal hedging levels withrespect to the machine state transition struc-
ture. We use these intuitive monotonicity properties for testing our procedure as part of our numerical
experiments in Section 5.5.
There are also several other examples where hedging point type policies arise in single-part and
single-stage systems under more general modeling assumptions (see Cassandras (2007) for a general
model and its possible applications). A typical example is that of threshold subcontracting: additional
manufacturing resources can be used depending on the inventory level. Tan (2002a), Hu et al. (2004),
and Tan and Gershwin (2004) propose models and performance analysis approaches for this class of
problems. Zhang et al. (2001) is another example in which joint production and marketing decisions are
modelled through a hedging point type policy. Our approach,s we explain in more detail below, can be
utilized in such settings with some straightforward modifications.
If one is concerned with a system with several machine and demand states and fairly general ran-
dom disturbances (i.e., not necessarily exponentially distributed), then the generality of the problem and
the intractability of an analytical solution make a simulation-based method an attractive approach. Us-
ing a simulation-based method for finding optimal hedging points has been tried before by Caramanis
and Liberopoulos (1992), Liberopoulos and Caramanis (1994), Haurie et al. (1994), Yan et al. (1999),
Brémaud et al. (1997), Yan et al. (1999), and Yin et al. (2001). However, the optimization side of all
these papers were confined to the method of stochastic approximation and its variants, see Robbins and
Monro (1951). Although very prominent, in practice these methods suffer from serious drawbacks such
as slow convergence, lack of a good stopping criterion, and difficulty in enforcing feasibility. In partic-
ular, when there are constraints, these methods handle inequality constraints –even deterministic linear
inequalities– via projection onto the feasible set. Such a projection operation can retard the performance
of an optimization algorithm immensely, as illustrated by the simple example in Appendix 6 of Plam-
beck et al. (1996). In that example, such a method requires nearly 1043 steps to find the minimizer (the
origin) of a linear function on the nonnegative orthantR2+. Furthermore, even in the unconstrained case,
the empirical performance of stochastic approximation type methods is very sensitive to the choice of
a predetermined step size. Fu and Healy (1992), L’Ecuyer (1991), Glasserman and Tayur (1995), and
Gürkan (2000) contain a number of examples which demonstrate this sensitivity.
These difficulties are partly reflected in the available numerical results of simulation-based optimiza-
tion literature for finding optimal hedging points: none of the papers we are aware of (for single-part
single-stage models) present numerical experiments with systems having more than two decision vari-
ables and they are all solving unconstrained problems. Furthermore, very often, comprehension of how
the gradient estimates are derived is quite challenging fora non-specialist in gradient estimation literature
since the arguments leading to a particular estimator are often done case by case. For example, Brémaud
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et al. (1997) is one of the papers developing a rigorous infinitesimal perturbation analysis (IPA) algo-
rithm for a system whose transition times are not necessarily Markovian and the IPA analysis of the two
hedging point case is done in a separate section than the IPA estimate for a single hedging point. Zhao
and Melamed (2006, 2007) also deal with a general Make-to-Stock system (not necessarily Markovian)
with random demand and production rates and IPA derivativesar computed for the time averaged in-
ventory level and the time-averaged backorder level with respect to the base-stock level recursively via a
sample-path analysis. However, derivation of their IPA derivatives is not straightforward for some initial
conditions, which is also mentioned in Melamed et al. (2010)as a drawback and there are no numerical
experiments reported in these papers.
Application of IPA derivatives in stochastic fluid models isan active area of research. It is of inter-
est to develop computationally robust IPA formulas which are flexible (i.e., free of number of control
parameters and initial conditions of the system) and directly computable from a sample path (see Wardi
et al. (2010), Melamed et al. (2010) for recent work), which we attain with our approach as described
below. Moreover, we also provide numerical experiments forvarious number of system control parame-
ters and with service-level type probabilistic constraints, indicating the flexibility and practicality of our
methodology.
To overcome the difficulties encountered in the literature,in this chapter we propose using a different
simulation-based method, namely sample-path optimization, c upled with a generalized semi-Markov
process (GSMP) representation for the system. As we will expain below, this has two consequences. On
the optimization side, we are able to solve much larger (withseveral machine and demand states) and
general (not necessarily exponential disturbances) problems even with probabilistic constraints. On the
modeling and gradient estimation side, we derive a rigorous, intuitive, and transparent algorithm for a
general system that can compute the function and gradient values of the objective function and service
level type probabilistic constraints at any parameter setting in a single simulation run.
Next, we describe the basic ideas behind sample-path optimization. Roughly speaking, we are con-
cerned with solving a problem of optimization involving a limit function f∞ that we cannot observe.
However, we can use simulation to observe functionsfn that converge pointwise tof∞ asn→ ∞ almost
surely. In the kind of applications typically encountered,f∞ could be a steady-state performance measure
of a dynamic system or an expected value in a static system. Insystems that evolve over time, we can
simulate the operation of the system for, say,n time units and then compute an appropriate performance
measure. In static systems, we can repeatedly sample instance of the system and compute an average.
To be more precise, many problems in simulation-based optimization can be modelled by a real (or
vector)-valued stochastic process{ fn(ω ,x) | n= 1,2, . . .}. For eachn≥ 1 and eachx∈ Rk, fn(ω ,x) are
random variables defined on a common probability space(Ω,F ,P). It is helpful to keep in mind thatx
represents the decision variable,ω represents the sample path (which is indeed a list of random nu bers
that give rise to a particular discrete-event simulation ru), andn represents the simulation length.
We assume the existence of a limit functionf∞(ω ,x) such that for everyx, fn(ω ,x) → f∞(ω ,x) as
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n → ∞ at almost everyω ∈ Ω. We are interested in finding a minimizer off∞ and in general we can
only observefn for finite n. Therefore we will approximate minimizers off∞ using such information
about fn. The method is simple: fix anω ∈ Ω (by the method of common random numbers) and a
largen (to get a good estimate of the limit function), compute a minizer x∗n(ω) of fn(ω , ·), and take
x∗n(ω) as an approximate minimizer off∞(ω , ·). Note that minimizers of∞(ω ,x) may generally depend
on the sample pathω . However, in many practical problems for which one would anticipate using
this technique,f∞ is a deterministic function, for example a steady-state performance function or an
expectation, i.e., it is independent ofω .
The basic case of sample-path optimization, which concernsthe olution of simulation optimization
problems with deterministic constraints, appeared in Plambeck et al. (1993) and Plambeck et al. (1996)
and was analyzed in Robinson (1996). Robinson (1996) gave a number of sufficient conditions (on
{ fn(ω ,x)}) that guarantee that if we taken large enough, each approximate minimizerx∗n(ω) will be
close to a true minimizer of the limit function. Plambeck et al. (1993) and Plambeck et al. (1996) reported
extensive numerical experiments on large scale systems (project management involving PERT networks
with up to 110 stochastic arcs and cycle time optimization inunreliable tandem production lines with
up to 50 machines). In turn, Gürkan (2000) focused on optimization of buffer allocations in unreliable
tandem production lines and reported results also for systems with up to 50 machines. Both Plambeck
et al. (1996) and Gürkan (2000) used IPA for gradient estimation.
In the static case, a closely related technique centered around likelihood-ratio methods appeared in
Rubinstein and Shapiro (1993) under the name of stochastic counterpart methods. The basic approach
(and its variants) is also known as sample average approximation method in the stochastic programming
literature; see for example Shapiro and Homem-De-Mello (1998) and Linderoth et al. (2006) in the static
context of stochastic programming.
In Gürkan et al. (1996) and Gürkan et al. (1999a), the basicidea of using sample-path information
was extended to solving stochastic variational inequalities and equilibrium problems. This work was used
further in Gürkan et al. (1999b) for establishing almost-sure convergence of sample-path methods when
dealing with general stochastic optimization problems with stochastic constraints. Furthermore, Birbil
et al. (2006) deals with the theoretical analysis and application of sample-path methods to the so-called
stochastic mathematical programs with equilibrium constrain s.
In this chapter, we do not deal with theoretical issues related to convergence analysis; instead we
solely focus on the operational issues that need to be addressed in solving the hedging point problem
in practice. In general, doing a rigorous convergence analysis would require one to have additional
insight on path-wise functional properties of the performance measures involved. This can be achieved if
one is willing to make additional assumptions, say focus on certain distribution functions, as illustrated
in Gürkan (2000). There, certain path-wise functional properties of sample throughput (as function of
buffer capacities) are used to verify the sufficient conditions established in Robinson (1996) and almost
sure convergence of sample-path optimization is proven. Here, we would like to work in full generality
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and we only verify the convergence of our procedure through numerical experiments.
There are two key points that make sample-path type methods attractive in practice:(i) once we fix a
sample pointω andn, fn(ω ,x) becomes a deterministic function ofx; (ii) IPA — when it is applicable
— is able to compute xactgradients offn(ω ,x). With these observations, very powerful methods of
constrained and unconstrained deterministic optimization become available for use on thefn(ω , ·). In the
smooth case we can apply superlinearly convergent methods like the BFGS algorithm (or a variant for
constrained problems) to minimizefn to high accuracy in relatively few function and gradient evaluations.
For more information on these algorithms see Fletcher (1987) and Gill et al. (1981), and for the software
available see Moré and Wright (1993). Using superlinearlyconvergent methods enables us to be confident
about the location and the accuracy of the minimizer offn, because we can differentiate between the
errors due to the approximation off∞ by fn and those due to the inaccurate computation of a minimizer
of fn. With slower algorithms like stochastic approximation, this is difficult if not impossible.
It is well-known that in many cases in which one uses a discrete event simulation, the exact partial
derivatives (or directional derivatives) offn(ω ,x) with respect tox can be obtained by using IPA in a
single simulation run; see Glassermann (1991) and Ho and Cao(1991). To this end, we propose develop-
ing a GSMP representation of the system and utilizing that representation to derive recursive expressions
for the exact derivatives. A GSMP can simply be thought as a mathematical framework which models
the evolution of a discrete-event simulation. As it can be sen in Section 5.4, the GSMP framework
enables us to develop an intuitive and transparent algorithm for a general system with multiple machine
and demand states and with state transitions that are governed by general continuous distributions.
Finally, we would like to point out that our general approach, with appropriate modifications, could
be applicable to several other challenging problems encountered in practice, especially considering the
trends in using stochastic fluid models for decision making uder uncertainty; see Liu and Gong (2002),
Sun et al. (2004), and Cassandras (2007) for possible applictions in finance, telecommunications, and
engineering.
5.3 Problem Description
Consider a manufacturing system that produces a single product. The maximum production capacity
of the system can take one ofK possible values,r i (i = 1,2, . . . ,K) according to a stationary process.
We denote byα(t)(α(t) = 1,2, . . . ,K) the state of the machine at timet and rα(t) the corresponding
maximum production capacity in that state. The time spent instatei is a continuous random variable
with a general distributionFi. After statei, the next machine statek, is determined according to a matrix
{Pik} with ∑Kk=1 Pik = 1.
The system has to cope with a random demand. Similar to machine states, we denote byβ (t)(β (t) =
1,2, . . . ,M) the state of demand at timet and dβ(t) the corresponding demand rate in that state. The
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time spent in demand statej also has a general distributionG j and after statej, the next demand state
k is determined according to a matrix{Q jk} with ∑Mk=1 Q jk = 1. Note that although in many interesting
problems occurring in practicePii = Q j j = 0 would hold, we don’t necessarily require it in our model.
Let X(t) denote the inventory level at timet. Note thatX(t) can take negative values corresponding
to backorders in the system. To this end, it is useful to distinguish the positive and negative parts of
the inventory process. We define byX+(t) = X(t)I{X(t)≥0} the production surplus of the system and by
X−(t) = −X(t)I{X(t)<0} the backorder level (whereIA is the indicator function corresponding to setA).
The instantaneous cost function is then given as:c+X+(t)+c−X−(t) wherec+ andc− are, respectively
the holding and backorder costs per item per unit time.
We can classify the combined states of the system as(i, j) (i = 1,2, . . . ,K, j = 1,2, . . . ,M) considering
the maximum production rates and demand rates simultaneously. A state (i, j) is called deficient if
r i < d j . In such a stateX(t) has to be decreasing regardless of the production control selected. Similarly,
state(i, j) is called non-deficient ifr i ≥ d j ; in this caseX(t) can be increasing, decreasing, or constant
depending on the actual production control. Actually, ifr i = d j , X(t) can be either decreasing or constant
and such a state is called a zero state.
Let v(t) (rα(t) ≥ v(t) ≥ 0) denote the actual production rate at timet. The objective of the manufac-








is minimized. We study the above problem with the restriction thatv(t) is in the class of hedging point
policies. A hedging point policy drives the system to the hedging point of the current system state at the
fastest rate possible and then keeps it at the hedging point by adjusting the production rate until a system
state change occurs. Accordingly, for each non-deficient system state(i, j), there is a hedging pointzi j .





r i if X(t)< zi j
d j if X(t) = zi j
0 if X(t)> zi j
(5.2)
and in convention with the existing literature (see Liberopoulos and Hu (1995) for example) we as-
sume that the production rate in deficient states is set to themaximum rate (i.e.,v(t) = r i) regardless of
the inventory position. Naturally, other production rulescan also be easily formulated within the same
framework. The control problem under the restriction to this particular class of policies is to select the
optimal values of the hedging pointszi j in order to minimize (5.1).
An important issue is the stability of such a system under which there exists a stationary solution. Let
πi (i = 1,2, . . . ,K) denote the stationary probability of being in machine state i andq j ( j = 1,2, . . . ,M)
denote the stationary probability distribution of being indemand statej. Then a sufficient condition for
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q jd j . (5.3)
Brémaud et al. (1997) show that if condition (5.3) is not satisfied, then there exists no stationary solution
and any transient solution goes to−∞ as time goes to∞ (limt→∞ X(t) =−∞). We provide a proof of this
in Appendix 5.A. Hereon, we will restrict our attention to systems satisfying condition (5.3).
In addition, we assume that the processX(t) does not “hit and run” any of the hedging points. That is,
there exist anε > 0 such that ift ′ is a time thatX(t ′) becomeszi j , then we should haveX(t
′
+ε) = zi j for
eachi and j. Following the terminology of Brémaud et al. (1997), we will call this assumption “hit and
stick”. “Hit and stick” is almost always satisfied. In practice, it means that two events (end of holding
time in a state and reaching to a hedging level) do not happen at the same instant, which is satisfied almost
surely, since the probability of a continuous variable being equal to a specific value is always 0. Roughly
speaking, excluding the possibility of the simultaneous occurrence of exogenous (end of holding time in
a state) and endogenous (reaching to a hedging level) eventsh lp to ensure the differentiability of the
performance measure. Otherwise, one can still develop expressions for one-sided directional derivatives,
but they may not be equal, as also noted by Brémaud et al. (1997) for a two hedging point system.
5.4 The GSMP and Gradient Estimation
As mentioned earlier, to carry out the subsequent simulation and infinitesimal perturbation analysis, we
will utilize a generalized semi-Markov process (GMSP) representation of the system. Glynn (1989)
provides a brief introduction and an excellent descriptionof this framework can be found in Shedler
(1993).
The basic idea of a GSMP can be explained as follows: There is aset of states and a set of events.
The GSMP jumps from one state to another upon the occurrence of an event; at each state there are some
active events. At any time, each active event is associated with a clock representing the residual lifetime
of that event and a speed at which the clock runs down. If the clock corresponding to evente in states
equalsk and the speed at which this clock runs isr, thene is scheduled to occur afterk/r units of time.
The next event and the time until it occurs are always determined by the smallest clock reading/clock
speed ratio. More formally, letk(e, t) be the reading of the clock for evente at timet andr(e, t) be the
speed at which that clock runs down.E(t) is the current set of active events, i.e., the set of events with
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Upon the occurrence of an event, changes may occur in the physical state, clock settings, and clock
speeds: If evente occurs in states, the process may move to a new states′ with a certain probability
p(s′;s,e); the set of active events changes with the state; clocks for any old events which remain active
continue to run in the new state; new clocks are initialized for all new active events and for the event
which just occurred if it is also active in the new state. The initial value of each new clock for evente in
states is a random variable with a pre-specified cumulative distribu ion functionF(·;s,e). This goes on
until a termination criteria is reached.
To develop a GSMP representation for our system, let the current system states beα(t) = i and
β (t) = j and then define the following five possible events:
MF : the end of a sojourn time at current machine statei,
U H : reaching the hedging pointzi j of current system state(i, j) from below,
DH : reaching the hedging pointzi j of current system state(i, j) from above,
DG : the end of a sojourn time at current demand statej,
T f : the simulation termination.
We let u(t) = v(t)− dβ(t) to denote the fill-in rate, the total rate of change in the inventory level
process, at timet. Also let WM(t) denote the remaining time until the current machine state changes
andWD(t) denote the remaining time until the current demand state changes. If we letT to denote the
prespecified amount of time that the system will be simulated, we can then define the clock readings and
machine speeds as in Table 5.1.
e MF U H DH DG T f
k(e, t) WM(t) zi j −X(t) X(t)−zi j WD(t) T − t
r(e, t) 1 u(t) −u(t) 1 1
Table 5.1: The clock readings and associated speeds
Next, utilizing this GSMP representation, we derive a recursive formula to computexactderivatives
of long-run average cost per unit time with respect to hedging points, in a single simulation run. As
mentioned earlier, we use IPA to compute derivatives of long-run average cost per unit time. Letf :
RKM → R be a function which has a gradient at a pointz= (z1, . . . ,zKM), then IPA computes an array





f (z+∆zyi j )− f (z)
∆z
,
whereyi j (i = 1, . . . ,K, j = 1, . . . ,M) is the(i, j)th unit vector inRKM. In the following we use∂ ( ·)/∂zi j
to denote the(i, j)th partial derivative of( ·) at the pointz. Furthermore, we abuse notation and use
z+∆zi j andz+∆zyi j interchangeably; that is∆zi j = ∆zyi j .
Whenz= (zi j ) is the vector of hedging points, asT gets large, the long-run average cost per unit time
could be defined asJT(z) =C(T)/T, whereC(T) is the cumulative cost incurred by the system over time
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Note thatC(T) depends on the production ratev(t) and the inventory levelX(t) which which are
adjusted in each state depending on the hedging levelz. Let t0, t1, . . . be the event occurrence times in a
sample path andτn = tn−tn−1 be the time between the(n−1)st andnth events. Without loss of generality
we assumet0 = 0. If thenth event is the event that the system has been workingT time units, i.e.,tn = T




















From (5.5) we see thatJT(z) has derivatives if and only ifC(tn) has them. Next we show thatC(tn) has
the desired property and derive a recursive expression for∂C(tn)/∂zi j , which is a quantity computable
from the simulation information generated up timetn.














Recall thatv(tn) is the actual production rate andu(tn) is the fill-in rate attn; that is, if the controller
is in state(i, j) at tn, thenu(tn) = v(tn)−d j . (5.7) below gives a recursive expression forC(tn+1).



































Here is the main theorem.
Theorem 5.4.1.For n ≥ 0, C(tn+1) has partial derivatives at z for all z and i= 1, . . . ,K, j = 1, . . . ,M,






















































The proof of Theorem 5.4.1 is by induction. In practice, to compute∂C(tn+1)/∂zi j we need to be
able to compute∂X(tn+1)/∂zi j (done in Lemma 5.4.4 below),∂τn+1/∂zi j (done in Lemmas 5.4.2, 5.4.6,
5.4.5, 5.4.7 below), and∂u(tn)/∂zi j (done in Lemma 5.4.3 below) recursively, using informationthat is
available up totn+1. Before proceeding with the proof of the theorem, we first mention the concept of
“similarity” (which we address in detail in Appendix 5.B) and state a few technical lemmas. The proofs
of all lemmas of this section are in Appendix 5.C.
“Similarity” of the nominal path and the perturbed path (which are made precise in Appendix 5.B) is
a standard issue one needs to deal with when developing IPA algorithms. In Appendix 5.B, we show that
along any sample path of finite length, sayk events, with min{τn|n = 1,2, . . . ,k} > 0, there is always
a ∆zi j > 0 (or ∆zi j < 0 whose size depends on the sample path) small enough such that increasing (or
decreasing, respectively)z by ∆zi j does not cause any event order change; that is, the perturbedpath and
the nominal path remain similar.
Lemma 5.4.2. For all n = 0,1, . . ., r(en+1, tn) has partial derivatives at z for all z and i= 1, . . . ,K, j =
1, . . . ,M, which are0.
Proof. See Appendix 5.C.
Lemma 5.4.3.For all n= 0,1, . . ., u(tn) has partial derivatives at z for all z and i= 1, . . . ,K, j = 1, . . . ,M,
which are0.
Proof. See Appendix 5.C.
Lemma 5.4.4. Suppose that X(tn−1) and τn have partial derivatives at z for all z and i= 1, . . . ,K, j =
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Proof. See Appendix 5.C.
Lemma 5.4.5. Suppose that WM(tn−1), WD(tn−1), and τn have partial derivatives at z for all z and




















Proof. See Appendix 5.C.
Lemma 5.4.6. Suppose that X(tn), WM(tn), WD(tn), and tn have partial derivatives at z for all z and i=









∂zi j if en+1 = MF ,
I{i=α(tn), j=β(tn)}−
∂X(tn)
∂zi j if en+1 = U H ,
∂X(tn)
∂zi j − I{i=α(tn), j=β(tn)} if en+1 = DH ,
∂WD(tn)
∂zi j if en+1 = DG ,
− ∂ tn∂zi j if en+1 = T f .
(5.9)
Proof. See Appendix 5.C.
Lemma 5.4.7. Suppose that tn has partial derivatives at z for all z and i= 1, . . . ,K, j = 1, . . . ,M. Then




















Proof. See Appendix 5.C.
The next lemma will start the induction.
Lemma 5.4.8. t1,τ1,X(t0),WM(t0),WD(t0), and C(t0) have partial derivatives at z for all z and i=




























u(t) I{i=α(t0), j=β(t0)} if e1 = U H ,
1
u(t) I{i=α(t0), j=β(t0)} if e1 = DH ,
0 otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix 5.C.
Now we are ready to prove the main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5.4.1. First, observe that because of Remark 5.B.4 (in Appendix 5.B), we
can treatI{X(tn(z))≥0}, I{X(tn+1(z))≥0}, I{X(tn(z))<0}, and I{X(tn+1(z))<0} as constants while using the chain
rule of differentiation. Next, Lemma 5.4.8 provides the start of inductive argument. Suppose that
tn,τn,X(tn−1),WM(tn−1),WD(tn−1), andC(tn−1) have partial derivatives atz for all zandi = 1, . . . ,K, j =
1, . . . ,M. Apply Lemma 5.4.5 to get the recursions forWM(tn) andWD(tn); Lemma 5.4.4 forX(tn);
and Lemma 5.4.7 fortn+1 andτn+1. Lemmas 5.4.2 and 5.4.6 provide the necessary information ab ut
∂k(en+1, tn)/∂zi j and∂ r(en+1, tn)/∂zi j .
In Appendix 5.D, we provide a pseudo code for our simulation and n IPA algorithm that we devel-
oped utilizing our GSMP representation and the recursions developed in this chapter. The steps (needed
for the IPA algorithm) added to the basic simulation algorithm are marked as “IPA”.
Note that the GSMP framework together with the recursive manner of computing partial derivatives
allows one to use IPA also for the computation of second-order partial derivatives. However, we have
not pursued this here, since most of the state-of-art deterministic nonlinear optimization codes (includ-
ing E04UCC we use in our numerical experiments reported in Section 5.5) are capable of using just the
derivative information for maintaining and utilizing efficiently dynamic BFGS quasi-Newton approxima-
tions for the Hessian.
It is also worth noting that an important issue in gradient estimation literature has been the devel-
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opment of estimators with good asymptotic behavior. The convergence theorems and convergence rate
results for stochastic approximation type methods are concerned with the unbiasedness of the gradient
estimator, for example see Kushner and Clark (1978); whereas convergence theorems for sample-path
optimization may not have these requirements in general, for example see Robinson (1996). When using
sample-path optimization the main requirement from the practic l point of view is anexactgradient or
a directional derivative (whichever is available) of the sample function to be optimized so that an effi-
cient deterministic optimizer is able to utilize this sensitivity information. In this sense, the sample-path
performance functions (for finite time) of the buffer optimization problem addressed in Gürkan (2000)
constitute an interesting example. They were discontinuous functions and their exact derivatives were
most likely biased. However, under the assumption that the steady-state throughput is a continuous func-
tion of buffer capacities, Gürkan (2000) proves the almostsure convergence of sample-path optimization.
Furthermore, the deterministic optimizer was able to utilize theexactdirectional derivatives of the dis-
continuous sample functions efficiently and find the optimalbuffer allocations in systems with up to 50
unreliable machines.
Proving the unbiasedness of the estimator we derived here israther standard and we tackle that next.
Lemma 5.4.9. For any z and i= 1, . . . ,K, j = 1, . . . ,M, |JT (ω ,z+∆zi j )−JT(ω ,z)∆zi j | ≤ (c
++ c−), for any∆zi j
small enough so that the event order list does not change, where ω is the sequence of random numbers
which give rise to a particular simulation run.
Proof. See Appendix 5.C.
Theorem 5.4.10.IPA provides an unbiased gradient estimator; that is, we have E[∂JT(ω ,z)∂zi j ] =
∂E[JT (ω ,z)]
∂zi j .
Proof: From Lemma 5.4.9, we have|JT (ω ,z+∆zi j )−JT (ω ,z)∆zi j | ≤ (c





JT(ω ,z+∆zi j )−JT(ω ,z)
∆zi j
exists at anyzwith probability 1.
We chooseg(ω) := (c++c−) as the dominating function and use Lebesgue’s dominated convergence
theorem to obtain























In this section, we report some of our numerical experimentsused for testing the empirical performance of
the ongoing methodology. First, we compared the analyticalresults of some production control problems
found in the literature with our results. Then, we solved fivedifferent examples with dimensions up to ten
machine and four demand states. In Example 5.5.1, we also compared sample-path optimization (SPO)
with a variant of stochastic approximation (SA), called single-run optimization (SRO) (see Meketon
(1987)), since the SRO variant of SA is reported to perform better than classical SA for some problems
in the literature; see for example Leung (1990). In all numerical experiments, we used the exponential
distribution for state transition times. Essentially any continuous distribution whose support is on(0,∞)
can be used; the choice of the exponential distribution is mainly made for comparison and convenience.
In order to simulate a general model withK machine andM demand states, we use our pseudo code
written in C which calculates the gradients and the value of the objective function and constraints in a
single simulation run. We convey these values to the optimizer which determines an “optimal” point.
The illustration of the method is given in Figure 2.2 (b) of Chapter 2 (x corresponds to the hedging points
z in this chapter). We formulate the approximating problem asan NLP problem in the optimizer and the
average cost function in the objective is defined as an external nonlinear function. We use an iterative
procedure in which NLP solver calls the simulation model (GSMP) at any decision point that it would
like to evaluate its optimality. The GSMP model enables us toobtain the value and the (directional)
derivatives of the approximating average cost function at asingle simulation run at each iteration. The
iterations continue until the optimality conditions of theNLP problem at a decision pointz∗ are satisfied,
which is taken as the optimal threshold levels of the system.In Section 5.5.3, we also include stochastic
constraints in the NLP problem and use sample-path method ina similar way to solve the approximating
problem. In the modified stochastic problem, we constrain the long run proportion of time that the system
is in backlog state below a pre-specified level.
As the optimizer, we use the deterministic nonlinear optimization code E04UCC of NAG C library,
Mark 7, NAG (2002). E04UCC is designed to minimize an arbitrary smooth function subject to con-
straints, which may include simple bounds on the variables,linear constraints, and smooth nonlinear
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constraints. Essentially, it is a sequential quadratic programming method incorporating an augmented
Lagrangian merit function and a BFGS quasi-Newton approximation to the Hessian of the Lagrangian.
The code iteratively determines the total number of simulation runsN required to find an approximate
minimizer; this is controlled by the “Optimality Tolerance(OptTol)”. The parameterOptTol specifies
the accuracy to which the user wishes the final iterate to approximate a solution of the problem. Broadly
speaking,OptTol indicates the number of correct figures desired in the objective function at the solution.
For example, ifOptTol is 10−6, the final value of the objective function would have approximately six
correct figures. When there are only linear constraints, E04UCC considers a point “optimal” if the current
step length, the norm of the search direction, and the norm ofthe projected gradient become sufficiently
small. In the presence of nonlinear constraints, to be considered “optimal”, the point should also satisfy
an additional stopping criteria; namely, the violation of all active constraints should also become suffi-
ciently small, see NAG (2002) for additional details. It is worth noting that in the absence of convexity of
the functions involved, a nonlinear optimization program like E04UCC (rather than a specialized global
optimization code) can only guarantee to find a local optimumwhich may or may not be a global opti-
mum. The convexity of the cost function is proven by Akella and Kumar (1986) for a two machine state
(up and down) system in the Markovian case. In systems with multiple hedging points, counterexamples
show that convexity does not hold in general as we also observe in our numerical experiments.
As mentioned earlier, to verify the correctness and accuracy of our numerical procedures, we first
compared our results with other results we could find in the literature. These include analytical results
reported in Bielecki and Kumar (1988) and Gershwin (1994), and nalytical/numerical results reported in
Haurie et al. (1994) (their single-part model), Yan et al. (1994) (their single-stage model), and Liberopou-
los and Caramanis (1994) (their single-part model). Aside from the system of Liberopoulos and Cara-
manis (1994) which had two hedging points, all the others were systems with a single hedging point.
In all cases, we observed that our results converged to the corr ct optimal solutions with relatively little
computational effort.
Additional test cases are provided by Liberopoulos and Hu (1995). They analytically established the
relative ordering of optimal hedging points of more than twomachine states in four specific Markov chain
systems. In our experiments, we used their Systems 1, 2, and 3with different numbers of machine states
and parameter values. Optimal hedging points that we found had always the same ordering properties
established by Liberopoulos and Hu (1995).
All the runs reported here are performed by a Dell PC with Dual-Intel Xeon, 2.66 GHz processors,
and 2GB 266 MHz DDR Non-ECC SDRAM Memory using Windows 2000.
5.5.1 Optimization of Unconstrained Production Control Problems
In this part, we report the results of three numerical experim nts. An additional test for the quality of
the solutions we compute in these experiments is provided through a well-known result: the probability
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that the system is in backlog state (P(X(t)< 0)) at an optimal solution should be equal to the proportion
c+/(c++c−) (see Brémaud et al. (1997)). In our computations, we approximate the probability that the
system is in backlog state by computing the long run proportion of time that the system is in backlog
state which we denote byPblog(z).
Example 5.5.1.The first experiment is with four machine states and a constant demand rate. Table 5.2
contains the data of this problem and the corresponding transi io matrix of the four machine states is in
Figure 5.1. Note thatPblog(z∗∞) should be equal to 0. 90910 at the optimal hedging pointz
∗
∞.
In this example, we have two non-deficient machine states, namely 3 and 4. We usedT = 500,000
simulation time per simulation call which corresponded to ar und 5,000,000 machine events in order
to get a good estimate of the limit function. We setOptTol to 10−6 and solved the problem from
five different initial pointsA,B,C,D, andE; we observed convergence to the same final pointz∗T with
Pblog(z∗T) = 0.090910. As we do not know the analytical solution, we found the “optimal” solutionz
∗
∞
and the function valuesJ∞(z) by using SPO with a very large computational effort; using a simulation
time of 5,000,000 per simulation call which corresponded to around 50,000,000 machine events. We
observed thatz∗∞ and z
∗




T) = 0.090910, which confirms their
optimality. The results are summarized in Table 5.3. Recallth t N is the number of simulation runs
determined by E04UCC to find an approximate minimizer.
Machine states 1 2 3 4
Maximum production rate 0 4 80 40
d c+ c− c+/(c++c−)
9.533 1 10 0.090910
Table 5.2: Specifications of 4-machine state system with constant demand rate for Example 5.5.1


−4 4 0 0
0 −8 0 8
14 0 −15 1
0 1 9 −10


Figure 5.1: Transition rate matrix of machine states for Example 5.5.1
As mentioned earlier, for comparison, we also solved this example by using an SRO algorithm of the
form: zn+1 = ΠΦ(zn− a0n gn), wherezn is the hedging point vector at thenth iteration,gn is the gradient
estimate atzn, a0 is the predetermined step size constant, andΠΦ(·) is the projection onto the feasible set
Φ determined by the simple bound constraints. It is well-knowthat it is possible for an SRO algorithm to
diverge if one does not impose explicit bounds on the variables to ensure the boundedness of the iterates.
We used a lower bound with each element equal to zero and an upper bound with each element equal to
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1000.
We tried to observe the behavior of SRO iterates under the samco putational budget used by SPO.
In our implementation of the SRO, for each initial point, we usedT = 100,000 simulation time per
simulation call which corresponded to around 1,000,000 machine events and we made 5N iterations
(i.e., simulation runs), each run corresponding to one iteration of the algorithm. We chose to have a
runlength of approximately 1,000,000 machine events per iteration since Liberopoulos and Caram nis
(1994) used this value in their numerical experiments with the stochastic approximation method. Since
the simulation timeT used in each iteration of the SRO is one fifth of the simulationimeT used in each
iteration of SPO, we made 5N iterations for SRO so that we could compare both methods under the same
computational budget. Table 5.4 contains the results of theSRO algorithm with differenta0 values; the






As mentioned earlier, it is well-known that one of the main drawbacks of SA-type algorithms (includ-
ing the SRO variant) is the sensitivity of their empirical performance to the choice ofa0; documented,
for example, in Fu and Healy (1992), L’Ecuyer et al. (1994), Glasserman and Tayur (1995), and Gürkan
(2000). Our own experiments also confirmed this sensitivityissue even in this small example and we
spent considerable effort to find reasonable values ofa0 which also depend on the initial point. For
example, as seen in Table 5.4, from initial pointsA, B, C, andD, the iterates converge to the optimal
solution witha0 equal to 20; whereas from initial pointE, among the ones we tried, the only good value
of a0 is 1.8.
Experimenting with severala0s was feasible in this example since this was a small problem (with
a relative short run time, no constraints, and two decision variables) and we knew where the “optimal”
solution was. Since SRO is a first-order gradient method, onewould expect to experience the same
difficulties more severely in larger examples. Therefore wedecided not to compare SRO with SPO in
larger unconstrained examples of Section 5.5.1. For the constrai ed examples of Section 5.5.3, since we
are not aware of any literature addressing how an SA-type method can handle those, we did not perform
comparisons there either.
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Machine states 3 4 JT(z) Pblog(z) J∞(z)
Initial point A 5.00 5.00 8.398 0.176439 8.376
Initial point B 20.00 20.00 17.360 0.001518 17.359
Initial point C 5.00 20.00 11.177 0.063795 11.163
Initial point D 20.00 5.00 12.764 0.021478 12.742
Initial point E 1.00 2.00 18.794 0.576287 18.769
Final point(z∗T ) 7.44 5.27 7.382 0.090910 7.357
“Optimum” point(z∗∞) 7.45 5.25 7.382 0.090910 7.357






































Final point (z3, z4)
J∞(z) Number of
Initial “relative error” iterations
Point a0 = 1.5 a0 = 1.8 a0 = 2 a0 = 10 a0 = 15 a0 = 20 a0 = 30 a0 = 40 (5N)
(7.13, 5.43) (7.23, 5.50) (7.28, 5.53) (7.45, 5.59) (7.46, 5.35) (7.45, 5.27) (7.45, 5.23) (7.45, 5.23)
A 7.371 7.366 7.365 7.363 7.358 7.357 7.357 7.357 70
0.0019 0.0012 0.0011 0.0008 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(15.91, 17.08) (15.19, 16.44) (14.72, 16.01) (7.45, 6.55) (7.45, 5.28) (7.45, 5.23) (7.45, 5.23) (6.53, 10.37)
B 17.786 13.143 12.724 7.432 7.357 7.357 7.357 8.054 70
1.4176 0.7865 0.7295 0.0102 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0947
(5.30, 17.64) (5.36, 17.17) (5.40, 16.86) (7.20, 7.78) (7.46, 5.64) (7.46, 5.26) (7.46, 5.24) (7.47, 5.24)
C 10.343 10.181 10.075 7.565 7.365 7.357 7.357 7.357 55
0.4059 0.3838 0.3694 0.0283 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(16.12, 4.12) (15.41, 4.02) (14.95, 3.97) (7.48, 5.15) (7.45, 5.23) (7.46, 5.24) (7.33, 7.62) (3.43, 42.22)
D 10.445 10.074 9.843 7.358 7.357 7.357 7.545 18.713 55
0.4197 0.3693 0.3379 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0255 1.54363
(7.17, 4.92) (7.44, 5.21) (7.59, 5.36) (13.46, 7.42) (17.25, 10.21) (20.78, 14.12) (27.32, 23.25) (32.57, 33.84)
E 7.372 7.357 7.360 9.618 12.484 15.953 23.422 30.326 65
0.0020 0.0000 0.0004 0.3073 0.6969 1.1684 2.1836 3.1221
Table 5.4: Solutions generated by SRO with differenta0 values
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Example 5.5.2.We modify the system in Example 5.5.1 by adding four demand state with a transition
rate matrix as in Figure 5.2. The corresponding demand ratesare given in Table 5.5. Note that unit
holding and backorder costs are the same, thusPblog(z∗∞) should still be equal to 0. 90910 at the optimal
hedging pointz∗∞.
In this example, we have eight non-deficient states and it canbe seen that the system copes with a ran-
dom demand which has an average value equal to the constant deman of Example 5.5.1; that is 9.533.
We usedT = 1,000,000 simulation time per simulation call which correspondedto around 12,000,000
events in order to get a good estimate of the limit function. We again setOptTol to 10−6, solved the prob-
lem from different initial points, and observe convergenceto the same point withPblog(z∗T) = 0.090910,
which confirms its optimality. Table 5.6 displays the systemcost and the probability that the system is in
backlog state at both the initial points and the optimal point.
If we compare the hedging point levels in Examples 5.5.1 and 5.5.2, there are significant differences.
For instance, in Example 5.5.1, the optimal hedging level for machine state 4 is 5.25 whereas, in Example
5.5.2, it differs between 3.96 and 22.15 depending on the demand state. A similar result is also observed
for machine state 3. The differences between the optimal hedging levels in Examples 5.5.1 and 5.5.2
clearly illustrate that we cannot ignore the stochastic behavior of demand; that is, the variability of
demand has an important effect on optimal hedging points. Therefore considering only the average
demand without paying attention to the variability of demand leads to incorrect decisions.


−2 2 0 0
7.5 −8 0.5 0
0 0.3 −3 2.7
0 0 5 −5


Figure 5.2: Transition rate matrix of demand states for Example 5.5.2
Demand states 1 2 3 4
Rate 5 8 15 20
Table 5.5: Demand rates for Example 5.5.2
Example 5.5.3.The third experiment is on a system with ten machine and four demand states. Table 5.7
contains the data of the problem and the transition rate matrix of machine and demand states are shown
in Figure 5.3. This system has twenty two non-deficient state. We usedT = 3,000,000 simulation time
per simulation call which corresponded to around 25,000,000 events.
Here, different from Examples 5.5.1 and 5.5.2, when we started f om different initial points, we ob-
served finding different “optimal” solutions. To make sure that these differences were not caused by
insufficient accuracy, we increasedOptTol to 10−7, but still observed the same behaviour as reported
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Machine states 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
Demand states 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 JT(z) Pblog(z)
Initial point A 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 28.766 0.261616
Initial point B 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 24.390 0.036370
z∗T 6.72 9.67 24.16 24.78 3.96 7.90 21.23 22.15 17.030 0.090910
Initial point N Total CPU time
A 16 7min07sec
B 32 13min44sec
Table 5.6: Optimal solution and the run-time information for Example 5.5.2
in Table 5.8; different initial points are indicated as A, B,and C and different final solutions reached




C, respectively. In general, there could be two major sourcesfor the multi-
plicity of solutions. First, when an objective function is rather flat near an optimum point (as observed
in this example and discussed in Section 5.5.2.5), there maybe several points that can be declared as
“optimum” for all practical purposes; a situation termed as“multiple optima”. Clearly, all the relevant
performance measures would take equal (or very close) values t all of these optimum points. Second,
in the absence of (strict) convexity, a function can have several local optima, which may have similar or
different performances. We also discuss the nonconvex nature of this objective function in more detail in
Section 5.5.2.6. It is worth observing that all the different solution points in Table 5.8 have very similar
performance measures; that is, the system cost does not differ significantly and the probability that the
system is in backlog state is very close to 0.090910 for all the solution points suggesting multiple optima.
Furthermore, it can also be seen from Table 5.8 that some hedging points are close to each other and
form clusters. We also discuss this clustering effect in more detail in Section 5.5.2.7.
Machine states 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Maximum production rate 0.4 0 0.8 8 5 1.2 10 6 3 15
Demand states 1 2 3 4
Rate 1.3 1.8 3.2 4.0
c+ c− c+/(c++c−)
1 10 0.090910
Table 5.7: Specifications of 10-machine and 4-demand state sys m for Example 5.5.3
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

−12 0 0 4 4 4 0 0 0 0
0 −5 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0
0 0 −2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
7 0 0 −8 0 0 0 0 0 1
4 0 0 0 −4 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 6 0 0 0 0 −6 0 0 0
0 5 0 0 0 0 0 −5 0 0
0 0.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0.1





−2 2 0 0
7.9 −8 0.1 0
0 0.1 −5 4.9
0 0 10 −10


Figure 5.3: Transition rate diagrams of machine and demand states for Example 5.5.3
5.5.2 Observations and Conjectures From Numerical Experiments from Unconstrained
Systems
In these numerical experiments, we have undertaken many simulat on runs and observed some behav-
ior that we found interesting during these runs. Below, we repo t some of these as observations and
conjectures.
5.5.2.1 Effect of Load
As mentioned earlier, Liberopoulos and Hu (1995) study ordering properties of optimal hedging points
for some special systems. Among those, we used their Systems1 and 2 with two and three non-deficient
and one deficient states to test our simulation runs. After several runs with different parameter settings
(with two non-deficient and one deficient states of both System 1 and System 2), we observed that when
the load of the system is increased (by either increasing thedemand or decreasing the maximum produc-
tion rates), the proportion of the difference between optimal hedging points to the values of the optimal
hedging points themselves decreases. That is, the differenc between the optimal hedging points stays
constant but because of the increased load, the optimal hedging points increase and the difference be-
tween them become negligible compared to their values. Example 5.5.4 is an experiment with their
System 1 in which there are two hedging points and as the load,ρ , is increased they become close to
each other.
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Machine Demand Initial Initial Initial





4 1 5.00 10.00 20.00 19.97 18.30 18.42
4 2 5.00 10.00 20.00 21.68 21.74 22.47
4 3 5.00 10.00 20.00 34.88 29.74 29.72
4 4 5.00 10.00 20.00 29.47 30.03 28.46
5 1 5.00 10.00 20.00 20.10 21.52 21.11
5 2 5.00 10.00 20.00 20.98 22.30 21.95
5 3 5.00 10.00 20.00 29.55 28.89 28.63
5 4 5.00 10.00 20.00 28.82 31.25 33.81
7 1 5.00 10.00 20.00 7.54 7.29 7.33
7 2 5.00 10.00 20.00 9.04 9.00 9.07
7 3 5.00 10.00 20.00 27.65 22.87 21.65
7 4 5.00 10.00 20.00 23.11 21.48 21.38
8 1 5.00 10.00 20.00 7.40 7.35 7.41
8 2 5.00 10.00 20.00 9.49 9.44 10.29
8 3 5.00 10.00 20.00 19.96 21.23 20.45
8 4 5.00 10.00 20.00 23.59 21.42 20.34
9 1 5.00 10.00 20.00 8.31 8.30 8.36
9 2 5.00 10.00 20.00 10.99 12.22 11.45
10 1 5.00 10.00 20.00 13.91 13.70 13.91
10 2 5.00 10.00 20.00 16.03 14.69 13.97
10 3 5.00 10.00 20.00 28.44 28.30 28.17
10 4 5.00 10.00 20.00 27.44 28.42 26.50
JT(z) 28.634 25.116 25.687 22.087 22.085 22.087
Pblog(z) 0.193072 0.123462 0.057995 0.090841 0.090899 0.090921
Initial point N Total CPU time
A 105 2h 22 min 49 sec
B 58 1h 18 min 47 sec
C 55 1h 15 min 53 sec
Table 5.8: Optimal solution and the run-time information for Example 5.5.3
Example 5.5.4.System 1 of Liberopoulos and Hu (1995) consist of 3 machine stat . The transition rate
diagram of machine states are given in Figure 5.4 and the parameter settings of the system are given in
Table 5.9. The optimal hedging points of this system are:z∗1 = 11.5 andz
∗
2 = 8.40 when the demand rate
d is 5 and the corresponding loadρ is 0.44 . When we increase the load by increasing the demand, we
obtain the results summarized in Table 5.10. This leads to the following conjecture: As the load increases
to one, the difference between the optimal hedging points becom negligible compared to their values.
In other words, the optimal hedging points appear to get close t each other as the load of the system
increases.








Figure 5.4: Transition rate matrix of machine states in Example 5.5.4
Machine states 1 2 3
Maximum production rate 20 40 0
c+ c− c+/(c++c−)
0.1 1 0.090910
Table 5.9: System specifications of Example 5.5.4





5 0.44 11.50 8.40 3.10 0.27
6 0.52 17.57 14.30 3.27 0.19
7 0.61 26.92 23.37 3.55 0.13
8 0.70 41.96 38.24 3.72 0.09
9 0.79 69.13 66.05 3.08 0.04
10 0.87 136.15 132.05 4.10 0.03
Table 5.10: Effect of load in Example 5.5.4
5.5.2.2 Irrelevant Hedging Point
Simulation runs of System 2 of Liberopoulos and Hu (1995) with two non-deficient and one deficient
states show that when one of the non-deficient states, say State 1, has a very small long run average
maximum production rate compared to the demand rate (i.e.,r1 > d but r1π1 ≪ d), the hedging point of
State 1 becomes “irrelevant”; that is, the value it takes does not really matter. The optimal hedging point
of non-deficient State 2 determines the optimal hedging point of the system. A similar result is obtained
with systems having three non-deficient and one deficient states, wherer1π1 ≪ d, r2π2 + r3π3 > d,
r2π2 < d, andr3π3 < d hold but it is not the case thatr2π2 ≪ d or r3π3 ≪ d. In this case,z1 becomes
irrelevant andz2 andz3 determine the optimal hedging points of the system. This leads to the following
conjecture:
Assume that there is a non-deficient statei which has a very small average maximum production rate
compared to the demand rate in the long run, that is,r i > d but r iπi ≪ d, but this is not the case for
the other non-deficient states in the long run, that is,r jπ j ≪ d does not hold for∀ j, j 6= i. For such a
system, the optimal hedging point of statei is irrelevant and the optimal hedging points of the system are
determined by the optimal hedging points of statesj.
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5.5.2.3 Effect of Transition Diagram and Transition Probabilities
The more the machine states communicate with each other and the more the state transition probabilities
are close to uniform distribution, the more the optimal hedging points get close to each other. In the
simulation runs up to systems with 10-15 non-deficient state, w observed that when the machine states
form a closed set in which all states communicate with each other with a uniform transition distribution,
all of the optimal hedging points are very close to each other. As the transition probabilities between the
machine states become less uniform, the optimal hedging points move away from each other.
5.5.2.4 Effect of Demand and Production Variability
In the simulation runs of Example 5.5.3, we have observed that as the production and demand variability
increase, the optimal hedging points also increase to hold enough safety stock against the uncertainty in
production and demand rates. When the variability in production is not very high, the hedging points get
more separated from each other as the demand variability increases. When production variability is high,
the hedging points are first separated from each other and theget closer to each other as the demand
variability increases. These observations confirm a similar comment made by Tan (2001) for a small
system with two machine and two demand states.
5.5.2.5 Flatness of the Objective Function and Effect of Cost Ratio on Flatness
From the simulation runs of Example 5.5.3, we have also observed that as the ratioc+/c− gets smaller,
that is the system has very low holding cost compared to its shortage cost, the objective function value
does not change much with considerable increases in hedgingpoi ts. This is very intuitive since the
holding cost is very low, a large increase in the hedging level is reflected to the cost function with a
relatively very small effect. Moreover, for a given ratio ofc+/c−, the objective function is flatter near the
optimum points and its flatness increases as the number of hedging points increases.
5.5.2.6 Non-convexity of the Objective Function
As also mentioned in Brémaud et al. (1997) the objective functio (5.1) is generally not convex in systems
with two or more non-deficient machine states. Figure 5.5(a)shows the nonconvex average cost function
with respect to hedging points of machine states 3 and 4 of Example 5.5.1; whereas Figure 5.5(b) depicts
its level sets. Despite this non-convexity, we reached to the same final solution for Examples 5.5.1 and
5.5.2 when we started from several different initial points. In comparison, in Example 5.5.3 when we
started from different initial points, we reached to different final points which is not unexpected when
dealing with nonconvex functions. As mentioned earlier, inthe absence of convexity, a nonlinear opti-
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mization program like E04UCC (rather than a specialized global ptimization code) can only guarantee
to find a local optimum which may or may not be a global optimum.In addition, we should point out that
we did not encounter any numerical difficulties in finding thelocal optimal solutions even in large sys-
tems despite the nonconvex nature of the objective function. We also note that at different local optimal
solutions, the objective function values are very close to each other suggesting also multiple optima.
5.5.2.7 Clustering Effect on Hedging Points
It can be observed from the optimal solutions of Examples 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 (Tables 5.6 and 5.8) that the
optimal hedging points of some system states are very close to each other and form clusters. We have
observed this behavior in several systems that we experimented with. Unfortunately, how to correctly
predict which hedging points will form clusters is not obvious from the problem data in general. It mostly
depends on the topology of the transition diagrams and the transi ion rates of machine and demand states.
5.5.3 Optimization of Constrained Production Control Problems
In this part, we report the results of two more numerical experim nts. We modified our unconstrained











s.t. Pblog(z)≤ δ .
How to modify (5.7) and (5.8) to account for the change of objectiv function is almost trivial and
omitted. As mentioned earlier, the constraint functionPblog(z) is the long run proportion of time that the
system is in backlog state and it is desirable to keep it belowa pre-specified constantδ . As T gets large,
the long run proportion of time that the system is in backlog state can be computed asPblog(z) = B(T)/T,
whereB(T) is the cumulative time the system spends in backlog duringT. Similar to the recursive
expressions (5.7) and (5.8), forC(tn+1) and∂C(tn+1)/∂zi j , respectively, it is possible to write recursive
expressions forB(tn+1) and∂B(tn+1)/∂zi j as follows:
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How these can be incorporated to the IPA algorithm in Appendix 5.D is trivial and omitted.
Figure 5.6(a) shows thePblog(z) function of the system of Example 5.5.1 which is again nonconvex,
as one can clearly see from its level sets in Figure 5.6(b). Therefore, it is possible that when we start from
different initial points, we may find different local optimal solutions which will indeed be the case for
Examples 5.5.5 and 5.5.6 as explained below. We will explainthat, in Example 5.5.5, this multiplicity
is actually caused by multiple optima. Unfortunately, as inExample 5.5.6, it is not generally possible
to know the source of such multiplicity without additional tes ing; i.e., whether it is due to several local
isolated optima or multiple optima or both. Again, we also shuld note that despite the non-convexity
of Pblog(z), we did not encounter any numerical difficulties in our experim nts in solving even larger
problems.
Upon observing how flat both the objective function and the constraint around the solution points, we
used 10−5 asOptTol in Examples 5.5.5 and 5.5.6 below. In the presence of nonlinear constraints, one
needs to specify an additional parameter,ConsTol, which is a measure of largest constraint violation that
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Figure 5.5: Cost function of Example 5.5.1 with respect to hedging points of machine states 3 and 4
Example 5.5.5. (Probabilistically Constrained Problem of Example 5.5.2)
















































Figure 5.6:Pblog(z) of Example 5.5.1 with respect to the hedging points of machine states 3 and 4
Here, we solved the probabilistically constrained problemfor the system of Example 5.5.2 (of Section
5.5.1) withδ = 0.05. Note thatδ is equal to 0.090910 at the optimal hedging level for the unconstrained
problem. In Table 5.11, it can be seen that when we start from different initial points (A and B), we
find different optimal solutions (z∗A andz
∗
B, respectively). In Table 5.11, the more significant differenc s
between the optimum hedging levels appear to be inz∗34 andz
∗
44. In order to understand better the behavior
of the objective function and the constraint, we draw both functions with respect toz34 andz44 by keeping
the other hedging points at their optimal levels reached from the initial point B; see Figures 5.7(a) and
5.7(b). The contour lines of these functions illustrated inF gure 5.7(c) show that the lowest contour
line of the cost function lying belowPblog(z) = 0.05 is at 13.253 and it overlaps with the contour line of
Pblog(z) = 0.05 at a range of hedging points. In this range, whilez44 is anywhere above 27,z34 can vary
between 30 and 32 and from the performance side, all these points are equally good. We mark this range
using a bold box in Figure 5.7(c). Indeed, both optimal soluti ns reported in Table 5.11 are located in
that box, illustrating a case of multiple optima.
Example 5.5.6. (Probabilistically Constrained Problem of Example 5.5.3)
We also solve the probabilistically constrained problem for the system of Example 5.5.3 (of Section
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contours of Cost function 
contours of Pblog function 
Figure 5.7: Average cost andPblog(z) of Example 5.5.5 with respect toz34 andz34.
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Machine states 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
Demand states 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 JT(z) Pblog(z)
Initial point A 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 2.812 0.261616
Initial point B 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 20.596 0.036370
z∗A 12.22 15.54 30.43 30.95 9.37 13.50 27.05 41.13 13.259 0.050000
z∗B 12.22 15.62 30.30 31.41 9.41 13.53 27.29 28.03 13.253 0.050000
Initial point N Total CPU time
A 46 19 min 43 sec
B 30 12 min 59 sec
Table 5.11: Optimal solution and the run-time information fr Example 5.5.5
5.5.1) withδ = 0.05. The results are shown in Table 5.12. Similar to Example 5.5.5, when we start
from different initial points, we find different optimal solutions with very similar performances. In the
absence of other constraints and/or other selection criteria, one can choose any one of these local optimal
solutions since all perform equally well.
5.6 Conclusions
We investigated the problem of finding optimal hedging points a stochastic fluid model of a produc-
tion/inventory system by simulation-based optimization.The model is fairly general in terms of the num-
ber of machine and demand states and state transitions. On the modeling and simulation side, a GSMP
representation provided a general and transparent description for the evolution of the system and was
crucial for obtaining sample-path derivatives. On the optimization side, an implementation of sample-
path optimization enabled us to optimize systems with more than wenty hedging points and probabilistic
constraints.
The empirical performance of sample-path optimization in our numerical examples is very satisfac-
tory. For small problems, the optimal solution always coincides with previously reported solutions. For
large problems, although there are no reported benchmark solutions, the solutions obtained always pass
a number of consistency checks. This is very promising for other potential applications of this approach
and we consider it another encouraging sign that sample-path optimization will contribute to the solution
of difficult problems with several variables and/or constraints. Furthermore, from our numerical exper-
iments, we obtain insights on the structure of optimal hedging points for much larger systems than is
usually reported in the literature. In particular, we observe that production and demand variability has an
important effect on the optimal threshold levels of a system. As the production and demand variability
increases, the optimal threshold levels also increase to hold enough safety stock against the uncertainty
in production and demand rates. Moreover, as the utilization of a system converges to one, the optimal
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Machine Demand Initial Initial Initial





4 1 5.00 10.00 20.00 57.92 25.71 26.88
4 2 5.00 10.00 20.00 26.43 28.56 24.82
4 3 5.00 10.00 20.00 64.33 49.75 40.39
4 4 5.00 10.00 20.00 82.52 52.16 37.49
5 1 5.00 10.00 20.00 25.85 28.26 28.12
5 2 5.00 10.00 20.00 26.65 34.22 28.56
5 3 5.00 10.00 20.00 69.72 48.23 39.02
5 4 5.00 10.00 20.00 75.45 52.24 38.01
7 1 5.00 10.00 20.00 14.32 15.22 14.97
7 2 5.00 10.00 20.00 16.97 16.78 16.59
7 3 5.00 10.00 20.00 45.99 42.67 30.05
7 4 5.00 10.00 20.00 40.13 39.54 32.70
8 1 5.00 10.00 20.00 15.25 14.64 14.48
8 2 5.00 10.00 20.00 17.38 17.98 17.44
8 3 5.00 10.00 20.00 42.78 29.03 29.57
8 4 5.00 10.00 20.00 58.12 39.23 29.48
9 1 5.00 10.00 20.00 15.25 15.69 15.61
9 2 5.00 10.00 20.00 17.56 16.31 20.75
10 1 5.00 10.00 20.00 21.78 22.56 21.32
10 2 5.00 10.00 20.00 21.99 14.53 23.02
10 3 5.00 10.00 20.00 65.56 45.69 37.79
10 4 5.00 10.00 20.00 75.00 42.19 35.19
JT(z) 3.590 7.816 16.958 16.655 16.615 16.586
Pblog(z) 0.193072 0.123462 0.057995 0.050000 0.050000 0.050000
Initial point N Total CPU time
A 79 1h 45 min 18 sec
B 50 1h 07 min 14 sec
C 87 1h 56 min 38 sec
Table 5.12: Optimal solution and the run-time information fr Example 5.5.6
threshold levels get close to each other and converge to a single threshold level.
The hedging point policy in the context of manufacturing flowcontrol is an example of a general
class of policies for stochastic fluid systems where the optimal control (i.e., controllable flow rate) for
each state of the external stochastic process depends on a single threshold parameter expressed as the
quantity of fluid in some buffer (inventory or queue). The flowrate is then adjusted depending on this
threshold. A number of other interesting and important problems, other than manufacturing flow control,
fall into this framework. In production/marketing problems involving dynamic pricing, the optimal price
may vary as a function of thresholds (i.e., decrease price ifinventory is higher than a threshold). In
192 5.6. Conclusions
subcontracting/manufacturing problems, when to subcontract depends on the current inventory (or order
queue) level (i.e., use a subcontractor when the number of waiting orders exceeds a threshold). Similarly,
in several admission control or routing problems in telecommunications, there is typically a threshold
type policy structure (i.e., admit new arrivals of a given class if the buffer is lower than a threshold, reject
otherwise). Our general approach should be applicable to such problems with certain modifications.
In addition, there are other important classes of stochastic op imization problems that are not typically
modelled by stochastic fluid models but that involve the optimization of a finite number of threshold
parameters in terms of certain buffer quantities. In revenue management, which fare classes to open are
typically determined by (possibly time-dependent) thresholds on the number of seats/resources available.
Even though these problems may require different approaches for simulation and derivative estimation,
the performance of sample-path optimization in our numerical results indicates that it is a promising
approach for the optimization side of such problems.
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5.A Proof of Stability Condition in Eq. (5.3)
Recall that the state of the system at time t is(α(t),β (t)) whereα(t) is the state of the machine (α t) =
1,2, . . . ,K) andβ (t) is the state of the demand (β (t) = 1,2, . . . ,M), and the number of possible states
of the system isKM, counting all combinations of(α(t),β (t)). Tan (2002b) shows how a system with
two machine states and two demand states can be represented by an equivalent system with four machine
states coping with a constant demand rate. Below we generaliz th s basic idea for a system withKM
states.
Consider a system statek= (i, j) whereα(t) = i,β (t) = j. Let r̃k = r i +∑Mi=1di −d j be the maximum
production rate andpk = ∑Mi=1di −d j be the minimum production rate associated with statek. Let d̃ =
∑Mi=1di be the constant demand rate in the equivalent representation. Then we can label statek as deficient
if r̃k < d̃, non-deficient if ˜rk > d̃, and zero if ˜rk = d̃. This way statek= (i, j) gets the same label in both
representations:
i) deficient: if r̃k < d̃ thenr i +∑Mi=1 di −d j < ∑Mi=1 di andr i < d j ,
ii) non-deficient: if ˜rk > d̃ thenr i +∑Mi=1 di −d j > ∑Mi=1 di andr i > d j ,
iii ) zero: if r̃k = d̃ thenr i +∑Mi=1 di −d j = ∑Mi=1 di andr i = d j .
Let ṽ(t) denote the actual production rate and ˜u(t) = ṽ(t)− d̃ denote the fill-in rate at timet in the
equivalent representation; fill-in rate specifies the totalrate of change in the inventory level process at






r̃k if X(t)< zk
d̃ if X(t) = zk
pk if X(t)> zk
and for deficient states ˜v(t) = r̃k regardless of the inventory position.





r̃k− d̃ = r i −d j if X(t)< zk
d̃− d̃ = 0 if X(t) = zk
pk− d̃ =−d j if X(t)> zk
and for deficient states ˜u(t) = r̃k − d̃ = r i − d j < 0 which again coincide with the fill-in rate,u(t) =
v(t)−dβ(t), of the original system representation.
Now, let φk (k = 1,2, ..,KM) denote the stationary probability of being in system statek = (i, j).
Brémaud et al. (1997) show that a sufficient condition for stability of a system withKM machine states
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φkr̃k > d̃. (5.13)
The left side of (5.13) isE[r̃], the expected maximum production rate of the system. ˜rk is a random
variable satisfying ˜rk = r i + d̃−d j . Hence,E[r̃] = E[r]+ d̃−E[d] with E[r] being the expected maximum
production rate of the machine andE[d] being the expected demand. If we letπi (i = 1,2, . . . ,K) to
denote the stationary probability of being in machine statei ndq j ( j = 1,2, . . . ,M) denote the stationary
probability distribution of being in demand statej, then we can calculateE[r] andE[d] as follows:E[r] =









q jd j .
5.B Similarity Properties
The sample path (obtained by fixingω ∈ Ω) of the underlying stochastic process operated at the base
hedging vectorz is called thenominal path. The sample path (with the sameω) of the same process
operated at a perturbed hedging vectorz+∆zi j is called theperturbed path. Whenever we would like to
indicate the value of a quantity in the perturbed path, we will put a superscriptp to the corresponding
quantity in the nominal path. For example,tpn denotes the occurrence time of thenth event andXp(t)
denotes the inventory level at timet, in the perturbed path.
Definition 5.B.1. A nominal path and a perturbed path aresimilar in [0, tk] if the order of events in the
nominal path,[0, tk], is the same as the order of events in the perturbed path,[0,
p
k ].
As mentioned in Section 5.4, “similarity” of a nominal path and a perturbed path is a standard issue
one needs to deal with when developing IPA algorithms and we address it in detail in this appendix.
In particular, we show that along any sample path of finite length, sayk events, with min{τn|n =
1,2, . . . ,k} > 0, there is always a∆zi j > 0 (or ∆zi j < 0, whose size depends on the sample path) small
enough such that increasing (decreasing)z by ∆zi j does not cause any event order change; that is, the
perturbed path and the nominal path are similar.
To this end, notice that, under our the “hit and stick” assumption, if tn corresponds to the eventU H
or DH , the length of time thatX(t) spends atzi j (as a consequence of thenth event),τn+1 satisfies:
τn+1 ≥ ε > 0. In addition to “hit and stick”, in the arguments below, without loss of generality we
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assume that eitherT (total simulation time) or the initial conditions are chosen in a way that ensures the
end of simulation eventT f does not coincide with any other event.
Lemma 5.B.2. Assume that the nominal and the perturbed paths (with an initial perturbation of∆zi j )
are similar in[0, tk]. Then for all n (n= 1,2, . . . ,k), the machine and demand states in the nominal path at
the nth event time are equal to the machine and demand states in the perturbed path at the corresponding
event time. That isα(tn) = α p(tpn ) andβ (tn) = β p(tpn ) for all n (n= 1,2, . . . ,k). Furthermore, if e∗(tn) ∈
{MF ,DG }, then tn+1 = t
p
n+1 and e
∗(tpn ) = MF (if e∗(tn) = MF ) or e∗(t
p
n ) = DG (if e∗(tn) = DG )
for all n (n= 1,2, . . . ,k).
Proof: The proof is by induction on the event instancestn and is omitted.
Lemma 5.B.3.Assume that the nominal and the perturbed paths (with an initial perturbation of∆zi j ) are
similar in [0, tk]. Then Xp(t)−X(t)≤ ∆zi j , ∀t ∈ [0, tk]. Furthermore, at all event times tn (n= 1,2, . . . ,k),
we have Xp(tpn )−X(tn) = ∆zi j or Xp(tpn )−X(tn) = 0.
Proof: We will only prove the second part of the lemma (the first part is an easy consequence) and will
argue through induction. We start the induction at timet0 = 0 with α(0) = i,β (0) = j, and X(0) =
Xp(0) = x0. Without loss of generality, we assume thati j is a non-deficient system state. (Because in
that case all possible events{MF ,U H ,DH ,DG ,T f } may occur; whereas in zero or deficient states,
only a subset of these events can take place.)
If e∗(t0) ∈ {MF ,DG ,T f }, thent1 = t
p
1 = τ1 = τ
p
1 andX(t1) = X
p(tp1 ). If e
∗(t0) = U H , we should
haveX(0) = Xp(0) = x0 < zi j and u(t1) = r i − d j . With an initial perturbation of∆zi j , we gettp1 =
t1+∆zi j/(r i −d j) andXp(tp1 ) =X(t1)+∆zi j . Similarly, if e
∗(t0)=DH , we should haveX(0)=Xp(0) =
x0 > zi j andu(t1) =−d j . With ∆zi j as initial perturbation, we gettp1 = t1−∆zi j /d j andX
p(tp1 ) = X(t1)+
∆zi j .
Now assume that the stated property holds until (and including) the event transition timestn andt
p
n .
Let α(tn) = k and β (tn) = m. By Lemma 5.B.2, we haveα p(tpn ) = k andβ p(tpn ) = m. Next observe
that we only need to consider the case wherek = i andm= j, because the others will leave everything
unchanged.
We first consider the caseX(tn) = Xp(t
p
n ). If the last event attn−1 is MF or DG , that ise∗(tn−1) ∈
{MF ,DG }, then by Lemma 5.B.2, we havetn = t
p
n . Hence, the induction step is the same as the
beginning step. Ife∗(tn−1)∈ {U H ,DH }, as we are in statekmwith k= i andm= j, the corresponding
inventory levels atn andt
p
n should beX(tn) = zi j andXp(t
p
n ) = zi j +∆zi j ; this is a contradiction. Hence,
we can conclude that ifX(tn) = Xp(t
p
n ), thene∗(tn−1) ∈ {MF ,DG } and the induction step will be the
same as the beginning step.
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Next, we consider the caseXp(tpn ) = X(tn)+∆zi j . We again need to differentiate two cases in which
the last event can be either in{MF ,DG } or {U H ,DH }.
If e∗(tn−1) ∈ {MF ,DG }, then by Lemma 5.B.2, we havetn = t
p
n . Now we need to consider the
possible events attn+1. If e∗(tn) ∈ {MF ,DG ,T f }, then τn+1 = τ pn+1. Since the system states are
also the same,Xp(tpn ) andX(tn) will change equal amounts; that isu(tn) = up(t
p
n ). Using X(tn+1) =
X(tn)+ τn+1u(tn), we getXp(tpn+1) = X(tn+1)+∆zi j . If e
∗(tn) ∈ {DH ,U H }, as we are in statekm
with k = i andm= j, the corresponding inventory levels attn+1 and t
p
n+1 should beX(tn+1) = zi j and
Xp(tpn+1) = zi j +∆zi j ; hence the induction step holds.
If e∗(tn−1) ∈ {DH ,U H }, then the next event could beMF ,DG , or T f ; i.e., e∗(tn) ∈
{MF ,DG ,T f}. Since the system will stay at its hedging level until the next event, andXp(t
p
n ) and
X(tn) will stay at the same levels withu(tn) = up(t
p
n ) = 0. Therefore,Xp(t
p
n+1) = X(tn+1)+∆zi j and the
induction step again holds.
Remark5.B.4. As a direct consequence of Lemma 5.B.3, we know that we can always select∆zi j > 0
small enough such that ifX(tn) ≥ 0 (or X(tn) < 0), thenXp(t
p
n ) ≥ 0 (or Xp(t
p
n ) < 0, respectively). This
ensures that when∆zi j > 0, I{X(tn(z)≥0)} = I{X(tn(z+∆zi j )≥0)} andI{X(tn(z)<0)} = I{X(tn(z+∆zi j )<0)} for anyn.
Similarly as a consequence of Lemma 5.B.3, we can always select ∆zi j < 0 small enough such that
if X(tn) > 0 (or X(tn) < 0), thenXp(t
p
n ) > 0 (or Xp(t
p
n ) < 0 , respectively). WhenX(tn) = 0, e∗(tn−1)
has to be eitherDH or U H . In either case, we getXp(tpn ) = 0 as well. In order to see thate∗(tn−1)
cannot beMF ,DG , or T f , note thatX(tn) = 0 meansτn = |X(tn−1)un−1|. This in turn would mean
|X(tn−1)un−1| = argmin{WM(tn−1),WD(tn−1),T − tn−1} whose probability is zero since the probability
of a continuous random variable being equal to a specific value is always zero.
Theorem 5.B.5. ∃ ε0 > 0 such that if any threshold zi j is perturbed less thanε0 (i.e., |∆zi j | < ε0), then
the nominal and the perturbed paths are similar.
Proof: Let ∆zi j > 0 be the initial perturbation. We will argue inductively as follows. LetX(t0) = X(0) =
Xp(0) and let the initial machine stateα(0) = k andβ (0) = m where without loss of generality,km is
assumed to be a non-deficient state. First note that, ifkm 6= i j thene∗(t0) = e∗(t
p
0 ), t1 = t
p
1 , andX(t1) =
Xp(tp1 ) trivially. Therefore, we consider the case where the perturbation is associated with the hedging
point km= i j ; that iszpkm= zkm+∆zkm, with ∆zkm> 0. By Lemma 5.B.2, we know thate
∗(tp0 ) = MF
if e∗(t0) = MF or e∗(t
p
0 ) = DG if e
∗(t0) = DG ; henceX(t1) = Xp(t
p
1 ) andt1 = t
p
1 trivially. The only
interesting case happens ife∗(t0) ∈ {U H ,DH ,T f}.
If e∗(t0) = U H , then this implies thatX(t0)< zkm andt1 = τ1 = (zkm−X(0))/u(t0). Now, the pos-
sible events in the perturbed path are on{MF ,DG ,U H , Tf}. If e∗(t
p





D(tp0 ), or T, respectively. Ife




1 = t1+∆zkm/u(t0) as illustrated
in Figure 5.8(a). We need to show that if we select∆zkm small enough, an event other thanU H does not
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occur on the perturbed path; that ise∗(tp0 ) = U H . This can be guaranteed ifW
M(tp0 )> t1+∆zkm/u(t0),
WD(tp0 )> t1+∆zkm/u(t0), andT > t1+∆zkm/u(t0). It is obvious that we can always ensure these condi-
tions by selecting∆zkm such that∆zkm< min{u(t0)(WM(tp0 )− t1),u(t0)(W
D(tp0 )− t1),u(t0)(T − t1)}.
If e∗(t0) = DH , then this implies thatX(t0) > zkm and t1 = τ1 = (X(0) − zkm)/ −
u(t0). Since e∗(t0) = DH , we know that t1 = τ1 < min{WM(t0),WD(t0),T}. The
possible events for the perturbed path this time are{MF ,DG ,DH , and Tf} and
e∗(tp0 ) = argmin{W
M(tp0 ),W




0 ) = W
M(t0), and (X(0) − (zkm + ∆zkm))/ − u(t0) < t1 from Figure 5.8(b), we get
e∗(tp0 ) = DH .
If e∗(t0) = Tf thent1 = τ1 = T. We should consider two cases here:
(a) In caseX(t0)< zkm as illustrated in Figure 5.8 (a), we know thatt1 =T <min{WM(t0),WD(t0),(zkm−
X(0))/u(t0)}. The possible events for the perturbed path are{MF ,DG ,U H , and Tf} and
e∗(tp0 ) = argmin{W
M(tp0 ),W
D(tp0 ),((zkm+∆zkm)−X(0))/u(t0),T}. Sincee
∗(t0) = Tf , it is easy




M(t0), andT < ((zkm+∆zkm)−X(0))/u(t0);
therefore we gete∗(tp0 ) = Tf .
(b) In case X(t0) > zkm as illustrated in Figure 5.8 (b), we know thatt1 = τ1 = T <
min{WM(t0),WD(t0),(X(0) − zkm)/ − u(t0)}. The possible events for the perturbed path
are {MF ,DG ,DH , and Tf} and e∗(t
p
0 ) = argmin{W
M(tp0 ),W
D(tp0 ),((X(0) − (zkm +
∆zkm))/(−u(t0)),T}. We need to show that if we select∆zkm small enough, an event other than
Tf does not occur on the perturbed path; that ise∗(t
p
0 ) = Tf . This can be guaranteed ifT <W
M(tp0 ),




M(t0) sincee∗(t0) = Tf . We can also ensure thatT < ((X(0)− (zkm+∆zkm))/(−u(t0))
holds by selecting∆zkm small enough (0< ∆zkm< (X(0)−zkm+u(t0)T)). This proves the first step
of the induction.
We now assume that the nominal path and the perturbed path aresimilar until (and including) the event
timestn andt
p
n . Let α(tn) = k andβ (tn) = m. By Lemma 5.B.2, we haveα p(tpn ) = k andβ p(tpn ) = m.




By the argument in Lemma 5.B.3, we know that the similarity ofthe paths until thenth event implies
that Xp(tpn ) = X(tn) or Xp(t
p
n ) = X(tn)+∆zi j . First assume that,Xp(tpn ) = X(tn). If i j = km, then we
know from the proof of Lemma 5.B.3 thate∗(tn−1) = e∗(t
p
n−1) ∈ {MF ,DG } which implies thatn = t
p
n .
Also if i j 6= km and if e∗(tn−1) = e∗(t
p
n−1) ∈ {MF ,DG }, thentn = t
p
n . In both cases,Xp(t
p
n ) = X(tn)
andtn = t
p
n ; hence the rest of the argument is identical to the first step of the induction and the next events
are identical. We now focus on the case wherei j 6= kmbut e∗(tn−1) = e∗(t
p
n−1) ∈ {U H ,DH }. This
implies thate∗(tn) ande∗(t
p
n ) can only be a machine or demand state transition or end of simulation, on
both nominal and perturbed paths; hencee∗(tn) = e∗(t
p
n ).
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Figure 5.8: Similarity of nominal and perturbed paths in[0, t1]
Next assume that,Xp(tpn ) = X(tn)+∆zi j . Here, we again need to consider two casesi j = km and
i j 6= kmseparately.
In case i j 6= km, e∗(tn−1) = e∗(t
p




{U H ,DH } then X(tn) = Xp(t
p
n ) = zkm and by Lemma 5.B.2 we havet
p
n = tn. By Lemma 5.B.2,
again e∗(tpn ) = MF if e∗(tn) = MF and e∗(t
p
n ) = DG if e∗(tn) = DG . If e∗(tn) = U H (i.e.,
X(tn) < zkm), then τn+1 = (zkm− X(tn))/u(tn). The possible events for the perturbed path are in
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{MF ,DG ,U H ,T{} and we can always select∆zi j small enough such thatXp(t
p
n ) = X(tn)+∆zi j <
zkm. Sincee∗(tn) = U H , we know thatτn+1 < min{WM(tn),WD(tn),T − tn}. We also know that






n ))/u(tn),T − t
p
n}. SinceWM(tn) = WM(t
p
n ),WD(tn) =




n ))/u(tn)< τn+1 as illustrated in Figure 5.9(a), we get∗(tpn ) =
U H . If e∗(tn) = DH (i.e., X(tn) > zkm), thenτn+1 = (X(tn)− zkm)/(−u(tn)). The possible events
for the perturbed path are in{MF ,DG ,DH ,T{} (U H is excluded sinceX
p(tpn ) > X(tn) > zkm).




n ), or T − t
p
n , respectively. Ife∗(t
p
n ) = DH
then τ pn+1 = (X
p(tpn )− zkm)/(−u(tn)) which implies thatτ pn+1 = τn+1 +∆zi j /(−u(tn)) as illustrated in
Figure 5.9(b). We need to show that if we select∆zi j infinitesimally small enough, an event other
than DH does not occur on the perturbed path, that ise∗(tpn ) = DH . This will be ensured if
WM(tpn )> τn+1+∆zi j/(−u(tn)),WM(tpn )> τn+1+∆zi j /(−u(tn)), andT−tpn > τn+1+∆zi j/(−u(tn)). It is
obvious that we can always ensure these conditions by selecting ∆zi j such that∆zi j < min{−(WM(tpn )−
τn+1)u(tn),−(WD(tpn )− τn+1)u(tn),−(T − tpn − τn+1)u(tn)}.
In case i j = km, we haveXp(tpn ) = X(tn) + ∆zkm. First consider the case wheree∗(tn−1) =
e∗(tpn−1) ∈ {MF ,DG }; then we havet
p
n = tn by Lemma 5.B.2. By Lemma 5.B.2 again,e∗(t
p
n ) =
MF if e∗(tn) = MF or e∗(t
p
n ) = DG if e∗(tn) = DG . If e∗(tn) = U H (i.e., X(tn) < zkm), then
τn+1 = (zkm−X(tn))/u(tn). The possible events for the perturbed path are in{MF ,DG ,U H ,T{}
(DH is excluded sinceXp(tpn ) = X(tn) + ∆zkm < zkm+ ∆zkm). Sincee∗(tn) = U H , we know that
τn+1 < min{WM(tn),WD(tn),T − tn}. We also know thate∗(tpn ) = argmin{WM(tpn ),WD(tpn ),((zkm+
∆zkm)− Xp(tpn ))/u(tn),T − tpn}. SinceWM(tn) = WM(tpn ), WD(tn) = WD(tpn ),T − tn = T − tpn , and
((zkm+ ∆zkm)−Xp(tpn ))/u(tn) = τn+1, we gete∗(tpn ) = U H . The argument is similar for the case
e∗(tn)=DH with τn+1 =(Xp(tpn )−(zkm+∆zkm))/(−u(tn)). We now consider the case where∗(tn−1)=
e∗(tpn−1)∈ {U H ,DH }. This implies thate
∗(tn) ande∗(t
p
n ) can only be a machine or demand state tran-
sition or end of simulation, on both nominal and perturbed paths; hencee∗(tn) = e∗(t
p
n ). This completes
the induction argument.
The case with∆zi j < 0 can be argued similarly.
5.C Proofs of Lemmas in Section 5.4 for Gradient Estimation
Proof of Lemma 5.4.2. Observe that at any event timetn, r(en+1, tn) is equal to either one of 0, 1,r i −d j ,
or−d j for somei and j. Thusr(en+1, tn) is a function ofr i andd j for somei, j andtn. Of those variables
only tn depends on the hedging points. As a consequence of similarity fo small enough∆z, tn(z+∆zyi j )






r(en+1, tn(z+∆zyi j ))− r(en+1, tn(z))
∆z
= 0.
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Figure 5.9: Similarity of nominal and perturbed paths in[tn, tn+1]
Proof of Lemma 5.4.3. Similar to Lemma 5.4.2.
Proof of Lemma 5.4.4. Sinceu(t) is constant between adjacent events, we haveX(tn) = X(tn−1) +
u(tn−1)τn. From Lemma 5.4.3, we know that∂u(tn−1)/∂zi j is 0; hence the result follows.
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Proof of Lemma 5.4.5. Recall thatWM(tn) = WM(tn−1)− τn andWD(tn) = WD(tn−1)− τn. The result
follows by taking the partial derivatives of these equations atz.





WM(tn) if en+1 = MF ,
zα(tn)β(tn)−X(tn) if en+1 = U H ,
X(tn)−zα(tn)β(tn) if en+1 = DH ,
WD(tn) if en+1 = DG ,
T − tn if en+1 = T f .
The result follows immediately.
Proof of Lemma 5.4.7. Direct consequence of (5.6) and Lemma 5.4.2.
Proof of Lemma 5.4.8. Since we start at timet0 = 0, we haveX(t0) = x0,WM(t0) =WM,WD(t0) =WD,
andC(t0) = 0. Clearly these are all independent ofzi j . Sincet1 = τ1 = k(e1, t0)/r(e1, t0), it is enough to
show the following facts aboutk(e1, t0) andr(e1, t0): (a) r(e1, t0) 6= 0; (b) r(e1, t0) has partial derivatives
atz for all zandi = 1, . . . ,K, j = 1, . . . ,M, which are finite; (c)k(e1, t0) has partial derivatives atz for all
z and i = 1, . . . ,K, j = 1, . . . ,M, which are finite. Since1 ∈ E(t0), (a) is immediate from the definition
of E(t) and (b) follows from Lemma 5.4.2. To see (c), observe thatE(t0) = {MF ,U H ,DG ,T f} or





WM if e1 = MF ,
zα(t0)β(t0)−x0 if e1 = U H ,
x0−zα(t0)β(t0) if e1 = DH ,
WD if e1 = DG ,
T − t0 if e1 = T f .
Thusk(e1, t0) is a differentiable function ofzi j for i = 1, . . . ,K, j = 1, . . . ,M whose partial derivative is
−1,0, or 1.
Proof of Lemma 5.4.9. From Lemma 5.B.3 in Appendix 5.B, we haveX(ω , tn(z+∆zi j ))−X(ω , tn(z))≤
∆zi j . Then|C(ω , tn(z+∆zi j ))−C(ω , tn(z))| ≤ tn|∆zi j |(c++c−). Hence|C(ω ,T(z+∆zi j ))−C(ω ,T(z))| ≤
T|∆zi j |(c++c−) and|JT(ω ,z+∆zi j )−JT(ω ,z)| ≤ |∆zi j |(c++c−). Therefore
|
JT(ω ,z+∆zi j )−JT(ω ,z)
∆zi j
| ≤ (c++c−).
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5.D Pseudo Code for Simulation and IPA Algorithm
5.D.1 Variables and Procedures
Let wMi be the mean holding time in machine statei andw
D
j be the mean holding time in demand statej.
We use sample(µ) to denote a sample taken from a prescribed distribution with meanµ .
The following events are defined for the GSMP representationwhen the current state isαβ :
MF : the end of the sojourn time of the current machine state
U H : reaching the hedging point of current system state from below
DH : reaching the hedging point of current system state from above
DG : the end of the sojourn time of the current demand state
T f : end of simulation.
The following notation and procedures are used in the simulation/gradient estimation algorithm:
INF : A very large constant
t : Current time
τ : Time to occurrence of triggering event
M : Number of demand states
K : Number of machine states
α : Current machine state
β : Current demand state
d j : Rate of the demand statej
zi j : Hedging point of statei j
r i : Maximum production rate of machine statei
v : Current actual production rate of the system
u : Current fill-in-rate of the system
X : Current inventory level of the system
Xprev : Previous inventory level of the system
cost : Current cumulative cost of the system
Avg cost : Average cost of the system
No Events : Number of possible events
E[i] : Possible Eventi, i = 1,2, . . . ,No Events
T[i] : Time to occurrence ofE[i]
K∗ : Index of triggering event
WM : Time to occurrence of eventMF
WD : Time to occurrence of eventDG
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Tremain : Time to occurrence of eventT f
tsim : Total simulation time
x0 : Initial inventory level
α0 : Initial machine state
β0 : Initial demand state
Csum[i][ j] : Accumulator of∂C/∂zi j
Tsum[i][ j] : Accumulator of∂ tn/∂zi j
Xsum[i][ j] : Accumulator of∂X(tn)/∂zi j
XPrevsum[i][ j] : Accumulator of∂X(tn−1)/∂zi j
WMsum[i][ j] : Accumulator of∂WM(tn)/∂zi j
WDsum[i][ j] : Accumulator of∂WD(tn)/∂zi j
Temp[i][ j] : Accumulator of∂τn/∂zi j
GenSys : Boolean variable which is 1 if it is a general system (M > 1), 0 otherwise
S[i][ j] : State of the system at machine statei and demand statej.
I{A } =
{
1 if A holds
0 otherwise.
Procedure: DetermineEvent Space()
E[0] = MF ; E[1] = U H ; E[2] = DH ;
IF (Gen Sys== 1) THEN{E[3] = DG ; E[4] = T f ; No Events= 4;}
ELSE{E[3] = T f ; No Events= 3;}
Procedure: DetermineStates()
FOR i=1 TO K DO
FOR j=1 TO M DO
{IF (r i < d j ) THEN S[i][ j] =‘deficient’;
ELSE IF (r i > d j ) THEN S[i][ j] =‘non-deficient’;
ELSE IF (r i == d j ) THEN S[i][ j] =‘zero’;}
Procedure: SetUv()
IF (S[α ][β ] ==‘non-deficient’) THEN
IF (X < zαβ ) THEN v= rα ;
ELSE IF (X == zαβ ) THEN v= dβ ;
ELSE IF (X > zαβ ) THEN v= 0;
ELSE IF (S[α ][β ] ==‘zero’) THEN
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IF (X > zαβ ) THEN v= 0; ELSEv= rα ;




t = 0; τ = 0; X = x0; Xprev= 0; Tremain= tsim; cost= 0;
IF (M > 1) THENGen Sys= 1; ELSEGenSys= 0 ;
DetermineEvent Space();
DetermineStates();
Choose initial machine stateα0 : α = α0; Choose initial demand stateβ0 : β = β0;
SetUv();
GenerateWM ∼ sample(wMα )
IF (Gen Sys== 1) THEN GenerateWD ∼ sample(wDβ )
0(IPA). Initialization:
FOR i=1 TO K DO
FOR j=1 TO M DO
{Csum[i][ j] = 0; Tsum[i][ j] = 0; Xsum[i][ j] = 0; XPrevsum[i][ j] = 0; WMsum[i][ j] = 0;
Temp[i][ j] = 0;
IF (GenSys== 1) THENWDsum[i][ j] = 0;}
1. Next Local Event:
T[0] =WM;
IF (S[α ][β ] ==‘non-deficient’) THEN
{IF (X < zαβ ) THEN { T[1] =
zαβ−X
u ; T[2] = INF; }
ELSE IF (X == zαβ ) THEN { T[1] = INF; T[2] = INF; }
ELSE IF (X > zαβ ) THEN { T[1] = INF; T[2] =
X−zαβ
−u ; }}
ELSE IF (S[α ][β ] ==‘zero’) THEN
{T[1] = INF;
IF (X > zαβ ) THEN T[2] =
X−zαβ
−u ; ELSET[2] = INF }
ELSE IF(S[α ][β ] ==‘deficient’) THEN
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{T[1] = INF; T[2] = INF}
IF (Gen Sys== 1) THEN{T[3] =WD; T[4] = Tremain;} ELSET[3] = Tremain;
2. Next Global Event:
K∗ =argmin(T [i] : i = 1,2, . . . ,No Events);
τ = T[K∗]; e∗ = E[K∗];
3A(IPA). Perturbation Generation:
Case:
e∗ = MF : FOR i=1 TO K DO
FOR j=1 TO M DO
Temp[i][ j] =WMsum[i][ j];
e∗ = U H :FOR i=1 TO K DO
FOR j=1 TO M DO
Temp[i][ j] = 1u(I{i=α , j=β}−XPrevsum[i][ j]);
e∗ = DH :FOR i=1 TO K DO
FOR j=1 TO M DO
Temp[i][ j] = 1−u(−I{i=α , j=β}+XPrevsum[i][ j]);
e∗ = DG :FOR i=1 TO K DO
FOR j=1 TO M DO
Temp[i][ j] =WDsum[i][ j];
e∗ = T f : FOR i=1 TO K DO
Temp[i][ j] =−Tsum[i][ j];
3B(IPA). Perturbation Update:
FOR i=1 TO K DO
FOR j=1 TO M DO
{Tsum[i][ j] = Tsum[i][ j]+Temp[i][ j];
Xsum[i][ j] = XPrevsum[i][ j]+u×Temp[i][ j];
IF e∗ = MF THENWMsum[i][ j] = 0; ELSEWMsum[i][ j] =WMsum[i][ j]−Temp[i][ j];
IF e∗ = DG THENWDsum[i][ j] = 0; ELSEWDsum[i][ j] =WDsum[i][ j]−Temp[i][ j];}
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4. Update:




































4A(IPA). Update Cost Perturbation:
FOR i=1 TO K DO
FOR j=1 TO M DO
{Csum[i][ j] = Csum[i][ j]+
I{Xprev≥0}I{X≥0}c
+[Xsum[i][ j]τ +XTemp[i][ j]−uτTemp[i][ j]]+
I{Xprev<0}I{X<0}c


















e∗ = MF : Generate new machine statek; α = k; GenerateWM ∼ sample(wMα );
e∗ = DG : Generate new demand statel ; β = l ; GenerateWD ∼ sample(wDβ );
IF (e∗ 6= MF ) THENWM =WM − τ ;
IF (Gen Sys== 1) THEN
IF (e∗ 6= DG ) THENWD =WD − τ ;
IF (e∗ = T f ) THEN GO TO Output;
ELSE IF (e∗ 6= T f ) THEN
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FOR i=1 TO K DO
FOR j=1 TO M DO
∂C/∂zi j =Csum[i][ j]/tsim;
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Gürkan, G.,Ö. Özdemir, and Y. Smeers (2012b). Strategic generation capacity choice under demand
uncertainty: analysis of Nash equilibria in electricity markets. Working Paper, Tilburg University,
Tilburg, The Netherlands.
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Summary
The wordstochasticis from a Greek origin and conveys the idea of “randomnes”. Itis used to indicate
that a particular subject or system contains random phenomen that obeys probabilistic, rather than de-
terministic, laws. The research in this thesis deals with modelling and solving some interesting stochastic
problems with contributions in two areas; namely in electricity markets and in production and inventory
control. To this aim, we utilize the theory and application of optimization and equilibrium problems and
simulation techniques in operations research. Chapter 2 provides the reader with the necessary back-
ground for the theory, methods, and mathematical notation used in the succeeding chapters.
One of the most interesting and recent applications in economics include electricity markets which
have experienced significant changes towards deregulationnd competition with the aim of improving
economic efficiency. Since the introduction of competitionn electricity markets by decentralization
of electricity generation, many interesting research question have been addressed in the intersection
of operations research and noncooperative game theory in economics. Most of these questions originate
from the challenges faced by regulators and policy makers due to the specific characteristics of electricity
markets. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the problem of generationcapacity investments in deregulated
electricity markets, which has gained a lot of attention since the concern about incentives to invest in
adequate generation capacity was raised in the literature as well as among policy makers.
In Chapter 3, we consider the problem of resource adequacy incompetitive electricity markets. Under
the old-style vertically integrated monopoly structure ofelectricity markets before deregulation, prices
were regulated and set to cover total costs and hence enable the utility to finance investment for sufficient
generation capacity to meet consumers’ current and projected electricity demand. Since deregulation,
the power generation sector has operated in a competitive enironment and the investments in power
generation capacity is no longer done by a central planner and are left to private companies responding
to current and expected market prices. Thus, long term planning of power generation capacity may
suffer from uncertainty and imperfections in the short-term (e.g., day ahead and real time) operation of
electricity markets. Initially, when liberalisation was introduced, policy makers held the view that energy-
only electricity markets would provide sufficient incentives for investment in new generation capacity.
However, experience with these energy-only markets have led policy makers to change their views and
raise the question whether these markets would provide sufficient incentives for investment or whether
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additional policy measures would be needed to ensure these investments and thereby security of supply
in competitive electricity markets. Parallel to the policydebate, many authors in the scientific literature
argue that important conditions for adequate generation capacity investments in energy-only electricity
markets are prices which are allowed to rise to the point where consumers would prefer to be shut off
instead of paying this price (i.e., the value of lost load (VOLL)) and sufficient flexibility in demand to
react to high prices. However, these conditions are not necessarily met in real energy-only electricity
markets. Due to the lack-of demand-side response (e.g., smart meters) for most of the consumers and
low and volatile spot market prices, reflecting short-run marginal costs and constrained by low price caps,
current energy-only electricity markets may not provide ince tives for investments in adequate generation
capacity.
Additional market mechanisms have been discussed in the literature to remedy the resource adequacy
problem in energy-only electricity markets. Chapter 3 provides analysis of three examples of these mar-
ket mechanisms under perfect competition: an energy-only electricity market with VOLL pricing or a
price cap, an electricity market with an additional forwardcapacity market, and an electricity market
with operating-reserve pricing. We elaborate on both how these market mechanisms can be represented
by mathematical models and the assessment of equilibrium for generation capacity investments under
different market designs when future spot market conditions are not known in advance (i.e., under de-
mand uncertainty). Under each market design, the investment decisions of generators are formulated as a
two-stage equilibrium problem where generation capacities ar installed in the first stage and generation
takes place in future spot market at the second stage. We emphasize the link between optimization and
equilibrium problems and show that, regarding the problem of generation capacity investments in per-
fectly competitive electricity markets, the equilibrium problems of most of these market mechanisms can
be cast as optimization problems (e.g., (non)linear programs, two-stage stochastic programs). In particu-
lar, this result indicates the prevalence of optimization problems, which are fast and efficient to solve, for
providing solutions to stochastic equilibrium models of real world systems with uncertainty. This result
also suggests that an equilibrium of a single-stage model (so calledopen loop model) in which investment
and operation decisions are made simultaneously coincideswith an equilibrium of a two-stage model (so
calledclosed loop model) where investment and operation decisions are made sequentially.
Two-stage equilibrium models with stochastic elements (e.g., demand uncertainty) may prove compu-
tationally challenging to solve due to the resulting large scale problems. We also utilize simulation-based
methods and provide detailed algorithmic approaches for numerically tackling all the models of these
different market designs. Our computational methods allows lving large-scale problems with several
uncertain parameters by utilizing deterministic off-the-shelf solvers. We also illustrate that these algo-
rithmic approaches help further reduce the computational time. Through numerical experiments, we
gain insights on the impact of demand uncertainty and to whatextend these different mechanisms can
remedy the resource adequacy issue. In particular, we show that uncertainty of demand leads to higher
total generation capacity investments and a broader mix of technologies compared to the investment de-
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cisions assuming average demand levels. Furthermore for the same VOLL level, energy-only markets
with VOLL pricing tend to lead to total generation capacity below the peak load with a certain probabil-
ity whereas energy markets with a forward capacity market oroperating-reserve pricing result in higher
investments, assuming random demand with finite support andno forced outages. Finally, the regulator
decisions (e.g., reserve capacity target) in capacity markets and operating-reserve pricing can be chosen
in such a way that results in very similar investment levels and fuel mix of generation capacities in both
market designs.
In Chapter 4, we again consider the problem of generation capacity investments in energy-only elec-
tricity markets but this time by strategic generators. Thus, we have a closed loop model where strategic
electricity generators anticipate perfectly competitivespot market outcomes with demand uncertainty
while choosing their capacities and their power generationis dispatched after the level of demand is
realized. In this case, an equilibrium of the closed loop model does not coincide with an equilibrium
of the less complicated open loop model. In general, such closed loop models can be formulated as an
equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) and examples have been posed in the literature
that have multiple or no equilibria. As a consequence, an equilibri m for the corresponding two-stage
game may not exist or, if exists, it is in general not unique. Therefore, it is of interest to define general
sets of conditions under which solutions exist and are unique, which would enhance the value of such
models for policy and market intelligence purposes. We consider various types of such a closed loop
model regarding the underlying price-demand relations (elastic and inelastic demand), the assumed de-
mand uncertainty with a broad class of continuous distributions, and any finite number of generators with
symmetric or asymmetric costs. We establish sufficient conditi s for the random demand’s probability
distribution which guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria in most of the cases of this closed
loop model. We identify a broad class of commonly used continuous probability distributions satisfying
these conditions. Establishing a set of general conditionsf r existence and uniqueness is desirable for
policy and market models including strategic firms so that users can have confidence in their solutions
before solving such complicated closed loop models. Furthermore, we also show that whether strategic
firms sell their power via central auction or bilateral contrac s in the competitive spot market, the cor-
responding closed loop games yield the same equilibrium, ifit exists. Thus, when the spot market is
perfectly competitive, different structures of buying andselling electricity do not affect the generation
capacity choices of strategic firms.
The final chapter of the thesis, Chapter 5, addresses a different stochastic problem which falls in
the field of production and inventory control. A number of important problems discussed in the litera-
ture under production and inventory control involve optimizat on of multiple target inventory levels or
hedging points in manufacturing systems. In such systems, the production and demand rates change ac-
cording to some stochastic process. According to the previous studies in the literature, derivation of the
closed-form analytical solution and finding the optimal hedging points are difficult for large scale pro-
duction systems with several production and demand states.Chapter 5 addresses the problem of finding
224 SUMMARY
the optimal hedging points in such a stochastic manufacturing flow control system whose dynamics can
be modelled using generalized semi-Markov processes (GSMP). The GSMP framework enables us to
compute several performance measures and their sensitivities from a single simulation run for a general
system with several states and fairly general state transitio . We then use a simulation-based optimiza-
tion method,sample-path optimization, for finding optimal hedging points. We report numerical results
for systems with more than twenty hedging points and service-lev l type probabilistic constraints. In
these numerical studies, our method performs quite well even on problems with nonconvex objective
functions and probabilistic constraints, which are considere very difficult to solve by current standards.
In addition, we obtain insights on the structure of optimal hedging points for much larger systems than
is usually reported in the literature. In particular, we observe that production and demand variability has
an important effect on the the optimal hedging point levels of a system. As the production and demand
variability increases, the optimal hedging point levels also increase to hold enough safety stock against
the uncertainty in production and demand rates. Furthermore, as the utilization of a system converges
to one, the optimal hedging point levels get close to each other and converge to a single hedging point
level. Although the main focus of Chapter 5 is the analysis ofa particular manufacturing flow control
problem, the scope of application for the developed techniques is potentially much wider; e.g., produc-
tion/marketing problems involving dynamic pricing, usingcapacity options and subcontracting strategies
in manufacturing problems, or admission control or routingproblems in telecommunications.
Finally, a key difficulty in decision making under uncertainty is in dealing with an uncertainty space
that is huge and frequently leads to very large-scale stochasti models. Thus, development of alternative
methods to find a solution to stochastic problems is an activearea of research. Among these, we utilize
a class of simulation-based methods, so calledsample-path methods(also known assample average
approximation methods), to solve the stochastic problems presented in Chapters 3 and 5. In sample-
path methods, a complex stochastic system is observed alongfixed sample path by using the method
of common random numbers from simulation literature. This way the underlying stochastic problem
is converted to a deterministic problem which provides an approximate solution to the solution of the
stochastic problem. The resulting deterministic problem is then solved by fast and effective deterministic
solution methods available and its solution is taken as an approximate solution of the original stochastic
problem. By using sample-path methods in Chapters 3 and 5, wecan solve large-scale problems with
several uncertain parameters by utilizing deterministic off-the-shelf solvers.
